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“Anyone who knows me is aware of my intolerance of 
mistakes ... When I come across an inaccuracy in a book 
written by somebody else, I become discouraged, wondering 
whether I can really learn something from an author who 
has already been proved wrong on at least one point.  When 
the errors concern me or my work, I become furious.  The 
reader of this volume can therefore readily imagine the 
agonies of embarrassment I am already enduring just 
through imagining dozens of serious mistakes being found 
by my friends and colleagues after publication and pointed 
out, whether gleefully or sorrowfully, to the perfectionist 
author.  In addition, I keep thinking of the legendary ﬁgure 
described to me … a Norwegian lighthouse keeper who has 
nothing to do on long nights throughout the winter but read 
our books, searching for mistakes.”  
(Gell-Mann, 1994, p. xv)
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INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
This is not a “strategy textbook” to replace others. Such a book will strive to be deﬁnitive, 
become drearily repetitive and highly theoretical. 
Deﬁnitive, because the presupposition would be that it is not necessary to read other books. 
On the contrary, the aspirant strategist is beseeched to read as widely as possible, but also to 
go beyond reading and to practice strategy. Our book is aimed at supporting practice.
Repetitive, because in order to cover the whole ﬁeld in a textbook fashion, everything, or nearly 
everything that has already been said, will have to be said again. If ever we have a slight 
criticism of the ﬁeld, it is the unending repetition from textbook to textbook to textbook. Our 
book is aimed at supporting other texts and gives those helpful process tips that might not be 
so readily available in other books.
Highly theoretical, because it seems to us as if many practitioners want to turn the discipline 
of strategy into a science. This involved and unnecessary complication helps business schools 
and consultants, but is of little value to a manager trying to get through his or her daily 
business life. And, of course, this approach is of no value for people in other walks of life. 
We need strategies to look after our health, care for the environment, mount expeditions, go 
to Mars, keep our families together, look after our communities, ensure our safety, etc., The 
business school/theoretical approach could impoverish our lives by removing the strategy 
approach from all other walks of life and developing it as a discipline primarily in the military 
and business. At the same time an uncanny observation emerged out of the process directly 
into our path: making the strategic approach more general greatly demystiﬁed the practice, 
also for business.
We have applied our approach in many walks of life. Over the last few years we facilitated many 
businesses in diverse industries, such as mining, ﬁnancial services, manufacturing, energy 
and transport utilities, etc. through this process, with delightful results. What delighted us 
even more was when we started to apply the principles at municipalities, chess clubs and in 
personal development situations, and realised how well it works.
We learnt that strategising is a universal discipline and nothing more than an afﬁrmation of 
our enduring ability to think. At the same time it challenges us to become more proactive in our 
thinking and to take charge of our existence, in our personal lives and in everything we do.
But we also learnt that thinking individually is quite different from the challenge of participative 
thinking. In the age of transformation to a higher order of uniﬁed diversity, we have, as a 
human race, largely failed to uncover inclusive processes in strategy formulation. 
Through our book we would like to provide a practical guide on how to increase our ability to 
think strategically and some tools for doing this in a group environment.
The authors
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 UNDERSTANDING STRATEGY
CHAPTER 1
STRATEGY AS CONSULTATIVE THINKING 
What it is – creating the lasting plan
Critical issues for this chapter
MYTHS AND REALITY – What is the true essence of strategy?
INHERENT OBSTACLES – What stops us from thinking and participating?
THE DRIVERS OF SUCCESSFUL STRATEGY – What are the essential ingredients for success?
SUMMARY – How do we pull these thoughts together?
1. MYTHS AND REALITY
Strategy is, for many people, a weighty subject. The subtle meaning seems frightening to some 
and seems to convey a sense of near mystical and charismatic power to others. It also seems 
like a state of mind or ability that a lot of people aspire to and many people believe is beyond 
them.  The question is whether these perceptions are valid.
The practical concept of strategy is actually quite the opposite. It is not a science nor a 
profession. It has been around in its military form for ages, but in all other aspects it is quite 
new (less than 50 years) as a discipline, or ﬁeld of study. Nor is what strategy aims to achieve 
complex. Hitt et al. deﬁne strategy as:
an integrated and co-ordinated set of commitments and actions designed to exploit 
core competencies and gain a competitive advantage. (Hitt et al., 2003, p. 9)
It is not always beneﬁcial to try and ﬁnd a “perfect” deﬁnition, nor does it make much sense 
to try and force learners to blindly memorise such deﬁnitions. But what does this deﬁnition 
(which, by the way, seems reasonably accurate) really say? It merely challenges the strategist 
to consider key variables, map out a set of activities based on these considerations and follow 
this map, in any possible enterprise. One could extend this practical summary to say:
When trying to achieve any goal in any human endeavour, consult widely and let all affected 
parties consider their strengths and advantages, all the weaknesses and disadvantages, 
map out a course of activities to achieve the goal and implement these activities.
2. INHERENT OBSTACLES
This simple deﬁnition within itself points to the following inherent obstacles facing the 
strategist:
• Heuristics;
• Individuality;
• Exclusivity; and
• Lack of pervasive strategic thinking.
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2.1 Heuristics
De Bono said: 
… the main purpose of thinking is to abolish thinking. The mind works to make sense 
out of confusion and uncertainty. The mind works to recognize in the outside world 
familiar patterns. As soon as such a pattern is recognized the mind switches into it 
and follows it along – further thinking is unnecessary. (De Bono, 1983, p. 39)
The brain as an organ gave human beings the evolutionary advantage over other mammals. 
It is also the most demanding organ in the human body. It consumes 20% of all energy that 
the body receives, and is also ﬁrst in line when energy is sparse (which means other organs 
always collapse ﬁrst when you are starving!). As such our bodies created a natural system 
to “conserve” brain energy that actually drives us not to think. In fact, if you had to rethink 
every move and decision of every day, then modern life would be impossible. The person that 
overcomes the natural tendency to not think, irrespective of ability, will already have a jump 
on competitors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 70% of important business decisions in the 
world are made based on heuristic reaction rather than thought. The ﬁrst inherent obstacle in 
our deﬁnition is therefore acting rather than consideration (see box on heuristics).
Heuristics
“A heuristic is a rule of thumb that is used to simplify complex decision-making situations” (Robbins, 
1983, p. 401).  Steers also calls heuristics “obvious solutions or previous solutions that worked in 
similar situations” (Steers, 1984, p. 281). One should be aware of heuristics as they inhibit thinking 
and should be overcome by the strategist.
Certain thought constructs will help the reader to identify heuristics and develop thinking 
alternatives: 
No previous thoughts are perfect. One should use and integrate what others think, but most scientiﬁc 
thought is subject to correction and even the most perfect scientiﬁc theories are revised over time. 
Many approaches in management theory are far less robust than we think and a remarkable quantity 
of data, interpretations and conclusions that managers are presented with in the daily course of 
business is incorrect. One can challenge “optimal thought” and should do this often.
Very little can be determined with certainty. At some stage incomplete data will have to be accepted 
and integrated. Waiting for absolute answers will invariably cause the decision-maker to wait 
indeﬁnitely and ﬁnally make a thoughtless decision, if a decision is made at all.
Don’t accept the ﬁrst satisfactory alternative. Don’t think “up to” a solution, but rather think to 
generate multiple solutions. March and Simon maintain that “most human decision-making, whether 
individual or organisational, is concerned with the discovery and selection of satisfactory alternatives; 
only in exceptional cases is it concerned with the discovery and selection of optimal alternatives” 
(March and Simon, 1981, p.138).
We are born with a tendency to be biased. Bias (though strongly criticised when identiﬁed) is part of 
our everyday lives. It is caused by an unwillingness to accept that we don’t know everything (therefore 
we will rather accept gross assumptions), a tendency to oversimplify the complex and an unwillingness 
to accept randomness (a condition better explained by chaos theory in Chapter 4).
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All events regress to the mean. In a series of random events, an extraordinary event will most 
likely be followed by something ordinary. We will often praise an exceptional performance, just to 
be ﬂabbergasted when it is followed by an ordinary performance. The principle of regression to the 
mean is often at work, rather than speciﬁc achievements being the result of some management 
intervention – which will cause us to over-correct behaviour. 
It is hard to ﬁnd representative sample data in complex systems. Representative data identiﬁcation 
is a strategic conceptual task and the ability to ﬁnd the correct predictors is not so easy. The classic 
example is of a group that was asked whether a quiet, organised, academically orientated person is 
a business man, sales representative or librarian. The group overwhelmingly opted for the librarian 
option (Martin, 1985, p. 6). Think of all the background data, both obvious and not so obvious, that 
is ignored. Is it possible that there are many more sales and business people than librarians? Even if 
only some librarians are outgoing and only some business and sales people are reserved (a fact that 
we also probably have little data on), we could still ﬁnd that there are more reserved business and 
sales people than reserved librarians in the world.
We commonly revert to easily available examples. The strong drives of association and imagination 
“force” us to revert to “ﬁrst” experiences. These drives are so strong that major psychological ﬁelds of 
study, such as those of Freud and Jung, are based on this.
We tend to develop conﬁdence in our judgement in proportion to what we know, rather than to what 
we have reasoned. Information is not power, nor is knowledge, but rather synthesized knowledge:
Regardless of whether the task seemed strange or the case material atypical, the judges’ 
conﬁdence ratings show that they became convinced of their own increasing understanding of 
the case. As they received more information, their conﬁdence soared. Furthermore, their certainty 
about their own decisions become entirely out of proportion to the actual correctness of those 
decisions. (Kahneman, 1985, p. 292)
We need less information to predict a favourable event than an unfavourable one. But once we’ve 
made up our minds to be pessimistic, the reverse becomes true. Irrespective of anything, all human 
beings are at heart “conservative”; it is in our blood.
We hate gambles, but constantly gamble with risks. Most people will not gamble away (for instance) 
their monthly salaries at a casino, but will still expose themselves to tremendous health, insurance 
and other physical risks, without thinking about it.  
People need a strong inducement to put money into a gamble. But they expose themselves to 
tremendous risks in order to avoid a loss. (McKean, 1985, p. 28).
2.2 Individuality
Adair maintains that:
… given the realities of the situation, strategy in the military ﬁeld is usually simple. 
It is also commonly the product of many minds. When generals in modern times 
– Montgomery is a good example – write their memoirs, especially if they tend to be 
egotistical, they exaggerate their own role in devising strategy and correspondingly 
denigrate the contribution from others, be it their superiors, colleagues or 
predecessors. (Adair, 2003, p. 36)
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In fact Montgomery, at least for a large part of his early career, listened to advisers. The 
extent to which military strategists achieved the integration of many intelligent minds into a 
strategy often predicted success. Many military strategists (such as Napoleon, Montgomery, 
and Hitler1) had successful early careers, while they still listened to and integrated information 
from their advisers, and more disastrous later careers as they became more isolated and 
unwilling to do this.  The same is true of business leaders. 
2.3 Exclusivity
Strategy originated as a military concept and penetrated the world of business ﬁfty years ago 
(as a relatively new ﬁeld of study). In the course of this development it became synonymous 
with higher-order military or business thinking. This synonymity is incorrect. Strategy is merely a 
way of thinking with rich examples in many other ﬁelds. The case study of Scott and Amundsen 
(refer to the case study in Chapter 17) is a case in point. Strategy is enriched with examples 
from many other ﬁelds (such as physics, biology, archaeology, art, exploration, sport, etc.). The 
ability to integrate lessons from all these ﬁelds will enrich strategy and strategic thinking as a 
discipline in its own right.  
2.4 Lack of pervasive strategic thinking
Saloner et al. make a strong case for strategic thinking as a different and more important 
concept than a mere strategic process (Saloner et al., 2001, p.10). It is a fact that many so 
called “strategists” in business and “strategy departments” at corporate centres have fallen 
into the trap of managing an annual strategic process, a ritual with little real meaning. Strategic 
thinking refers to the development of a conceptual model of the position that you are in. It 
differs from tactics which refer to the various functions and relationships that are components 
of the model and operations which are the transactions that occur within the model. If one 
can get one’s head around these important distinctions, half the strategic battle is won (see 
box on the STO model). The inherent inhibitor is the psyche’s natural tendency to move from 
concept to function to transaction – the natural tendency to do something. It is true that it is 
often better to do something rather than nothing, but it is also true that it is better to think 
before acting, in an efﬁcient and goal-orientated fashion.  
In summary, we want to:
• Overcome the obstacles of thinking instead of forming conclusions based on past 
perceptions;
• Keep this thinking on a conceptual level;
• Involve as many minds as possible in the thinking process; and
• Look for examples and reference points from a wide variety of disciplines.  
1 Hitler especially suffered from this paradox. He made valuable contributions to military strategy in the earlier years of 
his reign, including mechanisation, Blitzkrieg, democratisation (which increased the competence of more junior ofﬁcers 
right down the line) and promoting unity, ingenuity and daring in his top command (Earle, 1973, p. 505). In his later 
years all his military mistakes were exactly on these terrains. He took personal control of mechanised forces on the 
eve of D-day, which meant that the Pantzers were in the wrong place when the Allied forces landed, he ordered long 
sieges – in contrast with the Blitzkrieg doctrine, but above all, he stopped listening to men on the ground or his senior 
commanders.
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The STO Model
The STO (Strategy, Tactics, Operations) model is a useful tool to help the practitioner with the 
development of strategic thought.
S
T
O
Strategy Concept
Tactics Function
TransactionOperations
Figure 1:  STO model
One always has the option to react thoughtlessly. That is a mere transaction. Working at a cash register 
at the local store is a transaction. The work gets done, but the work in itself will not increase sales, 
grow brands, defend proﬁts, save costs, develop alliances, etc. It is a mere transaction. When the 
enemy attacks and I defend in the same way as I have always done it (think of trench warfare in World 
War I), it is also a mere transaction, or if I reduce prices when my competitors do, without thinking, 
this is also transactional behaviour. Functional behaviour (tactics) takes place when I understand 
the effect of the transaction within a certain context. In other words, the cash register operation is 
part of the commercial function of selling. It requires certain systems, procedures, etc. to keep the 
commercial function going. When I elevate the thought to a conceptual map with goals and objectives 
within a speciﬁc open system I achieve strategic thought - what is it that I want to achieve (brand, 
proﬁts, growth, etc.), how do I position this achievement in a wider context (vis-à-vis suppliers, buyers, 
competitors, etc.) and how will I get there? Developing, maintaining and executing this conceptual 
map is strategy.
This thinking can even be applied to the strategic function itself (see Figure 2).
The so-called functionaries who arrange annual strategic conferences are often doing no more than 
transacting. Developing a set of ﬁnancial statements and planning gearing ratios, etc. for the following 
year is a function, but understanding and developing the positioning of your business is strategy.
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S
T
O
Positioning the business
Strategic analysis, financial planning
Arranging the strategic conference
Figure 2: The STO model of the strategic function
The ability to overcome these natural inhibitors to clear thinking is the key to success. Tracy 
says that:
… the quality of your life is determined by the quality of your thinking. The better you 
think, the better results you get. (Tracy, 2002, p. 4)
These inhibitors can be further clariﬁed on a simple map (Figure 3).
3. THE DRIVERS OF SUCCESSFUL STRATEGY
The map depicted in Figure 3 also points us towards two of the most important drivers of 
successful strategic thinking, i.e. the level of participation and the depth of thought. 
There are many strategic thought pieces (books and articles) which refer to business drivers 
and the importance of ﬁnding a set of drivers for a speciﬁc situation, but not so many looking 
for the drivers of successful strategy. These two - i.e. thought and participation - are a useful 
starting point and also a useful diagnostic. The diagnostic is based on a simple set of questions 
to position your situation on the map. If the result points to:
a. “Lose touch with reality”:  You feel marginalised, alone and as if your behaviour tends 
to be irrational.  Solution: You desperately need to consult knowledgeable experts 
on your position and give a rational step back from it. Consider the situation from a 
distance, based on a valid conceptual model and developed with the help of experts 
you can trust (see box on the IME model for a simple but extremely useful approach.)
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b. “Silent schemer”:  You feel as if you have given some position a lot of thought, but 
nobody seems to support your course of action. Solution: Become speciﬁc about the 
need to communicate and determine the intensity of the required communication (see 
box on the realities of proper decision-making communication).
c. “Mass hysteria”:  You feel as if you are swept up in a common belief, tradition or 
untested “group-think” scenario. Solution: Get the group to apply novel and creative 
group-thinking exercises.
d. “The lasting plan”:  If you’ve reached this position, you will not only have the best chance 
of developing a useful solution, but you will also achieve buy-in and commitment.
LE
VE
L 
OF
 P
AR
TI
CI
P
AT
IO
N
DEPTH OF THOUGHT
Solitary
Mass hysteria The lasting plan
Silent schemerLose touch with reality
Group
a b
c d
Perception based
ss hysteria  lasting plan
il nt schemere touch with reality
Thought based
Figure 3:  A conceptual map for overcoming thinking inhibition
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The IME Model
The IME Model is a simple systemic tool that divides a system into three distinct parts (Figure 4).
This Model is applicable to everything. In a human body internal will refer to the limbs and organs 
of the body and how it is put together; nature, earth and atmosphere will be the market area where 
the body competes with other life for resources; and survival and law, love, art, etc. will be external 
drivers which control the body’s activities and purposes. In a business human and other resources, 
ﬁnance, technology, etc. will be internal aspects; the place where the business competes with image, 
brand and products will be the market place; and the governance of the business (shareholders, 
etc.), laws under which it must operate and economies that determine issues such as exchange rates 
are external factors.
The aspects that are under the system’s control (enabling the 
team)
Internal
The area where the system as a whole competes for positioning, 
survival, etc. (playing the game)
Market
The area that qualifies and controls the system, its reason for 
existence (the rules of the game)
External
Figure 4: The IME model
The realities of proper decision-making communication
Communication is always important - the level of information, consultation, negotiation and lobbying 
can have an important impact on strategy.
D1C1B1A1
D2C2B2A2
D3C3B3A3
W
H
O 
W
IL
L 
B
E
 A
FF
E
CT
E
D
WHO HAS THE POWER TO MAKE THE DECISION
you mostly you you & others equally only others
only you 
privately
you & your 
close 
associates
mostly other 
people
Inform
Consult
Negotiate
Lobby
Figure 5: The power/affected grid
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Look at the power/affected grid depicted in Figure 5 carefully. We tend to look at this complexity in 
one dimension, i.e. along the x-axis. We believe that if we have the power to make a decision we at 
most need to inform; when we have most of the power, we consult; when we have half the power, 
we negotiate; and if the power is somewhere else, we lobby. However, this is mostly effective if we 
ourselves are affected by the decision. 
If other people are affected, however, and we follow the same pattern, we are nothing more than 
dictators and, even if we take benevolent decisions, paternalistic dictators. 
If we follow the B-line vertically upwards (from B1 to B3), for example, it is true that right through you 
don’t have to do much more than consult (it is, after all, mostly your decision), but you will be amazed 
at how much a little negotiation and more (even in your private life!) can achieve, if other people are 
affected.
This consultative approach to decision-making is depicted in Figure 6 below.
D1C1B1A1
D2C2B2A2
D3C3B3A3
W
H
O 
W
IL
L 
B
E
 A
FF
E
CT
E
D
you
mostly 
you
you & others 
equally
only 
others
only you 
privately
you & your 
close 
associates
mostly other 
people
Inform
Consult
Negotiate
Lobby
WHO HAS THE POWER TO MAKE THE DECISION
Figure 6: The consultative approach to the power/affected grid
Mintzberg (2000) attempts to play off the two aspects, which he calls “commitment” (in our 
model “participation”) and “planning programming” (in our model “thinking”) against each 
other. He  iscusses this under the heading of decentralisation and comes to the conclusion that 
planning is a “centralising” process. We couldn’t agree more. The upper pinnacle of our STO 
model couldn’t and shouldn’t be decentralised. The challenge is not met by decentralisation, 
but by participation.  In fact Mintzberg goes as far as trying to choose between these two 
drivers:
The honest response, then, when different activities must be tightly and formally 
coordinated, would seem to forget about participation and commitment and simply 
impose central planning. As Bass puts it, ‘if the actions of doers are fully programmed 
by the planners, the gain in predictability of performance may be offset by the loss in 
doer interest.’ (Mintzberg, 2000, p. 166) 
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But Mintzberg immediately provides perspective in the next sentence by stating:
And when commitment is crucial, the appropriate response may be to forget about 
planning, at least as conventionally practiced. (ibid.) 
The undisputed holy grail of strategic planning is to achieve both, i.e. full commitment through 
the line (as wide as possible) and full programmed thinking ability.
4. SUMMARY
A summary of the most important thoughts for this chapter is depicted in Figure 7.
P
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N
DEPTH OF THOUGHT
So
lit
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y
Perception 
based
Mass hysteria The lasting plan
Silent schemerLose touch with reality
Thought 
based
G
ro
up
Inform
Consult
Negotiate
Lobby Involve more 
people in the 
thinking 
process
Strategy as 
consultative 
thinking
Overcome the 
hurdle of 
unfounded 
perceptions
Think of 
examples from 
all disciplines
Move to world 
of concepts
Begin to 
think
Think 
wider
Think 
deeper
M
ake groupw
ork a 
habit
So
lit
ar
y
The l ting plan
G
ro
up
habit
Figure 7: A summary model for effective thinking
If we think of strategy as “consultative thinking”, we need to encourage two processes, i.e. the 
thinking process and the consultation process. We achieve this by:
• Understanding unfounded perceptions (and assumptions) and overcoming them
• Finding broad examples, developing conceptual models (to improve thinking – such as 
STO and IME) and by involving people; and
• Including consultation when we are only required to inform, and including negotiation 
when we are only required to consult.
This will assist us to develop lasting plans, i.e. strategic plans that can survive most battle 
scenarios and which will be followed in the heat of battle by most “warriors”.
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The next logical question is about the reason for the battle. If we want to increase our depth of 
thought and encourage people to participate in this process, it needs to be made clear why we 
engage in the enterprise in the ﬁrst place. Therefore all discussion about strategy must always 
begin with objectives. We will address the pervasiveness of clear objectives vs. total lack of 
direction in the next chapter.
Final take-out
MYTHS AND REALITY – Strategy is easy to do, but difﬁcult to start.
INHERENT OBSTACLES – We think better than any other sentient being we know of, but it requires 
inordinate energy and we therefore do not like to think.
THE DRIVERS OF SUCCESSFUL STRATEGY – Strategy is about deeper thought and wider participation. 
Both. Equally.
SUMMARY – Strategy begins with consultative thinking. In any situation.
CHAPTER 2
STRATEGY BASED ON OBJECTIVES
Why we need it - the lasting plan
Critical issues for this chapter
GOAL-ORIENTATED BEHAVIOR – Does goal-setting come naturally?
THE NATURE OF GOALS AND OBJECTIVES – Are all goals the same?
A SIMPLE HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES – What is the hierarchical relationship between goals?
THE BALANCED SCORECARD AND OBJECTIVES – How do objectives, strategy and people hang 
together?
SUMMARY – How do we pull these thoughts together?
1. GOAL-ORIENTATED BEHAVIOUR
In our previous chapter we clearly identiﬁed the “what” of strategy.  It is a consultative thinking 
process to help us achieve a certain goal. The question of “why” still needs to be answered. Is 
it worth it? And, if so, how much effort should I put in? Towards the end of the previous chapter 
we reverted to the military image of strategy being an aid for warriors (the “what”), in which 
case the “why” is quite simple, i.e. victory. Warriors have a strategy because they would dearly 
like to achieve victory, i.e., there is a speciﬁc attainable goal to achieve. This means that a 
speciﬁc objective always precedes strategy.  
This observation is not as obvious as it seems. It is amazing how much is done in the world, 
in many spheres of life, without a speciﬁc goal in mind. In fact, most people go through life 
without clear objectives for their existence, without a real understanding of what it is that they 
want to achieve. In battle (where strategy as a concept ﬁrst emerged) the objective apparently 
seems clear – victory, and sometimes in business (proﬁts, growth), but upon closer scrutiny it 
becomes clear that this is not always the case. The overriding objective of the main protagonists 
of the great wars is still unclear and many businesses still don’t understand their positioning 
ideals for the future. Did Scott go to the South Pole for scientiﬁc discovery, to prove that he is 
a man, or to be the ﬁrst there? Scott was unclear about this, as opposed to Amundsen, whose 
strategy was driven by a single objective – to be ﬁrst. Von Clausewitz (1968, p. 367) says 
“pursue one great decisive aim with force and determination”, and:
The Plan of the War comprehends the whole Military Act; through it that Act becomes 
a whole, which must have one ﬁnal determinate object, in which all particular objects 
must become absorbed. (ibid.)
The ﬁrst lesson for the strategist is therefore goal-orientated behaviour. As illustrated in Figure 8, 
if objectives lead to strategies which should determine actions, then goal-orientated behaviour 
requires goal-orientated decisions, which in turn require clear goals and objectives. 
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Objective Strategy Action
Clear goals 
& 
objectives
Goal-
orientated 
decisions
Goal-
orientated 
behaviour
Clear goals & 
objectives
Figure 8: Clear goals
Campbell et al. summarise this as:
strategic decisions are concerned with the acquisition of sustainable competitive 
advantage, which involves the setting of long-term corporate objectives and the 
formulation, evaluation, selection and monitoring of strategies designed to achieve 
those objectives. (Campbell et al., 2002, p. 20)
2. THE NATURE OF GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Adair (2003, p. 161) describes sound goals as “clear, realistic and challenging”.
Analoui and Karami (2003, p. 125) take this description further and talk about SMART 
goals, i.e. they are Speciﬁc, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time bound, a very useful 
description (see point 3.1 in this chapter).  Two other areas to take into account are:
• There seems to be a hierarchy of goals, which presupposes the management of a clear 
link and distinction between goals. The way in which the links are managed and the 
names given to the levels of the hierarchy are less important than the absolute chaos 
that ensues when they are not managed properly. Mintzberg maintains:
The assumption of strategic planning seems to be that objectives are 
decided upon by the top management for the entire organization, which in 
turn evokes the process of formulating strategy, and, themselves, cascade 
down the structural hierarchy, as devices of motivation and control 
– that is, to provide incentives as well as means against which to asses 
performance. But if the objectives truly exist to motivate, then according 
to behavioural scientists, people have to be involved in the setting of their 
own ones. So instead of cascading down, objectives have to be made in 
different places and then aggregated up. But if so, how can they relate to 
strategies? With one aggregating up and the other cascading down, how do 
they get together? To quote Eigerman, ‘In a purely bottom-up system, the 
integration of strategy across units is achieved with a stapler!’. (Mintzberg, 
2000, p. 71)
This indeed seems confusing, but in many respects unnecessarily so. We will propose 
a simple hierarchy later in this chapter (see point 3). In the meantime it should be 
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remembered that strategic objectives and strategy formulation are deﬁnitely not the 
“exclusive domain” of top management (see box on the grassroots and hothouse 
models of strategy formulation).
• Goals are meaningless if the buy-in of “warriors” who need to execute them are not 
obtained. Everyone involved in the execution must accept them.
The grassroots and hothouse models of strategy formulation
Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel (1998, pp. 196-198) describe two extremes of strategy formulation 
and emphasise that real strategic behaviour should be informed by both approaches. 
The grassroots model of strategy formulation is a bottom-up approach that allows strategies to be 
grown initially like weeds in a garden.  The process is not over-managed and patterns are allowed to 
emerge from any source in the organisation.  Should any pattern be powerful enough to permeate 
the organisation, formally or informally, and be recognised as valuable, this should become an 
organisational strategy and be managed more formally.  The role of management in this scenario 
is to create a climate for strategic creativity, to recognise the emergence of valuable strategies and 
intervene when appropriate.
The hothouse model of strategy formulation is a top-down approach, where the CEO is the only 
strategist.  Strategies are cultivated consciously and come out of this process fully developed, to be 
made formally explicit and implemented.  The role of management is to provide appropriate data and 
to provide strategic input into the CEO’s strategic thought process, and manage communication and 
implementation of the strategies.
It is now possible to depict the drivers of sound objectives in a simple model (Figure 9).
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Figure 9:  The basic drivers of goals
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The ﬁrst important observation is the direct correlation between the drivers of strategy and 
the drivers of goals. If strategy presupposes some objective, and if strategy is deﬁned by the 
depth of thought and breadth of participation, then goals are deﬁned by the “SMART”-ness of 
the goal and its level of acceptance. This enables us to determine the efﬁciency of goal-setting 
as depicted in Figure 10.
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SMARTNESS OF GOALS
Figure 10: The efﬁciency of goal-setting
Thinking “waste products” are those “funny” entries on brainstorming lists. (A mining client 
identiﬁed a market for two million tons of their commodity in Cape Town – 2000 km from our 
client’s mine. One of the “funnies” on the marketing brainstorm list was “ﬂy the commodity 
to Cape Town”. Not a SMART goal – and nobody wants to do it – a thinking “waste product”). 
But sometimes goals are smart. You will ﬁnd yourself saying this is so speciﬁc, achievable and 
realistic that “I can almost taste it”, but still nobody wants to do it. This is truly a lost opportunity. 
On the other hand, we sometimes ﬁnd ourselves in a situation where we are all chasing a 
dream that, in all honesty, simply cannot be achieved. Once again a simple diagnostic can be 
applied to determine position a, b, c or d which leads to simple corrective action:
a. Thinking waste products:  Don’t waste too much time on thinking “waste products”. If 
the idea cannot trigger a better one – let it go.
b. The opportunity lost:  Work out a speciﬁc communication plan to gather support. Who 
can make the difference and what argument will convince that person?
c. The pipe dream:  Firm up on the objective. There is something behind it that people 
really want. Use that energy and translate the need into something that can actually be 
achieved.
d. The real target:  Develop the implementation details of the plan.
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3. A SIMPLE HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES
The further aspect of objectives is the issue of hierarchies. The ﬁrst important point is to not 
split hairs on the meaning of the words “objective”, “goal”, etc. It is more important to clearly 
understand the hierarchical nature of objectives. This is summarised in Figure 11.
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Figure 11: A hierarchy of objectives
In the most simple system we classify objectives into three groups, i.e. strategic themes, 
strategic goals and implementation targets. 
Strategic themes are the result of our ﬁrst understanding of our position within chaos. We 
answer questions such as where am I, what do I want to achieve in general and on which areas 
should I concentrate. In business these could be as broad as a growth theme, rationalisation 
theme, innovation theme, etc. Businesses often have a range of two to a maximum of four 
themes that are current at any given moment.
Strategic themes are followed by strategic goals and are the result of our conscious (in business 
often formal – but not always) strategic planning exercise. These could be goals such as the 
capture of certain markets, development of a new product, etc. Businesses almost always 
have at least one strategic objective in each of the internal, market and external spheres. It is 
difﬁcult for any CEO to manage many more than ﬁve to eight of these.
For each strategy certain implementation targets can be identiﬁed. These are visible in three 
categories, i.e. project milestones, process improvements and business improvements:
• Project milestones are visible in the completion of certain steps of a strategic project. 
For a marketing project this could be the completion of research by a speciﬁc date, the 
development of a campaign, etc.
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• Process improvements are the performance measurements of certain business 
processes (which strategic projects seek to inﬂuence). This could be an improvement 
in reject percentage, labour productivity, etc.
• Business improvements are the ultimate improvements that strategies bring about. This 
could be an improvement in ROI, market share, etc. (Modern value-based management 
techniques seek to link process and business improvements. This is advisable, but it 
is a complex area of value-based management, and beyond the scope of our practical 
strategy development and implementation discussion.)
3.1 Managing “Smartness”
Under point 2 in this chapter we referred to Analoui and Karami’s (2003, p. 125) description 
of SMART goals, i.e. Speciﬁc, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time bound. We need a 
short introduction to these concepts:
• Speciﬁc objectives refer to the need to remove vagueness from the strategic process. 
This is true whether we are speaking of strategic themes, strategic objectives or 
implementation targets. “Growth” is vague (as a strategic theme), but “organic growth” 
is less so. “Improved product development and innovation” is vague (as a strategic 
objective), but “an annual increase of 10% in new products to market over the next 5 
years”, or “an increase in the share of new products in industry of 25% over the next 
three years” is speciﬁc.
• Measurable objectives mean that objectives, in ﬁnal form, need to be measured in 
operational terms. This is discussed in more depth in the box on the balanced scorecard 
approach.
• Achievable objectives are as much a psychological concept as a physical one. If the 
targets are set too high a sense of hopelessness will ensue. A target which is set too 
low tends to create inertia.
• Realistic objectives require that objectives must be within the normal reach of the 
organisation.
• Time-bound objectives suggest that a speciﬁc time frame for success must be stated. 
4. THE BALANCED SCORECARD AND OBJECTIVES
Kaplan and Norton, in their books on the balanced scorecard (The Balanced Scorecard: 
Translating Strategy into Action (1996) and The Strategy-Focused Organization: How Balanced 
Scorecard Companies Thrive in the New Business Environment (2001)), have created a very 
valuable new direction in strategic thought. It accentuates the importance of the relationship 
between objectives, strategy and the dynamic tools to measure strategy implementation (see 
box on the balanced scorecard and strategy maps, and also Chapter 15).
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Balanced Scorecard and Strategy Maps
The study that eventually resulted in the development of the balanced scorecard was initiated in 
the belief that, in the information age, relying primarily on ﬁnancial performance measures was 
insufﬁcient.  The two mantras “If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it”, and “You get what you 
measure” underscore this belief.
In the Balanced Scorecard Kaplan and Norton (1996) retain the ﬁnancial perspective as a critical 
component of managerial and business performance, but supplement it with a more integrated set 
of measurements that also link customers, internal business processes and employee development 
to managerial and business performance.
The Balanced Scorecard, depicted in Figure 12, therefore provides a framework to link strategy with 
performance measures.  The purpose is to articulate and communicate the strategy of the business, 
while aligning individual, organisational and cross-departmental activities and performance with the 
strategy.
Vision and strategy
Internal Business Process
Critical business process 
at which the organisation 
must excel
Customer
Performance in targeted 
market segments
Financial
Bottom-line improvement
Learning and growth
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organisation must build to 
create lo -term growth and 
improvement
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Customer
Perfor nce in targeted 
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create long rm growth and 
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Figure 12: The four perspectives of the balanced scorecard 
An important determinant of the successful application of the Balanced Scorecard is the ability to 
link a series of objectives and measures that are both consistent and mutually reinforcing.  Kaplan 
and Norton take this concept further in their book The Strategy-focused Organisation: How Balanced 
Scorecard Companies Thrive in the New Business Environment (2001) by developing strategy maps. 
The strategy map for the Balanced Scorecard depicts the strategy’s hypotheses through cause-and-
effect relationships.  
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A simpliﬁed strategy map is depicted in Figure 13 ( Kaplan & Norton, 2001, p. 125):
Install and roll out SAP 
manufacturing modules
FINANCIAL
CUSTOMER
INTERNAL BUSINESS 
PROCESSES
LEARNING AND 
GROWTH
Re-engineer 
manufacturing supply 
chain
Redesign logistics chain
Reduce delivered price 
of product to retailer
Improve our operating 
margin
Improve return on net 
assets
Figure 13: Example of a strategy map to re-engineer manufacturing
At the heart of the research that led to the publishing of their ﬁndings lies the fact that 
strategy implementation fails because of a lack of participation through the line (not only top 
management) and because of inadequate measurement tools, speciﬁcally designed to track 
the implementation of strategy. This is another way of saying that goals and objectives should 
eventually be stated in operational terms, directly related to the strategy, and then tracked 
and implemented by everybody (i.e. make strategy everyone’s job). 
5. SUMMARY
Human beings are not typically objective-orientated systems. We tend to “wander” through 
life, aimlessly, because objective-setting requires energy and we, by nature, conserve this 
energy as much as possible. Systems that apply this energy economically will always have 
an advantage. Certain principles will determine whether objectives are effective, the most 
important of which is that these goals are SMART (Speciﬁc, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic 
and Time-bound) and accepted. 
The ﬁrst step is always to ﬁnd a “stamping ground” or area of thought; we call it to develop 
a “strategic theme”. This is followed by strategic goals and implementation targets. It is 
especially important, when dealing with implementation targets, to distinguish between the 
project milestones of the implementation process and the actual improvement that the project 
brings about (both in process and business terms).
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If we’ve engaged in the process of consultative thinking and understand that we need to 
develop speciﬁc strategic themes, we can begin to work on the strategic agenda. But is there 
a template, a “standard” sort of agenda that can guide us? In the next chapter we will explore 
the concept of the strategic agenda in greater detail. 
Final take-out
GOAL-ORIENTATED BEHAVIOUR – Setting goals is not natural; we need to be aware of it and regulate 
our behaviour accordingly.
THE NATURE OF GOALS AND OBJECTIVES – Goals are hierarchical, must be accepted and adhere to 
certain principles (SMART). An unaccepted goal is not a goal.
A SIMPLE HIERARCHY OF OBJECTIVES – The initial goal is always goal-setting in itself (i.e. the ﬁrst 
objective is to ﬁnd an area or theme in which to think). This must be followed by strategic goals and 
implementation targets.
THE BALANCED SCORECARD AND OBJECTIVES – The golden rule is in-depth research to uncover and 
track the truly important operational measures in each of the Balanced Scorecard dimensions that 
will track strategy in a participative fashion.
SUMMARY – Goals guide us, but we need to consciously guide the guide.
CHAPTER 3
THE GENERICS OF STRATEGY IN BUSINESS 
The core agenda and how it relates to objectives and consultative thinking
Critical issues for this chapter
THE STRATEGIC AGENDA – Is an agenda important?
THE TEMPLATE – Can we propose an agenda template?
DEEPENING THE AGENDA – Can we add the think/participate perspective to the agenda?
A FRESH LOOK AT RELATIONSHIPS – Can we add relationship thinking to these perspectives?
THE EXTENDED RELATIONSHIP AGENDA – Can we systemise current thinking on “standard” 
strategies?
SUMMARY – How do we pull these thoughts together?
1. THE STRATEGIC AGENDA
At the heart of strategic management is the “strategic agenda”. Many case studies show that 
a proper strategic agenda seems to be missing from many companies and other systems. This 
does not mean that the agenda does not exist; it often does in an unconscious way, as a “gut 
feel” or as an “unwritten” strategy. There is no imperative for the strategic agenda to be written 
down in all cases. There is, however, an imperative for the agenda to be known, understood 
and relentlessly targeted. Without this behaviour the system is doomed to being second-rate. 
We frequently ask managers about the strategic agenda for their business and are astonished 
at the weak and misaligned answers we receive.
It is common for writers of strategy to ﬁnd new concepts, core themes and standard agenda 
items for the era in which they write. A lot of great contributions to management literature have 
been made in this way and have lead to break-through strategic thinking by authors such as 
Mintzberg, Peters, Hammer, Senge, Porter and Hamel. The practical question for us is: is there 
a template? Is there a standard way to create and test the agenda to make sure that it at least 
covers what is important in the system?
2. THE TEMPLATE
A good place to start the search for a template is by looking at the IME model as described in 
Figure 4. We can extend this model to its systemic properties as depicted in Figure 14.
The strategic agenda must address issues in all three areas. The organism or system cannot 
survive without identity (external), a competitive advantage (market value proposition) and 
survivable DNA (internal strengths). The strategic agenda will always look at these three 
areas. 
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Enabling the team i.e. the organisational DNAInternal
Playing the game i.e. the value propositionMarket
The rules of the gamei.e. the networked environmentExternal
Figure 14: Systemic properties of IME Model
Certain generic agenda points can now be identiﬁed:
• The external agenda items deal with “rules of the game”, i.e. governance and links with 
the external environment within which the system operates. It deals with governments, 
regulators, alliance partners, shareholders and the broader economic system. It seeks 
to optimise regulatory issues, partnerships and shareholder value through improved 
relationships and improved outcomes for the system as a whole. It also relates to 
the core reason for the system’s existence, its identity and future positioning. For a 
human being this includes the governmental and societal laws within which he or she 
operates.
• The market value proposition agenda items deal with market positioning issues such as 
brands, products and services. It deals with customers and seeks to optimise market 
share through the acquisition and maintenance of better customers, the putting 
together of better deals and the delivery of better products and services to those 
customers. For a human being this includes the ability to compete for sustenance 
(food, shelter and air).
• The internal agenda items deal with the core constructs of the system, its DNA. Like 
any living organism, the DNA has two drivers for coming into existence, i.e. natural 
selection and chance. It is up to the evolving organism to increase the likelihood of 
survival by improving the selection methods and therefore strengthening the system 
within its environment. For a human being this includes core strength or health. For a 
business this will include ﬁnancial assets, technological assets, people and intellectual 
property.
3. DEEPENING THE AGENDA
An obvious next place to look in our quest to extend the agenda would be the core drivers of 
strategy as summarised in Figure 3, i.e. level of participation and depth of thought. We can 
extend the descriptors in this model to include those that describe speciﬁc actions around 
ingenuity and relationships (see Figure 15). The level of participation in any strategy requires 
relationships. Without relationships no strategy can, in fact, be developed nor executed. Depth 
of thought requires “cleverness” or ingenuity. The art of ingenuity must be available and 
applied in the strategy formulation exercise.
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The nature of these extended descriptors also means that the ideal situation is described 
differently for ingenuity and relationships. For ingenuity the descriptor is a state, a word 
that can be an adverb or adjective (such as robust, attractive or pragmatic actions). All 
relationships must be sound, so the descriptor here is the group of people with whom the 
sound relationships are sought.
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Figure 15: Relationships and Ingenuity
This means that the agenda now has six standard cells, i.e. external, market and internal on 
the one axis and ingenuity and relationships on the other axis (see Figure 16).
Sound relationships with:State of ingenuity:
Pragmatism
Attractiveness
Robustness
Employees (current & potential)Internal
Customers (current & potential)Market
Investors, regulators, partners 
& the broader community
External
Figure 16: Describing the agenda
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• On the ingenuity level:
o Robustness means that the strategy must allow, on the one hand, for the robust 
survival of the system in the external environment. Will it have identity, trust, 
acceptance, partners, etc. in the future? On the other hand, the strategy for external 
positioning itself needs to be robust, under all given or expected conditions;
o Attractiveness means that the business’ products and services must be attractive in 
the market place. It also means that the strategy itself must be attractive, under all 
expected supply and demand conditions; and
o Pragmatism means that the system must have the capabilities to survive. It also 
means that the system must have the resources to execute the chosen strategy or 
the wherewithal to obtain those resources easily.
• On the relationship level sound relations with investors, regulators and partners mean 
that the external environment can be managed properly; with customers they mean 
that the market environment can be managed properly; and with employees they mean 
that the internal production factors can be protected.
4. A FRESH LOOK AT RELATIONSHIPS
Notice that in this model we have moved beyond the old saw of “our employees are our greatest 
assets”. The fact of the matter is that businesses have many assets, but only employees can 
exploit, protect and multiply these assets. They are the only “asset managers” and no business 
can survive without them.
The ingenuity axis is quite self-explanatory, but in our systemic approach the relationship axis 
requires more clariﬁcation. Figure 17 illustrates three levels of relationships.
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The upper level (cognitive) is the very visible elements of the relationship. On the face of it, 
do the couple appear to like each other, is the customer buying the product or did the soldier 
appear for the battle? This could be called performance.
The middle level (sub-cognitive) is less apparent. Is the relationship sound in terms of shared 
interests, etc.; even if the customer is buying is she satisﬁed with the product, customer 
service, etc.; and is the soldier comfortable, equipped and committed to the cause? We could 
call this wellness.
The deepest level (emotional) is often not understood but it is where true loyalty is uncovered. 
Will the couple stick together no matter what; will the customer remain a customer even when 
prices rise and short-term setbacks appear; and will the soldier remain ﬁghting and follow 
orders, no matter what? This is the level of true loyalty.
This kind of thinking has been taken forward in leaps and bounds by Arnold and Amy Mindell’s 
Process Work Centre2. Amongst others, the school describes three realities as depicted in 
Figure 18.
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Figure 18: Different realities
In this work consensus realities are the visible physical realities or phenomena that we can 
see and agree upon, such as the properties of a product, transactions in the market place, 
etc. This is distinguished from the self-organising reality on the dreaming level, which is more 
experiential than physical. This is where we buy dreams rather than products and where we are 
2 Arnold and Amy Mindell are part of the original group that founded process-oriented psychology.  Process work is a 
cross-disciplinary approach to support individual and collective change. See inter alia Mindell (2002).
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more interested in that which we cannot necessarily see. Max Schupbach3 uses the example 
of paying much more for free-range eggs than for other kinds. We are buying into the dream 
of freedom. At the deepest level is the one-world reality. This is a state of true connectedness 
– we can also say true loyalty.
We incorporated this thinking into the relationships deconstructed in Figure 17 to say that 
relationships at the consensus reality level perform (or not), on the self-organising level are 
well (or not) and on the one-world reality level reach a state of true loyalty (or not). There 
also seems to be a hidden hierarchy at work here. Is it possible for a relationship to be well 
if it doesn’t perform, or can loyalty be present if true wellness is not experienced? There is a 
complicated customer loyalty theory that seems to say that it is possible, but a case has yet to 
be found where this is true in a sustainable way. 
5. THE EXTENDED RELATIONSHIP AGENDA
This deconstruction points to interesting themes that have stemmed from strategies in the last 
few decades and is summarised in Figure 19.
Employee satisfaction
Customer satisfaction
Transformational 
governance
Wellness LoyaltyPerformance
Performance 
measurement
Market share
Share price
Employee loyaltyInternal
Loyalty and value-
added services
Market
Triple bottom lineExternal
Figure 19: The extended relationship agenda
These agenda points seem familiar, but also point to a systemic view of quite a few “new” 
approaches to business.
The external relationship agenda
Many companies measure their success on the basis of their share price. This is the ultimate 
cognitive direct measurement for most. But isn’t it true that this has progressed to governance, 
to the issues relating, for example, to Enron and Parmalat?4 This goes beyond the mere price 
of the share towards eventually sustainable development and triple bottom-line reporting, the 
ultimate measure that will be required to make the environment “loyal” to the business.
4 At both Enron and Parmalat the share price in no way reﬂected real responsibility or governance at these two businesses, 
leading to massive losses for shareholders and the near break-down of governance due to corporate greed.
3 Max Schupbach is, together with Doctors Arnold and Amy Mindell, a founding member of the Process Work Centres of 
Portland, Oregon, and Zurich, Switzerland.
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The market agenda
With the market agenda, progress has been much more apparent. Towards the third quarter 
of the twentieth century many companies progressed beyond mere market share measures 
to customer satisfaction management. We’ve seen a proliferation of loyalty measurements 
and loyalty programmes lately, although the true meaning of the phrase and the proper 
management of customer loyalty still escape many companies.
The internal agenda
We started with employee performance management and supporting systems 50 years ago 
and this ﬁeld has also shown some progress.   There are some interesting case studies on 
employee wellness, but the issue of true employee loyalty is still in its infancy.
6. SUMMARY
The strategic agenda must be set (in any form – not necessarily written) and participation 
in execution presupposes that it must be known. It should deal with all three basic areas of 
the system - external, market and internal - and in all three those areas with performance, 
wellness and loyalty issues.
Now that we have set parameters for the agenda we can turn to a ﬁnal aspect, that of physics 
theory, to guide us through an ever-increasingly chaotic world, i.e. chaos theory, and how to 
deal with the simple and the complex at the same time.
Final Take-out
THE STRATEGIC AGENDA – The agenda’s imperative is not the written format, but the extent to which 
it is known.
THE TEMPLATE – The template view is a systems view. No two organisations are the same, but all 
must deal with external, market and internal issues.
DEEPENING THE AGENDA – The template can be extended to say that we must deal ingeniously with 
relationships on all three system levels.
A FRESH LOOK AT RELATIONSHIPS – We tend to look at the performance level of relationships 
(transactional).  We should uncover deeper levels in our relationships, such as wellness and at the 
deepest level – loyalty.
THE EXTENDED RELATIONSHIP AGENDA – Relationships with external stakeholders, customers and 
employees must improve from entailing mere involvement, to caring wellness and ﬁnally to true 
loyalty. This is one of the holy grails of a successful strategy.
SUMMARY – A strategic agenda can only work if it is known and also only if it deals (in its extended 
form) with the parties that will support the system in the external environment, will interact with it in 
the market place and will maintain it internally.  
CHAPTER 4
STRATEGY AND CHAOS
The simple and the complex
Critical issues for this chapter
NEWTONIAN PHYSICS AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE – What is the core of Newtonian physics and how 
does it relate to our strategy approach? 
PLANCK, EINSTEIN AND HEISENBERG – Has physics moved on?
CHAOS AND STRATEGY – How does the new science relate to strategy?
THE PLACE FOR THE NEWTONIAN APPROACH – Does Newtonian physics still play a role?
KEY LESSON – Is there a key lesson to be learned from the new science?
A BASIC MODEL – How can we develop a basic model from the key lesson?
MODEL APPLICATIONS – What applications are there for the basic model?
CULTURAL DNA – Can we look at more advanced applications?
SUMMARY – How do we pull these thoughts together? 
1. NEWTONIAN PHYSICS AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
One of the greatest breakthrough thinkers of pre-modern times was Isaac Newton. He has 
been described as
… a decidedly odd ﬁgure – brilliant beyond measure, but solitary, joyless, prickly to 
the point of paranoia, famously distracted (upon swinging his feet out of bed in the 
morning he would reportedly sometimes sit for hours, immobilized by the sudden 
rush of thoughts to his head), and capable of the most riveting strangeness. (Bryson, 
2003, p. 41)
Part of this strangeness can be ascribed to the fact that Newton spent much more of his 
research time on alchemic pursuits and his involvement in Arianism (a sect believing that there 
is no Holy Trinity). In fact, a growing recent theory on Jesus, the cruciﬁxion, Mary Magdalene 
and the Holy Grail, popularised by Dan Brown’s book The Da Vinci Code (2004, p.113) and by 
Baigent, Leigh and Lincoln in Holy Blood Holy Grail (1996, p. 133), links Newton with a secret 
society, the Priory of Zion, where he was reportedly a Grand Master between 1691 and 1727. 
This link  is unproven lore, but we do know that Newton spent many hours studying the ﬂoor 
plan of King Solomon’s temple. (The Priory of Zion believed that secrets around the Holy Grail 
were hidden there in the time of the Knights Templar’s “reign” in Jerusalem in the middle 
ages). 
This strange and paradoxical character’s contribution to “normal” physics is even more 
interesting. He was visited in 1684 by Edmond Halley. Halley was trying to calculate the curve 
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO STRATEGY34
of planetary orbits around the sun. Newton, astonishingly, suggested that he had already 
calculated the curve and that he knew it was a sphere, but searching for his calculation – based 
on a piece of mathematics called the inverse square law – couldn’t ﬁnd it. Halley pressed on 
Newton the importance of the calculation and asked him to redo it and publish a paper. It 
seems as if Newton had no idea of the importance of what he had found. But he achieved even 
more than that. In typical character, he retired for two years and produced his masterwork 
Principia (1687), which made him famous for all time.
Newtonian physics is well-known and includes his three laws of motion and the universal law 
of gravitation. The greatest paradox of his heritage is that the laws of science that he set in 
motion are not what he himself would have liked to be remembered for:
The universe that Sir Isaac Newton described was a seductive place. As the great 
clock ticked, we grew smart and designed the age of machines. As the pendulum 
swung with perfect periodicity, it prodded us on to new discoveries. As the Earth 
circled the sun (just like clockwork), we grew assured of the role of determinism 
and prediction. We absorbed expectations of regularity into our very beings. And we 
organized work and knowledge based on our beliefs of this predictable universe.
It is interesting to note how Newtonian most organisations are. The machine imagery 
of the cosmos was translated into organisations as an emphasis on material 
structure and multiple parts. Responsibilities have been organized into functions. 
People have been organized into roles. Page after page of organizational charts 
depict the workings of the machine: the number of pieces, what ﬁts where, what the 
most important pieces are. (Wheatley, 1999, p. 28)
2. PLANCK, EINSTEIN AND HEISENBERG
It required a whole range of eminent physicists to produce the ﬁrst major departure from 
Newtonian physics. The “birth” of this departure can probably be linked to Plank’s quantum 
theory5, published in 1900, followed by Einstein’s ﬁve papers in 1905, including his famous 
Special Theory of Relativity. The world now began to understand that Newton’s laws and gravity 
were not absolute, but rather events in and by-products of space-time. In time we would come 
to understand that an expanding universe has four dimensions, the three physical dimensions 
and time, and that these four dimensions are interwoven. These thoughts were taken further 
by Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle in 1924, which stated that we can either know an 
electron’s path or place, but not both at the same time. This means that you can never predict 
the electron’s position and physics entered a new age with words such as Quantum Physics, 
Quantum Mechanics and Chaos.
Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel try to relate these new directions to strategy and management 
science:
This represented an attempt to shift from a traditional scientiﬁc outlook, based on 
decomposing complex phenomena into simple and predictable elements, to one in 
which the system is seen as holistic and dynamic.
A central tenet of chaos theory is that simple sets of deterministic relationships can 
produce patterned yet unpredictable outcomes. Put differently, order can produce 
chaos and chaos can lead to new order.
5 Quantum is an elemental unit of energy in physics. Quantum theory states that energy is not absorbed or radiated 
continuously, but discontinuously in quanta (Guralnik, 1978, p. 612).
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However … disorder and chaos are intrinsic rather than alien properties of 
organisations. The constant disturbances that managers ﬁght contain important 
creative opportunities, which can be harnessed to produce learning that transcends 
established ways of strategic thinking. (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel, 1998, p. 
222)
3. CHAOS AND STRATEGY
In spite of this new way of thinking Ohmae says:
Quantum physics is widely accepted and recognised for its signiﬁcance. Nonetheless, 
we continue to expect that gravity will play a role in daily life. (Ohmae, 2001, p. 4)
And gravity will. Things will often continue as before and over time the models of gradual 
improvement, continuous enhancement and linear investments will pay off. But only until the 
mould is broken, until the next quantum arrives, until critical deconstruction starts something 
new.   That will happen and we cannot predict when.
This leaves us with two important questions, i.e. does the Newtonian approach to organisation 
and the way in which strategy is approached in the organisation still have a place and how do 
we prepare for quantum irregularities?
4. THE PLACE FOR THE NEWTONIAN APPROACH
Murray Gell-Mann developed an excellent model for understanding scientiﬁc theory and 
the orderly progression between theories from the most fundamental to the least, i.e. from 
mathematics, through physics, through biology to most of the behavioural sciences. He argues 
the impossibility of fundamentalism at nearly any level, but rather the importance of what he 
calls the “bridges” between sciences and scientiﬁc theory. He even allows for the maintenance 
of older theories:
The paradigm shift approach is concerned with such profound differences in 
philosophy and language between an old theory and a new one … I should like to call 
special attention to that feature, however, in order to point out that in the competition 
of schemata6  in the scientiﬁc enterprise, the triumph of one schema over another 
does not necessarily mean that the loser is abandoned and forgotten. In fact, it may 
be utilized far more often than its more accurate and sophisticated successor. That 
is certainly true for Newtonian versus Einsteinian mechanics of the solar system. 
(Murray Gell-Mann, 1995: 87)
Management science and strategy, based on Newtonian physics, have served us well and 
will probably continue to do so. What is important, however, is to maximise the lessons from 
quantum theory in our organisations.
5. KEY LESSON
The key constructs of the new theory, in very basic terms – and for the sake of our argument 
- are based on the concepts of order and chaos and the critical state in-between:
6 “Schema - An outline or image universally applicable to a general conception, under which it is likely to be presented to 
the mind; as, ﬁve dots in a line are a schema of the number ﬁve; a preceding and succeeding event are a schema of 
cause and effect” (BrainyDictionary).
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A decade of research by hundreds of other physicists has explored this question 
and taken the initial idea much further … but the basic message, roughly speaking, 
is simple: the peculiar and exceptionally unstable organisation of the critical state 
does indeed seem to be ubiquitous in our world. (Buchanan, 2003, p. 13)
Strangely enough – and a point that physicists don’t acknowledge readily - this dualism has 
an ancient philosophical heritage. It is old as the Cro-Magnon people of 25 000 years ago 
acknowledging the “struggle” between the sun and the moon, seasons, etc. It was taken 
further by Greek philosophers and their struggle with the concepts of form and matter, i.e. 
either everything is perfect form and frozen in this state or everything changes forever, “panta 
rei” (ubiquitous ﬂow), which means that Heizenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, as a philosophy, 
can be said to be 2500 years old! (This principle in Greek philosophy can also be described 
as the problem of the “one and the many” or the “plurality of cosmic unity vs. multiplicity” 
– Copleston, 1962, p. 94). 
This is an important point, for it seems that the total fabric of creation is suspended around 
the critical point of order and chaos. This includes the core fabric of the atom, quarks, through 
to the make-up of our physical world (the earth’s crust, etc.), the core tenets of the evolution 
theory, our DNA, history and all the behavioural sciences. Stable states are followed by minor 
upheavals and then, from time to time, major upheavals. We cannot predict the time of the 
upheavals nor their size, but the patterns are ubiquitous, measurable, predictable and, above 
all, certain. These patterns follow a power law and deep research into these power laws has 
been conducted; they have been well described by, among others, Mark Buchanon in his books 
Ubiquity (2000) and Small World (2003). 
6. A BASIC MODEL
The question then arises as to how we can incorporate these insights into our strategy 
preparations.  A good place to start is to look at the two elements that we have described up 
to now, i.e. change that relates to progressive, predictable (one could almost say Newtonian) 
events and change that relates to quantum events (let us call this chaotic or quantum change). 
Buchanan (2000) explains quite adequately in Ubiquity how progressive changes are merely 
stepping stones to chaotic change, i.e. these events are all part of one progression, unpredictable 
but pattern-deterministic in behaviour. In the ﬁeld of human history we experience history and 
change differently. We work with and experience gradual, or evolutionary, change in a gradual, 
daily fashion. This is the metaphorical car that we adapt, improve, ﬁt with better brakes and 
systems, etc. At the same time we work with and experience sudden quantum change where 
we re-invent. Our metaphorical means of transport might now be a ﬂying car, a totally new and 
revolutionary concept of transportation or even astral projection.
In both cases we will always be objectively involved (we will be affected by the event) and 
sometimes subjectively involved (we will be the architect of the event). History will impact on 
us, but can we impact on history and how? Once again we need to turn to a simple model (see 
Figure 20).
The model indicates a point of equilibrium or tipping point (see box on tipping points and 
criticality). The model also suggests that transformational architects, i.e. subjective (rather 
than objective) systems at work at the point of change have a better chance of survival. The 
second best chance for survival is offered to an objective system which has gone through a 
learning process, i.e. preparation for the transformation.
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This is why change agents always survive best at points of change and, at the second tier, 
people who have been prepared for change.
The critical question is: what are the characteristics of a system that is either a change agent 
or that has been prepared for change?
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Figure 20: Structured Chaos (Andersen, 2000)
Tipping points and criticality
The tipping point in the model is an interesting phenomenon and relates to the earlier references to 
a “critical state”:
The word critical arises in connection with the peculiar condition that matter gets itself into when 
poised exactly between two kinds of organisation. Water held under just those conditions, for 
example, is neither a vapour nor a liquid. This is known as the critical state since it is the knife’s 
edge between two utterly different conditions … The new theory, that is, applies to situations 
in which static, unchanging nothingness transforms into vibrant, changing dynamism, which is 
exactly what the tipping point is all about. (Buchanan, 2003, pp. 177-178)
The tipping point has a few interesting features. When a system is bombarded with forces for change 
(such as heat applied to water), change happens gradually up to a point of rapid deconstruction 
(the boiling point) at which time chaos and rapid change sets in. In a recent example the throughput 
of commodities through a port was monitored. Interestingly certain “tipping points” (expressed as 
capacity utilisation) were observed. As long as capacity utilisation remained below a certain ﬁgure, 
the port operated smoothly, but raising capacity utilisation only very slightly, beyond the observed 
tipping point, will bring utter chaos to the system (the proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s back)
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The principles of tipping points are as follows:
1. Research has shown that true creativity, change and positive transformation is accelerated 
with life “on the edge”, i.e. close to the tipping point; 
2. What is also true is that deconstruction and extinction occurs at this point, if a system cannot 
adapt; and
3. These tipping points are pervasive (they will occur), and unpredictable (due to complexity). 
Preparation for these critical states therefore lies in two types of behaviour: (1) preparing for 
transformation through learning; and (2) trying to be subjective (i.e. the architect) in the process, 
rather than objective. This would require becoming a transformational architect.
7. MODEL APPLICATIONS
We can apply the model depicted in Figure 20 to three organisational perspectives, i.e. 
structure, organisational behaviour and business processes.
7.1 Structure
The application of chaos theory to structure is depicted in Figure 21.
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Figure 21: Organisational structure and criticality
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• Hierarchical structures have little survivability during either evolutionary or quantum 
change. This is because information sharing and communication is sluggish, creativity 
is layered and therefore often suppressed, and slight changes cause collapse.
• The matrix structure allows for better communication, but is still slow and rigid. It 
therefore supports survival during gradual change and allows organisations to adopt 
new schemata. During rapid change conﬂict often arises around the two-directional 
arrows, which slows reaction time and is often fatal.
• The amoeba structure doesn’t allow for the re-invention of a speciﬁc cell, but rather 
its “spawning”. This means that cells in themselves often don’t grow and many die, 
but rapid change and extinction allow some to survive. Many organisations toying with 
amoeba structures are dumbfounded that many small businesses which were started 
didn’t survive. 
• The wave structure supports the best qualities of both the matrix and amoeba structure. 
It allows for teamwork and ﬂow (such as in matrix organisations), but it is not based on 
rigid rules. It allows for “spawning” as the resonance of the wave expands, but it keeps 
the original wavelength and resonance intact, i.e. it has strong learning controls.
7.2 Organisational behaviour
The application of chaos theory to organisational behaviour is depicted in Figure 22 below.
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Figure 22: Organisational behaviour and criticality
• Hive behaviour refers to an incessant need to stick together and work inwardly rather 
than outwardly. Because nothing in the external environment is noticed, no change 
(evolutionary or quantum) is supported. 
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• Army behaviour can deal with evolutionary change, because it adapts to new situations 
over time, but struggles with quantum changes as supply lines become stressed. 
• In a stampede evolutionary change is not possible, because the core links between 
nodes do not operate any longer. The very nature of a stampede, however, literally 
means that some elements will outrun the problem. 
• Flock behaviour encapsulates the best elements of army and stampede behaviour. 
The behaviour is outwardly focused and the vision is to move forward. The load is 
shared and different elements take turns to lead. The communication is ﬂuid and 
bi-directional, but the links between the nodes are strong. Critical events will have 
difﬁculty destroying the core “resonance” and survivability is at its highest.
7.3 Process
In classic process theory, depicted in Figure 23, functions are seen as rigidly following on each 
other, with various roles taking responsibility for each step. This approach leads to an insidious 
state of tension and poor integration between various organisational functions, for instance 
the classical battle between marketing, production and logistics.  It is extremely challenging 
for the organisation to change direction successfully.
Raw 
materials
Manufacturing Marketing Distribution
Figure 23: Classic process model
In the new approach, (depicted in Figure 24) processes are seen as seamless waves. The 
resonance of the wave is carried from event to event and all parties are involved in each step 
(like a ﬂock), but different parties might be “ﬂying in front”. A clear description of goals (though 
easy to adapt) is critical in such complex systems.
The new theory can be taken further to look at more complex systems, such as cultural DNA.
8. CULTURAL DNA
The idea of a “point of criticality” can be taken much further into all complex adaptive systems 
and even groups of complex adaptive systems, i.e. cultures. Gell-Mann (1995) describes how 
cultures adopt certain schemata and then adapt these through the life of a culture. On a very 
basic level cultures apply dominant schemata right away when the circumstances that require 
the application arise (i.e. moving to the hills when the plains are dry or performing a speciﬁc 
rain dance). At the next level revolution takes place and different schemata are adopted (in 
our example different agricultural techniques might be applied or different religions adopted). 
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Finally, at the highest level, survival or extinction occurs. These factors also have a time 
scale:
The three levels of adaptation take place, generally speaking, on different time scales. 
An existing dominant schema can be translated into action right away, within days 
or months. A revolution in the hierarchy of schemata is generally associated with a 
longer time scale, although the culminating events may come swiftly. Extinctions of 
societies usually take place at still longer intervals of time. (Gell-Mann, 1995: 294)
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Figure 24: The new process model
(Notice that the word “schemata” can be interchanged with strategy, which makes Gell-Mann’s 
excellent best-seller on quantum physics The Quark and the Jaguar (1995) an interesting and 
enlightening book on strategy.) We can take this description further and relate it directly to the 
IME model (Figure 4). This points us to the criticality between growth and decline as depicted 
in Figure 25.
We often ask the question about strategic “time horizons”. Generally speaking, operational 
procedures or internal strategies are quicker to adopt and deploy than external strategies. 
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Figure 25: IME, criticalities and time
It is also important to note the conﬁrmation that survival cannot be determined internally 
– that would be a contradiction in terms. Survival means “hanging on” in an external context 
and can therefore only be referenced externally, which in turn means it can only be understood 
and conﬁrmed on that level. Extinction is always the failure of a system to interact externally. 
At the same time revolution can never be successful as an internal concept. Change merely 
for the sake of change will always fail. Revolution is always about a system’s interaction in 
the market place through transformation. The most common example would be to purchase 
commodities in the market place (i.e. revolutionising the ﬂow of these commodities), transform 
these and sell them, once more in the market place (thereby revolutionising previous acquisition 
patterns of the transformed commodities).
Internally we talk about operations. A growing system will increase and optimise operations in 
an efﬁcient and effective way. In the declining state, inertia sets in and the system eventually 
runs down.
Strategies, as stated earlier and conﬁrmed by this model, have to deal with all three levels.
9. SUMMARY
The fundamental science of physics should be linked to the behavioural sciences in a more 
conscious fashion. Exploitation of this bridge has revealed to us that Newtonian physics 
have been enriched by quantum physics and that many of these principles are still lost on 
management science and strategy. At the centre of this learning is our new understanding of 
creativity, which is at its strongest at the point of criticality.
This understanding prepares us for the next step, the actual strategy development process.
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Final Take-out
NEWTONIAN PHYSICS AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE – Physics is one of the “fundamental” sciences 
and Newtonian physics in many ways the reference point of modern management science and 
strategic thinking.
PLANCK, EINSTEIN AND HEISENBERG – Physics has moved on from the Newtonian age to the age of 
quantum physics.
CHAOS AND STRATEGY – If physicians have adopted quantum physics, so should management 
scientists and strategists.
THE PLACE FOR THE NEWTONIAN APPROACH – The fundamental principles of Newtonian physics 
have served us well. We need to expand our thinking, rather than change it.
KEY LESSON – Everything is suspended around the critical point of order and chaos.
A BASIC MODEL – At the core of criticality is a tipping point, which is certain but unpredictable. 
MODEL APPLICATIONS – Preparation for the “tipping event” can involve trying to be a change architect, 
preferably, or at least trying to learn and prepare for the event.
CULTURAL DNA – Cultural change is also hierarchical, where survival and extinction are dependent 
on revolution and counter-revolution, operation and inertia. 
SUMMARY – The new science enriches the old science and expands our understanding of strategy.
 THE STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
CHAPTER 5
THE STRATEGIC PROCESS IN ACTION 
Guidelines for effective consultative thinking
Critical issues for this chapter
ASSUMING THE PROCESS – Can we propose a standard strategic process?
DECONSTRUCTING THE PROCESS – How do we get from theory to practice?
GROUPWORK – How do we optimise groupwork?
SUMMARY – How do we pull these thoughts together?
1. ASSUMING THE PROCESS
Many authors on strategic thinking, development and implementation generally assume the 
actual creative process. A lot of work has been done on Nominal Group Techniques, teamwork, 
etc., but it is not always clear if a speciﬁc, deﬁned and implementable process can be put into 
action that will deliver results and will ensure wide participation. The objective is quite clear: 
we would like a process that will ensure depth of thought and maximum participation (refer 
to Chapter 1).
In the ﬁrst chapter we deduced that, when trying to achieve any goal in any human endeavour, 
it is necessary to consult widely and let all affected parties consider their strengths and 
advantages, all the weaknesses and disadvantages, map out a course of activities to achieve 
the goal and implement these activities.
In a very basic sense this guides us to the strategic process. It is not much more than this on 
a basic and uncomplicated level and it is, in a certain sense, unnecessary to complicate the 
process further. The obvious aspects to add are effective intelligence gathering and possible 
future events in the external environment (often called scenarios).
This would extend our deﬁnition to say: when trying to achieve any goal in any human 
endeavour, consult widely and gather as much intelligence as possible, let all affected 
consider their strengths and advantages, all weaknesses and disadvantages, map out a 
course of activities to achieve the goal (taking into account expected future events) and 
implement these activities.
The deﬁnition is becoming a bit unwieldy, but can now be seen as a comprehensive strategic 
planning deﬁnition and, ultimately, as describing the strategic planning process.
2. DECONSTRUCTING THE PROCESS
In this second part of the book the reader is provided with a step-by-step guide to steer a 
large group through this process. The authors have applied the process to a wide variety of 
companies over the last few years and will refer to some speciﬁc examples. It was decided 
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to use four case studies, i.e. a large utility, a large food production company, a municipality, 
and a paper products manufacturer. These companies are all currently operating in Africa 
and some abroad; care is taken to protect their identities. In most cases this was achieved by 
“composite” cases, i.e. incorporating the story of more than one company in the same industry 
in the case study.  The case studies are discussed in Chapter 16 and it will be useful for the 
reader to read the cases before the rest of Part 2 is studied.
The strategic process followed in the rest of this book is deconstructed in Figure 26.
Market intelligence
Strategic choice
Positioning 
opportunities
Current state 
description
Internal analysis
Scenario building
Strategy 
implementation
Figure 26: The strategic process
2.1 Introduction to the elements of the strategic process
The strategic session is normally scheduled over a 2-day period.  Depending on the company’s 
situation at the time, certain elements will receive more attention and others less.  The logic 
of the process does, however, remain valid and guides participants through a certain thought 
process to facilitate strategic thinking.  But it is critical to keep in mind that the strategic 
process of an organisation must never be limited to this discussion.  The intelligence gathering, 
strategic discussions and debate that inform strategic choice should be a continuous process. 
The strategic session is in many instances simply required to formalise and align the strategic 
choice for communication to the broader stakeholder base, which includes employees, 
investors and regulators alike.
The elements of the strategic process are brieﬂy introduced here.  The details of each element 
are described in the rest of Part 2 and 3.
1. Market intelligence – An understanding of the internal, market and external 
environments is critical to inform strategic decisions. 
2. Current state description – The management team must articulate the strategic issue 
that has to be addressed, e.g. is it an annual strategic review, is it a decision to change 
the course of the business, or are we trying to deal with a very speciﬁc issue within the 
business?
3. Positioning opportunities – This is a view external to the company and is normally 
valid for most companies operating in this or similar industries.  What is required of 
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a company in my industry to be successful?  What are the key opportunities to be 
exploited and what are the key threats that should be counteracted?  
4. Internal analysis – We also need to understand what the company’s internal strengths 
and weaknesses are, as this will impact on which strategies can be executed.
5. Scenario analysis – Scenario analysis enables us to determine the future robustness 
of our strategic choice.  We identify and describe the external forces that will have the 
most signiﬁcant impact on our business in future.  Once a strategic choice has been 
made, we assume that it has been successfully implemented and look at the changed 
company.  Will that changed company survive in the given future scenarios that we 
deﬁned?
6. Strategic choice – The management team must take into account the prior analysis 
and make the “strategic sum”.  Given everything that we are faced with (good and bad), 
what should the business do to deliver maximum value to all stakeholders?
7. Strategy implementation – The real work starts here!  Firstly, we must understand the 
readiness of our organisation to implement the strategy.  Are the leaders equipped 
for implementation?  Does the current company culture support the implementation? 
Do our people and processes have the capacity to implement the chosen strategy? 
Secondly, we must develop a plan to consciously track the implementation of the 
strategy.  We make use of Kaplan & Norton’s Balanced Scorecard approach (refer to 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 15).
3. GROUPWORK
It is by no means necessary for a large group to have a speciﬁc face-to-face “event” to exercise 
the described process. The process could be virtual, executed over a period of time. For the 
sake of simplicity and because the more complex options become a ﬁeld of study in themselves, 
the simple face-to-face strategic “breakaway” is assumed. The incredible amount of waste still 
related to and observed at these sessions means that an improvement of these processes 
speciﬁcally will make a contribution.
When groups meet a few basic principles are at work:
1. The process should allow maximum participation. The process must be designed in 
such a way that all present have an opportunity to participate at all levels. 
2. A speciﬁc objective must be achieved. This is true for the overall meeting and for sub-
elements of the meeting. Each discussion must have an objective and outcome.
3. Ensure that the group represents relevant disciplines of the organisation.  Valid 
conclusions can only be reached if all relevant perspectives are taken into account. 
Creative tension is an advantage, if applied correctly. 
4. “Breakaway” groups are only useful if the groups stay close together and the results 
are thoroughly summarised.  It is often a good idea to have the discussion in a big 
hall, with plenary discussions in the middle and breakaway groups in the corners. 
This means that “contact” is never lost, the “strategic energy” rises in the room and 
delegates are not tempted to wander off.   After each breakaway group meeting, the 
facilitator must take care to capture and summarise the key points from all groups and 
strategically interpret these for the delegates. 
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5. The composition of the breakaway groups must be representative of the larger group. 
The facilitator must put in some effort to “balance” groups, according to functions, 
knowledge and experience. This need not be, and in most cases should not be, a 
democratic process.
6. The quality of facilitation is crucial.  It is our belief that the strategic thought process 
must be guided by an independent strategy facilitator.  The successful management of 
the group interaction, the succinct summary of the group feedback and the strategic 
interpretation of the results are key to the success of the session. 
7. Open space technology ideas are useful (see box on open space technology). This 
process allows the free emergence of ideas, but also for free adherence to these ideas. 
Delegates should never be forced to occupy a space to which they cannot subscribe.
(Refer to Chapter 9 for criteria for participants.)
Open space technology
Open space technology (OST) was created in the eighties, based on the ground-breaking work of 
Harrison Owen and described in his book, Open Space Technology: A User’s Guide (1995). The groupwork 
application is especially useful in large groups (hundreds and even thousands of people) that need to 
join in consultative thinking. There is no obvious minimum or maximum, but what is more important 
is for the practitioner to take note of Owen’s principles and apply these, especially for larger groups. 
We have used the methodology, in groups of 300 and more, and some of the principles for groups of 
around 50. It works.
OST works best for large diverse groups looking for an unknown solution. If a strong leader “thinks” 
he has a solution and wants to bring that to the table, the approach will not work. The technology is 
based on creating a circle (the fundamental geometry of human communication) and openly allows 
anybody to state a cause/solution/line-of-thinking associated with the problem. Breakaway spaces 
are created where “cause leaders” can hold discussions on their topic. At a “market place” discussion 
times and appointments are posted by the “cause leaders”. The “cause leader” then captures the 
proceedings and these results are brought to the plenary circle for communication.
All attendance, leadership, etc. is voluntary. Anybody can post a “cause”, explore it, arrange discussions 
and write up the proceedings (even if only one person joins the discussion, but the write up must 
illustrate who the course leader was and who participated). Anybody can attend any discussion, 
remain with one, move from one to the other or not even participate at all. Strangely enough, the 
process works very well for large groups and it is a great way of getting these groups through a useful 
experience. Owen says that “voluntary self-selection is the absolute sine qua non for participation in 
an Open Space event” (Owen, 1995, 22).
The core values attached to OST are: 1. Show up, 2. Be Present, 3. Tell the Truth, and 4. Let it all go. 
The ultimate facilitator “will do nothing and remain totally invisible”. The principles are: 1. Whoever 
comes are the right people, 2. Whatever happens is the only thing that could have, 3. Whenever it 
starts is the right time, and 4. When it is over it is over.
3.1 The nominal group technique
It has been estimated that as much as 50-80% of a manager’s time is spent in group meetings 
(Virginia Institute of Government).  Most managers, however, feel that much of this time is 
not spent effectively.  We certainly do not want the strategic session to contribute to this 
perception!
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Various methods can be employed by the facilitator during a strategic workshop to enhance 
creativity and productivity, to balance and increase participation and to reduce errors based 
on groupthink. According to Hill & Jones (1995, p. 21), groupthink “occurs when a group of 
decision makers embarks on a course of action without questioning underlying assumptions.” 
This is normally the case when a strong individual hijacks the process.
The method we follow is based on the Nominal Group Technique, developed by Andrew Delbecq 
and Andrew Van de Ven (as described in an article by the Virginia Institute of Government) 
speciﬁcally to counter the problems experienced during groupwork.  The purpose of the 
technique is to eliminate social and psychological dynamics of group behaviour which tend to 
inhibit individual creativity and participation in group decisions. 
The steps in the technique are depicted in Figure 27 below:
Silent idea 
generation
Final vote on 
priorities
Discussion
Round-robin 
feedback & 
recording
Prelim vote on 
priorities
Discussion
Facilitator 
preparation
Capturing of 
results
Figure 27: Steps in the nominal group technique
To ensure the successful participation of the group and the validity of results, the facilitator 
must prepare thoroughly and clearly formulate each issue to be addressed.  This is normally 
done in conjunction with the leader of the team.
The silent generation of ideas in writing provides each individual with the opportunity to focus, 
think about the issue at hand and generate ideas.  It avoids the typical scenario where strong 
personalities dictate the outcome.  The result is more diverse and creative.
The facilitator then gives participants the opportunity to describe ideas on a round-robin basis 
until everyone’s list is exhausted.  Each idea is recorded.  This process allows for conﬂicting 
ideas to be recorded and reinforces participation and concentration.  The facilitator must not 
allow discussions and debate to start before all ideas have been recorded; there is always a 
risk that a very creative idea could be lost!
The opportunity is then provided to brieﬂy debate each idea that has been recorded.  The 
facilitator must ensure that ideas are properly qualiﬁed and that all ideas receive equal 
attention.  This approach promotes the critique of ideas and not individuals.  
The participants then cast a preliminary vote to determine priorities.  To ensure that this is a truly 
democratic process and all votes are equal, this is normally done silently and independently. 
Each participant chooses and lists three ideas in order of priority.  The facilitator collects and 
collates the votes.
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The opportunity is provided to discuss the result of the preliminary vote.  Any uncertainties 
must be clariﬁed.  At this stage, the penny-principle also kicks in… 
Whenever you’re called on to make up your mind,
And you’re hampered by not having any
The simplest way to solve the dilemma, you’ll ﬁnd,
Is simply by ﬂipping a penny.
No, not so that chance shall decide the affair
As you’re passively standing there moping.
But as soon as the penny is up in the air, 
You’ll suddenly know what you’re hoping.
(The Economics Press (UK) Ltd, p. 3)
The ﬁnal vote on priorities is then cast in the same manner as the preliminary vote.  All 
members now have the opportunity to independently contribute and judge ideas, increasing 
the commitment to the process and the results.
The results must be captured to ensure that a record of the priorities is kept.
A variation is to divide the group into subgroups.  (Our experience has indicated that the ideal 
size is approximately 6 members per group, although it becomes extremely difﬁcult to facilitate 
more than three sub-groups – i.e. in groups of more than 18 people we allow for sub-group 
sizes of more than 6.)  Each group then generates ideas and the ideas are then summarised 
in the same manner as above.  This allows for some strategic debate prior to the discussion 
with the larger group, and enhances thinking and understanding of the issue.
Depending on the time available, the sub-groups can work on the same topic or on different 
topics.  Different topics are not always advisable, however, as cross-pollination between the 
various groups is invaluable for strategic energy and creativity.
4. SUMMARY
The strategic process consists of a few basic elements that can guide a management team 
through a thought process to make a strategic choice.  The quality of facilitation, the quality of 
the team and the extent of the participation from all members of the team will determine the 
validity of the strategic choice made.  
Final take-out
ASSUMING THE PROCESS – The strategic process can be deﬁned and applied to any strategic issue.
DECONSTRUCTING THE PROCESS – The elements of the strategic process are basic strategic concepts 
that can be learnt and applied.
GROUPWORK – Groupwork is an essential part of strategic choice.  The basic principle is to allow 
wide, unjudged participation, guided by an experienced facilitator. 
SUMMARY – The old maxim applies: “What you put in, is what you get out”.  The strategic process is 
simple, but the quality of the output is determined by the quality of the input.
CHAPTER 6
PREPARING FOR EFFECTIVE DISCUSSIONS
Basic thoughts for research – war intelligence gathering
Critical issues for this chapter
IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE – Do we need to know?
THE DRIVERS OF INTELLIGENCE – How do we make trade-offs?
THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE – What is the link between decision-making and intelligence?
THE IMPORTANCE OF DECISIONS – How do we minimise inertia?
THE LOGISTICS OF INTELLIGENCE – Bridging the time and place differential
TYPICAL STRATEGIC INFORMATION – Principles for selection of strategic tools
SUMMARY - How do we pull these thoughts together?
1. IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE
There are a huge number of case studies explaining and illustrating the value of good intelligence 
before any campaign – be it military, scientiﬁc, business, sports or personal. Intelligence 
successes, such as those in the Second World War where Japanese and German codes were 
broken and subterfuge was successful (such as with D-day), are also well known. But what is 
the minimum amount of intelligence required before certain decisions are made? And how 
long should intelligence efforts last before a decision is taken? A few practical questions will 
almost always remain unanswered.
One of the interesting examples of the role of (or the lack of) intelligence is the exploits of 
the conquistadors in South America at the height of Spain’s domination of the world. The 
conquistadors used subterfuge to get the village together; killed many of them based on 
trumped-up religious reasons for a “war”, then caught the local king or leader and ransomed 
him for all the gold that the rest of the population could bring. This seems like an excellent 
strategy – though quite cruel - but under what conditions will the strategy not work? One such 
a condition would be the spread of knowledge of the Spanish strategy, which remarkably, right 
through their campaign – over years – didn’t spread for more than 40 kilometres at a time. 
What would have been important for the inhabitants of South America? If they could have 
warned other villages quickly, with an accurate description of what the Spanish were up to and 
if they could do it without further major loss of life (i.e. keep the “cost” of the intelligence down), 
they would have done well. Intelligence almost always has these three important drivers, i.e. 
speed, accuracy/quality and cost. These three elements are involved in a perpetual trade-off 
that can be quite difﬁcult to manage.
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2. THE DRIVERS OF INTELLIGENCE
This then points us to the drivers of intelligence depicted in Figure 28.
COST
ExpensiveCheap
QUALITY /  ACCURACY
High Q
Low Q
SPEED
Slow
Fast
Figure 28: The drivers of intelligence
1. Intelligence that is gathered quickly is worthless if it is (i) inaccurate or of very poor 
quality and (ii) too expensive (costing more than the potential gain from the resultant 
campaign on which it is based).
2. Intelligence that is accurate and of high quality is equally worthless if (i) it is received 
too late to inﬂuence a campaign, (ii) an important campaign is delayed up to the 
point where it cannot be launched anymore (the opportunity is lost) or (iii) it is too 
expensive.
3. Cheap intelligence is also worthless if (i) the quality is substandard or (ii) it is obtained 
too late.
The intention with intelligence, like all production factors, is to get the most efﬁcient and 
effective result for that production factor. That is, we would like cheap intelligence that is useful 
and accurate, immediately. Unlike some of the other, more “common” production factors, 
this is often not managed properly. In the time of the knowledge economy many economies, 
especially emerging and third world economies, still have to learn this lesson.
Knowledge management as such has become a major discipline in the ﬁrst world, aptly 
highlighted by well-documented case studies, such as Buckman Laboratories7. Yet, we lack 
an uncomplicated and simple approach to incorporate it into the strategic process and often, 
even in the ﬁrst world, make the trade-off mistakes. If we take Figure 28 a little bit further 
and attempt to analyse the trade-offs, certain speciﬁc issues are highlighted as depicted in 
Figure 29.
7 Buckman is a benchmark knowledge management case study used in business schools around the world. Tom Peters 
gives a short, but precise, summary in Liberation Management (1992, p. 426-427).
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The ﬁgure illustrates poor, below average, above average and winning zones. But how does one 
get from expensive intelligence which is slow to acquire and of poor quality to the opposite?
 
COST
ExpensiveCheap
QUALITY /  ACCURACY
High Q
Low Q
SPEED
Slow
Fast
Cheap, slow, 
low Q
Expensive, 
slow, low Q
Expensive, 
fast, low Q
Expensive, 
fast, high Q
Cheap, fast, 
high Q
Cheap, slow, 
high Q
Below averagePoor
Above average Winning zone
Figure 29: The drivers of intelligence analysed
The illustration presupposes a startlingly obvious fact and that is that some form of (costly) 
investment in intelligence already exists. This sounds somewhat paradoxical, but is actually 
quite true. The opportunity cost of absent intelligence is high and should be considered. The 
routes to improvement are depicted in Figure 30. 
COST
ExpensiveCheap
QUALITY /  ACCURACY
High Q
Low Q
SPEED
Slow
Fast
a
*
*
b
Figure 30: The routes to improvement
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Either reduce the opportunity cost of intelligence and then improve the quality (a) or ﬁrst 
improve the speed at which intelligence is gathered and then improve the quality (b).
Reduce the opportunity cost by refusing research that will be too late to inﬂuence decisions and 
penalising managers that withhold or fail to gather important information in time (i.e. quantify 
and manage the opportunity cost downwards). This usually leads to more cost–efﬁcient, on-
time and better-quality information.
Improve the speed of intelligence by teaching people intelligence-gathering techniques, 
maintaining a conceptual model with referenced information of business issues in real time 
and insisting that all situations are analysed timeously to the extent that this is possible (and 
analysis is nearly always possible in strategic situations). This usually leads to quicker analysis 
time, analysis “ﬁtness” and reduced opportunity cost of information.
Don’t necessarily start by improving quality. There is nothing wrong with quality research, 
but quality merely for the sake of quality is an academic approach. Quality for its own sake 
(in research) is exactly what it is, quality research which is always important, but for generic 
systems, such as addressed by the academic world. A system under strategic stress can often 
break, if quality is sought merely for its own sake. The trade-offs are important. 
3. THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE
The next important aspect in intelligence gathering is to understand the role that the process 
plays within every system. Intelligence does not exist for any other strategic reason but to 
improve decision-making. This presupposes the answer to an important strategic question: 
what is the link between decision-making and intelligence (i.e. how do these processes hang 
together)?
A better understanding of the question is achieved by ﬁrst understanding the core aspects of 
the two processes separately, and then search for the link.  The intelligence-gathering process 
has three basic elements as illustrated in Figure 31.
The collection of dataGet
The codification and analysis of dataCode
The sharing of informationShare
Figure 31: Basic elements of the intelligence-gathering process 
The intelligence-gathering process consists of these three basic elements, which we call the 
get, code, share model:
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• The gathering of data (get) requires the efﬁcient and effective collection of data. This 
can invlove anything between a single focus group or a limited range of interviews, 
on the one hand, or a full-blown market study, feasibility study or portfolio analysis of 
businesses, on the other hand.
• The codiﬁcation of data (code) requires the illustrative codiﬁcation and analysis of 
data. The link to the next step is important here. The results of the analysis must 
be accessible to the ﬁnal user or decision maker. This means that thick reports of a 
highly scientiﬁc nature cannot be the only output. These reports can be useful to the 
scientist or academic who needs to continue the research or build on it. It is of no use 
to the decision maker, if it cannot be understood or used. The codiﬁcation and analysis 
therefore must lead to illustrative data – in the context of the business model.
• The sharing of information (share) requires the passing on of the intelligence to the 
decision maker in such a way that decision-making is enabled. This presupposes in-
time, useful and understandable information at the place where it is required.
Hitt et al. describe the most effective strategists as:
… having the self-conﬁdence necessary to select the best alternatives, allocate the 
required level of resources to them and effectively explain to interested parties why 
certain alternatives were selected. (Hill et al., 2003, p. 29)
He therefore describes a model of “decide, resource and communicate”. Ferrier picks the 
model up earlier by stating that:
The upper echelons and strategic decision-making literature suggest that managerial 
cognition and experience inﬂuences three key managerial activities: problem-sensing 
facilitated by greater awareness; interpretation and enactment of environmental 
cues and signals; and a decision-making process that matches perceived problems 
with strategic solutions. (Ferrier in Bresser, 2000, p. 170)
This then is a model of “sense, process and decide”. These two approaches provide us with a 
simple model depicted in Figure 32.
Decide
Sense
Process
Resource
Communicate
Figure 32: A simple decision-making model
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The model has three distinguishable parts, i.e. sense and process (the discovery area), decide 
(the strategic action area), and resource and communicate (the implementation area). This 
simple model points to some grave mistakes in strategic thinking and intelligence gathering.
3.1 The decision-making model explored
Textbooks often refer to the importance of having a “strategic model” of the system or business 
in place. Gell-Mann (1995) talks about a “schema” or “partial schema” and it should be 
remembered that developing, maintaining, growing, renewing and rediscovering this “schema” 
is probably the most important of all strategic activities. 
What the model teaches us is that the interrelationships and three distinct areas require a 
different perspective on intelligence and conceptual model maintenance.
The interrelationships relate to the nature of the activities in question. The area between sensing 
and processing requires (a) the application of illustrative analysis (i.e. some strategic decision-
making context for the processing), between sensing and decision, (b) the commissioning of 
validatory research (i.e. some processing of what was sensed) and between processing and 
deciding, (c) the validation of what is “sensed” by the leadership or system (Figure 33).
Decide
Sense
Process
Resource
Communicate
a
b
c
d
e
f
Figure 33: The interrelationships of the decision-making model
It also has a bearing on the common mistakes in intelligence relationships that are often 
made.
We often feel the urge to short-circuit the process by:
• Concentrating on sensing and processing only, i.e. building the “perfect research” with 
no regard for the fact that research must lead to decisions (in the strategic context) 
otherwise it is worthless;
• Concentrating on sensing and decision only, i.e. the typical picture of a leader that 
manages on “hunches” by the “seat of his/her pants” where no systemic processing of 
information takes place and mistakes are often made;
• Concentrating on processing and deciding only, i.e. where we’ve build such complex 
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and entrenched research systems that we ignore new information that doesn’t ﬁt the 
code and we therefore regard as useless, irrespective of its apparent urgency. (It took 
the American Navy many accidents and the loss of many men before they realised 
that the navy will lose more men and material through bad weather than battle. The 
system was set up to respond to “battle strategic information” and “weather strategic 
information” was regarded as second tier although the mariners themselves sensed 
that this was incorrect).
The same is obviously true for the other side of the equation. The decide–resource link 
(d) requires communication, the decide–communicate link (e) requires substance (which 
resources will be deployed) and the resource–communicate link (f) requires substance or 
context (on what decisions are the resource decisions based). Also here the urge to short-
circuit the process exists:
• Concentrating on decisions and resourcing, we often forget to communicate, thereby 
keeping the system or business in the dark, making it difﬁcult to deploy the resources 
effectively;
• Concentrating on decisions and communication, we fail to provide the system with the 
necessary resources to execute the decision, thereby making it impossible for the plan 
to work; and
• Concentrating on resourcing and communication, we fail to provide the context of the 
resources, thereby allowing these resources to be misused and wasted.
The three distinct areas of the model relate to three different requirements for intelligence, or 
different types of conceptual models, for the business (Figure 34).
Strategic caucus
Strategic
Scenario builders, 
strategic researchers
Exploratory
Functional fields 
(Finance, HR, 
Operations, Sales)
People involved
Tactical and 
operational
Type of conceptual 
model
Decide
Sense
Process
Resource
Communicate
cide
nse
rocess
source
municate
Figure 34: Three distinct areas of intelligence
The intelligence and conceptual model in the ﬁrst part is exploratory, in the second part 
strategic and in the third part tactical and operational. Many case studies have been observed 
where a critical error occurs here. Operationally modelled intelligence is not sufﬁcient for 
strategic decision-making or exploration, and vice versa. This is because:
• Exploratory models deﬁne the (external) playing ﬁeld of the business, the underlying 
economics (supply and demand), the value chain, etc. Knowledge of your own business’ 
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ﬁnancials, output or staff turnover is of little value here. The output of exploratory 
models is strategic constructs that will be used to determine positioning
• Strategic models deﬁne the competitive position of the business in terms of these 
strategic constructs and include portfolio analysis, supply chain analysis, etc. Once 
again knowledge of your own performance is of little use. The output of these models 
are decisions on operational drivers for success
• Tactical and operational models deﬁne progress with operational drivers such as 
ﬁnancials, ﬁnancial ratios, production output and throughput, staff turnover, etc.
Many businesses will enter a strategic thinking session with only operational intelligence. That 
is as good as saying your body will survive a walk to the south pole merely because you are ﬁt. 
More questions need to be answered such as: What is typically required for a walk to the south 
pole? What will the weather do? What does the terrain look like? These questions sound so 
obvious, but in business terms they are often not answered.
A ﬁnal thought on this matter is the question of who should be involved with what? This is a 
less important question to answer that the fact that this work should involve three disparate 
cycles of thought. In a small business it could be the same person, in a very large business 
exploratory work could be done by a scenario committee or even a range of them, strategic 
work by an extended top management team, and tactical and operational work through the 
business planning process of the functional teams. The important aspect is however that the 
thought processes should remain separate.
4. THE IMPORTANCE OF DECISIONS
Decision-making is at the heart of our model. Is there a reason for this? This is another aspect 
learnt from numerous case studies that seems obvious, but is not necessarily experienced 
as such. Decision-making is at the core of business, management and strategic thinking. 
Without making a decision, inertia sets in – the death knell for strategic management. The 
core output of top management work is decisions. So which manager is better in a given 
situation? One that makes 90 correct and 10 incorrect decisions or one that makes 19 correct 
and 1 incorrect decision? If learning follows both cases, the ﬁrst scenario must be the better 
one. Not only will the leader have 80 more decisions as output, but 71 more sound decisions 
to take the business forward. And not only will that, probably, be enough to counter the extra 
9 wrong decisions, the leader will learn from the experience and improve the ratio of correct 
to incorrect over time.
The analysis and conceptual model, therefore, must always facilitate decision-making at the 
right time and place.
5. THE LOGISTICS OF INTELLIGENCE
The time and place issue leads to a discussion of logistics. Logistics could be deﬁned as the 
time and place differential of any commodity’s value. This means that a commodity often has no 
economic value at the time and place of the commodity’s production. (This obviously includes 
intermediate production in all its phases up to the point of consumption). If the commodity 
could be moved to the point of future consumption and kept there (or vice versa, or stored 
at both ends, or stored at another place) the value of the commodity will increase up to the 
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point of ﬁnal consumption – when the relative value is at its highest. A lot of the value of the 
commodity could be tied up in the logistics, i.e. thermal coal, produced in South Africa, might 
cost R50 to produce, but more than R200 to get to the designated furnace in Europe. Coal that 
doesn’t make it there, or is lost along the way, or as in some cases spontaneously combusts in 
stockpiles in the harbour will not only be worthless, but could easily have a negative value.
This means that all views on intelligence must include the logistics behind the intelligence as 
well. How will I make sure that the consumer of intelligence has the information ready exactly 
at the time when it is needed?
The ﬁeld of knowledge management has emerged to ﬁll this vacuum lately, and a large body 
of studies that support the identifying, codiﬁcation, protection and application of business’ 
knowledge assets (which are both tangible and intangible) has appeared. Many IT departments, 
which in the eighties and nineties were quite destructive in business, began to understand 
their role as the custodian of this knowledge ﬂow on all levels. The ﬂow as such, depicted 
in Figure 35, used to be seen as three disjointed events and managed as such. The trend 
recently has been to manage these events and applications as a seamless process, based on 
the same data warehouse.
DATA WAREHOUSE
Market share data
Financial results
Sales data
DECISION MAKING
Strategic information
FUNCTIONAL 
Tactical information
TRANSACTIONAL
Operational information
Figure 35: Hierarchical, but integrated intelligence 
If this is a seamless model, which elements of the model are important to the strategist? To 
answer this question we can once again return to the IME model (Figure 4).
6. TYPICAL STRATEGIC INFORMATION
The ﬁeld of strategic analysis is richly endowed with all sorts of tools, some of these quite 
brilliant. 
We once again point you to two principles, i.e.:
• Establish a holistic picture of all three areas (IME); and
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• Integrate this picture into the overall conceptual model of the business and update 
frequently, if not periodically.
In order to achieve this objective we brieﬂy discuss four typical examples of models to obtain 
strategic intelligence.
6.1 External – Social Monitor/Triple Bottom Line 
(This paragraph is based on the publication “JSE SRI Index: Background and Selection Criteria”, 
2003.)
The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2002 (King II) (available from 
the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa) urges companies to embrace the triple bottom 
line as a method of doing business. At the same time, any attempt to develop triple bottom 
line practices needs to be balanced with the need for companies to make a return for their 
shareholders. 
The JSE Securities Exchange of South Africa developed a set of criteria to measure the triple 
bottom line performance of companies in the FTSE/JSE All Share Index. These criteria will 
form the basis of the Socially Responsible Investment (“SRI”) Index (participation in which is 
voluntary at the moment).
The criteria take into account that this is still an emerging business practice and the focus is 
to encourage companies to implement and report on their triple bottom line strategies and 
activities. It is expected that the criteria will evolve over time as the ability to measure these 
activities evolves.
The SRI is structured along the three pillars of the triple bottom line - environment, society 
and economy - each of which must be addressed if the company is truly to be said to have 
integrated sustainability into its business practices. 
• Pillar 1 - Environmental sustainability:  Africa’s rich resource base has to be used 
wisely if it is to provide sustainable support for the development of Southern Africa and 
its people.  All companies have an impact on environmental resources; they therefore 
need to develop strategies to measure and monitor their impacts and implement 
systems that ensure that these resources are used in a sustainable manner;
• Pillar 2 – Economic sustainability: Economic sustainability refers to balancing short-
term ﬁnancial performance with long-term growth and sustainability; and
• Pillar 3 – Social sustainability: Companies need to establish a culture of non-
discrimination, inclusivity and fairness in all aspects of business.  This includes 
promoting the social upliftment, development and poverty reduction of its staff and 
the communities in which it operates. 
The fundamental corporate governance principles of fairness, accountability, responsibility 
and transparency are common to all three the pillars - corporate governance is therefore 
the foundation in which each pillar of the triple bottom line is embedded. Consequently it is 
dealt with separately in the SRI.  The key challenge is to achieve a balance between ﬁnancial 
performance and compliance with the triple bottom line, while taking account of stakeholder 
expectations. 
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The criteria measure the following business practices:
• Policy and strategy:  Policies and strategy must deﬁne the company’s speciﬁc challenges 
in each of the pillars, determine its current impact and commit to the implementation 
of reasonable progress targets for long-term sustainability.
• Management systems and performance: The performance management system of 
the company must reﬂect the triple bottom line targets to ensure that progress is 
monitored and measured.
• Reporting: The company should report regularly, accurately and timeously on its 
strategies, targets and performance in relation to these targets. 
6.2 Market – Porter and customers 
6.2.1 Porter’s 5 forces
The external analysis – understanding industry forces, demand, supply and market creation 
– can be based on an analysis similar to Porter’s ﬁve forces framework.  This framework 
views the attractiveness of an industry as determined by ﬁve sources of competitive pressure. 
These ﬁve forces of competition include three sources of horizontal competition: competition 
from substitutes, entrants and from established rivals. The two sources of vertical competition 
consist of the bargaining power of suppliers and the bargaining power of buyers.
The strength of each of these competitive forces is determined by a number of key structural 
variables, some of which are depicted in Figure 36.
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•Switching costs
•Buyers’ propensity to substitute
Industry Competitors
(Intensity of Rivalry)
•Industry growth
•Fixed costs
•Over-capacity
•Product differences
•Brand identity
•Concentration and balance
•Exit barriers
Bargaining power of buyers
•Buyer concentration
•Volume
•Switching costs
•Substitute products
•Price sensitivity
•Ability to backward integrate
•Buyer profits
•Brand identity
Threat of new entrants
•Entry barriers
•Economies of scale
•Capital requirements
•Access to distribution
•Retaliation
•Proprietary learning curve
•Product differences
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•Differentiation of inputs
•Switching costs
•Substitute inputs
•Concentration
•Volume
•Threat of forward integration
•Input cost impact
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Figure 36: Porter’s ﬁve forces (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel, 1998)
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Porter’s work is discussed in nearly every strategy study available and we will therefore not go 
into detail here.  There are many proponents and opponents of Porter’s approach to industry 
analysis and resultant strategies.  We contend that it is a good basic framework to enable 
understanding of your environment and how this impacts on your competitive position.  This 
is, however, still only a part of the ﬁrst step of the strategic process. 
6.2.2 Dynamic customer satisfaction measurement 
The customer survey should always be conducted with the end result in mind.  Continuous 
tracking of customer satisfaction is critical to enable an organisation to: 
• Integrate the voice of the customer into the business’s decision-making processes by 
aligning strategies with current and future customer requirements:
o This includes the development a technical and commercial support strategy to 
optimise the use of the company’s products and/or services in the customer’s 
processes; and
o The development of a communication strategy to address incorrect perceptions 
and reinforce positive perceptions;
• Innovate:  A large portion of successful new products and services are the direct result 
of speaking with customers;
• Provide advance warning:  Customer data can be used as part of a measurement system 
to warn the organisation of upcoming trends, performance issues or opportunities;
• Obtain external performance feedback: Often customers can spotlight processes 
which are working well and others which are not. By actively contacting and speaking 
with customers, organisations can spot important opportunities for improvement;
• Increase customer retention: Learning what is most important to customers and how 
the organisation is seen as performing relative to competitors can help to prioritise 
change efforts;
• Develop training material, not only for the marketing force, but the broader business 
community relating with and impacting on the customer;
• Develop performance measures to ensure that customer satisfaction is a priority. 
(adapted from Toolpack Consulting)
The main steps in the process are depicted and described in Figure 37.
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Figure 37: Steps in a customer satisfaction survey
• Customer database and sampling:
o The ﬁrst step is to have access to a segmented database of all the company’s 
customers with accurate contact details and their history of doing business with 
the company. This is normally the most difﬁcult part of the process.  Despite all the 
buzz regarding customer relationship marketing, very few businesses, including 
some of the largest companies operating in speciﬁc industries in South Africa, have 
a customer list readily available.  Without accurate data regarding segmentation 
and without access to decision makers within the various functions (e.g. top 
management, production, distribution) of the customer’s structure, the survey is 
doomed from the start.  Once the database has been obtained (or developed), a 
representative sample of customers must be obtained.  This is normally done per 
customer segment, per income category, per function and, where relevant, per 
geographical region based on  stratiﬁed random sampling.8 
• Questionnaire development (satisfaction and needs analysis):
o Both hard and soft elements must be covered in a customer satisfaction survey. 
These include the range, quality and reliability of the service or product provided, 
price, relationship, business support and value added.
o The ideal approach to developing the questionnaire is to make use of focus 
groups.  Focus groups are in-depth, qualitative discussions with a small number 
of carefully selected people.  Unlike the one-way ﬂow of information in a one-on-
one discussion, focus groups generate data through the give and take of group 
discussion. Listening as people share and compare their different points of view 
provides a wealth of information - not just about what they think, but why they 
think the way they do.  These points of view are more likely to be revealed via 
the social setting created through a focus group and the interaction which being 
8 Stratiﬁed random sampling is discussed in many elementary and advanced statistics handbooks, such as Bouwer and 
Schuman (1991, p. 20).
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in a focus group entails.  Among the advantages of focus groups are the wide 
range of information that can be gathered in a relatively short time span and 
the moderator being able to explore related but unanticipated topics as they 
arise in the discussion.  These discussions will facilitate the identiﬁcation of 
relevant performance parameters relating to the company’s relationship with its 
customers.  The focus group attendees should once again be representative of the 
broader customer base to ensure that all relevant issues are unearthed.  These 
performance parameters will be quantiﬁed (based on feedback received during 
the focus group) and translated into a questionnaire, together with additional 
information that could be required by the company (bearing in mind that the 
questionnaire should not be too long) (adapted from the American Statistical 
Organisation).
o In many instances, unfortunately, the timing and cost involved in focus groups are 
prohibitive for many companies.  In such cases work sessions and interviews with 
the marketing function and some industry players will provide key input.  There 
are also ample examples of customer surveys available which can be used as a 
basis. It is, however, important to ensure that relevant dimensions, both from the 
company’s and customer’s point of view, are addressed. 
o Although very valuable in some instances, open-ended questions should be 
limited as they hamper interpretation, comparison and reliability of the study.
o Once the questionnaire is developed, to conduct a few pilot interviews with 
neutral parties (who have not been involved with the development) to validate the 
comprehensibility, length and results of the interview and adapt as required.
o The questionnaire design will also be inﬂuenced by the type of interview – face-to-
face, telephonic or electronic.  
• Interviews:
o On a practical level, sufﬁcient time must be allowed, both for the study and for 
the scheduling of the interviews.  It is not always possible to reach all the targeted 
customers over a short period of time.  In addition, you would need some lead 
time to get access to the decision makers within the customer’s organisation. 
This might seem obvious, but the results of many a study have been worthless 
because the wrong people were interviewed due to pressure to ﬁnalise the study’s 
outcome.
o During the interviews, customers are shown a list of the product/service dimensions 
that are being measured.  Opportunity should be given to add product/service 
dimensions which the customer perceives as important that are not on the list. 
Customers are asked to rank the dimensions in order of importance.  Customers 
are then asked to rank the company’s performance on these service dimensions 
relative to the company’s major competitors.
• Data capturing, analysis and interpretation:
o Data should be captured in a user-friendly format.  Care must be taken to ensure 
future use and comparability.
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o The comparison with competitors enables us to analyse and depict graphically 
the company’s service relative to those of competitors.  This is referred to as 
a customer value map9.  It is a four-quadrant graph that plots perceived price 
performance versus perceived service performance relative to competitors, 
depicted in Figure 38.
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Figure 38: The customer value map
The results display whether the value a company offers to its customers is high or 
low compared to those of competitors.  A bubble is used to represent the various 
segments; the size of the bubble represents the size of that segment (in volume or 
value). 
• Application of results (as discussed at the beginning of the paragraph).
6.3 Internal – Revenue Enhancement Diagnostic 
The revenue enhancement survey considers the underlying way in which the company 
exploits market opportunities to achieve proﬁtable, sustainable revenue growth.  The survey 
encompasses the key activities of the marketing and sales functions (identiﬁcation, creation 
and retention of customers), as well as the business system that supports these functions 
(strategy and planning, production, marketing, sales/channel management and customer 
service).
The survey takes the form of a written questionnaire completed by all key employees in the 
marketing management process.  The survey focuses on the aspects depicted in Figure 39.
9 Bradley Gale (1994) developed this useful concept which he calls “a plot of the prices and overall performance scores 
of competing offerings”. The map contains reference lines for assessing customer-perceived fair value and the frontier 
prices that represent the best relative values available to the buyers in the category (1994). His work, together with 
certain enhancements by Stephanus Loubser (associate director at the University of Stellenbosch business school), is 
used as a basis for this section.
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Figure 39: The revenue enhancement survey (Source: Andersen, 2000)
Identify measures the company’s understanding of its industry and customers, the effectiveness 
of its market segmentation and organisational structure to support these customers, and the 
effectiveness of identifying new market niches, new customers or new opportunities.
Create is about the ability to understand new customers’ needs, to market to them, to convert 
them into actual customers and to reach them geographically.  It is also about the ability to 
develop new products to serve market needs.
Retain is about retaining current customers, increasing sales as well as cross-selling, and 
about customers referring business to you.
Strategic planning is about the bigger picture – who do you serve now and who will you serve 
in future, why will this be successful and how will we tell and guide everyone who needs to 
know?
Product / service development is about the effectiveness of enhancing and/or developing 
products to enable you to serve the market proﬁtably, now and in the future.
Marketing is about choosing customers, knowing what they want and delivering it better than 
others can, now and in the future.
Channel management is about getting the right product to the right customer at the right time 
in the right condition, now and in the future.
Customer service is about hearing what your customers say and doing something about it to 
ensure a long-term proﬁtable relationship for both parties.
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Integrated customer management is about the ability to draw all these aspects together in 
a seamless interface for the customer, and about the ability to mine customer information 
internally to optimise effort, relationships and opportunities.
Throughout, integration and communication with the rest of the business is measured.
7. SUMMARY 
The importance of intelligence is undisputed, but the trade-off between quality, speed and cost 
of information is seldom investigated. The process of getting, coding and sharing information 
in an exploratory, decision-making and tactical/operational context means that different types 
of models must be developed by different cycles (types) of work. The only use of intelligence 
is to enhance decision-making, which means it should be available at the critical decision-
making point. Strategic information must be available on all three levels of the IME model 
(Figure 4). 
Final take-out
IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE – Mistakes can be prevented with some basic intelligence being 
shared with the relevant parties.
THE DRIVERS OF INTELLIGENCE – Trade-offs must be made between speed, quality and cost.  Due 
to the inherent opportunity cost in a lack of intelligence, either reduce the opportunity cost of 
intelligence and then improve the quality, or ﬁrst improve the speed at which intelligence is gathered 
and then improve the quality.
THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE – Exploratory (not operational) intelligence is critical to inform strategic 
decision-making.
THE IMPORTANCE OF DECISIONS – The right intelligence must be available at the right time in the right 
format to facilitate decision-making. Intelligence that doesn’t assist decision-making is worthless.
THE LOGISTICS OF INTELLIGENCE – Technology is facilitating the process of bringing intelligence to 
the user in a user-friendly format.
TYPICAL STRATEGIC INFORMATION – Intelligence must be holistic (addressing the internal, market 
and external environments) and it must be integrated into the overall conceptual model of the 
business.
SUMMARY – Knowledge is power – always.
CHAPTER 7
FIRST STEPS OF THE PROCESS 
Establishing issues, KSFs and the SWOT
Critical issues for this chapter
SYSTEMISED THINKING – How do I start the strategic thinking process? 
WHAT BOTHERS YOU? – How do I formulate key strategic issues?
WHAT IS THE IDEAL SITUATION? – How do I deﬁne the ideal situation?
OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS – How do I consider external inﬂuences on my situation?
WHAT DOES OUR TOOLKIT LOOK LIKE? – What is the real difference between opportunities and 
threats, and the toolkit?
TO SWOT OR NOT TO SWOT – Is a SWOT analysis worthwhile?
SUMMARY - How do we pull these thoughts together?
1. SYSTEMISED THINKING
Once we gained an understanding of consultative thinking, developed clear objectives, 
understood the strategic agenda outline and the effect of the new science on this agenda, 
we started preparations for a group strategic event. We’ve developed a process, with speciﬁc 
objectives for each part of the process, and gathered all the intelligence which we effectively 
could. In Chapter 7 we consider the bulk of the thought streams that will prepare us for the 
strategic decision. These can be brieﬂy summarised as:
• What is bothering me? (What is keeping the general awake at night?)
• What is the ideal situation that I would like to achieve? (What is the perfect position to 
be in before I go to war?)
• Which opportunities can I utilise in my campaign and what conditions will hamper the 
campaign? (For an army this could be alliances, local geographical factors, weather, 
etc.)
• Which tools do I have available (or not) to execute any given strategy? (In an army these 
could be weaponry, support systems, etc.)
It is important, once again, to refer to Figure 4 and summarise these points in that fashion, i.e. 
each question must be answered for the system’s internal, market and external facet. The ﬁrst 
important question has to do with listing the key issues.
2. WHAT BOTHERS YOU?
A good place to start the process is to make a list of strategic issues. There will always be 
internal, market and external issues. This means that all the systemic elements need to be 
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO STRATEGY72
described. To say that somebody is ill is not good enough. It could be that certain organs 
are affected, a virus is present, there is poison in the system, etc. (internal). This could be 
because the person is malnourished, was attacked by someone,  or exposed to other people 
with infectious diseases (market) and this could have happened because the person is not 
well liked, is constantly trespassing, is involved in illegal activities or is part of a high-risk group 
as far as infectious diseases go (external). As mentioned previously, we make use of four case 
studies to illustrate the strategic process.  These are described in detail in Chapter 16.  In 
each of the paragraphs we will use a speciﬁc case study as example.  We refer the reader to 
the complete case studies in Chapter 16 to see how each example ﬁts into the total strategic 
process for that speciﬁc case study, and also invite the reader to view the results for the other 
case studies.
The question posed to the participants of the strategic session is simply to describe the key 
strategic issues facing the company – in the internal, market and external environment.  For 
the utility, these are described as an example in the box “Example:  Key strategic issues facing 
the utility”. 
Example: Key strategic issues facing the utility
The key strategic issue facing the utility in its external environment was articulated as deconstruction 
challenges.  As in many developing economies, unbundling and privatisation are high on the 
government’s agenda, with the accompanying uncertainties experienced by investors, customers and 
employees alike.  This would require an independent ﬁnancial opinion of the utility, which could be 
affected by foreign exchange ﬂuctuations.  There is also an endeavour to interconnect the country’s 
electricity grid with that of neighbouring countries to broaden the utility’s market and to secure supply. 
The commercial impact of this endeavour, and the effect of government interventions from the various 
countries, however, were still unclear at the time of the strategic session.
The key strategic issue facing the utility in its market environment was articulated as a market 
disconnect.  Given the monopolistic history of the utility, customer relationships were not a priority 
on the strategic agenda.  The poor socio-economic conditions in the country led to challenges in 
revenue collection, compounded by theft.  The population is also geographically dispersed in small 
communities, making it very difﬁcult for the utility to reach the broader market cost-effectively.
The key strategic issue facing the utility in its internal environment was articulated as challenged 
resources.  On the supply side, the utility has long-term contracts with independent power producers 
(IPPs) which impact on its ability to optimise supply.  In addition, the utility’s dependence on hydro-
power is challenged during the dry season.  Limited ﬁnancial resources impact on the ability to 
invest sufﬁciently in infrastructure.  There seems to be a lack of teamwork amongst its employees, 
compounded by unintegrated IT systems. 
For ease of presentation, we normally summarise these key strategic issues in the format 
depicted in Figure 40.
The key take-out issue focuses our attention and enables the audience to digest the detail 
more easily for application to the strategic choice that follows later.
In our experience this is the best place to start.  People feel more at ease and are more 
prepared to contribute to the rest of the process if they have the opportunity to share what is 
bothering them about the business. 
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Once the strategic issues have been highlighted, the ideal situation can be described.
• Unbundling and privatisation uncertainties
• Independent financial opinion required
• Foreign exchange fluctuations impact on bottom line
• Impact of grid interconnection
• Problems with revenue collection
• Theft
• Image of monopoly
• Inability to reach market
• Long-term contracts with IPP’s
• Unintegrated IT systems
• Lack of infrastructure investment
• Staff – lack of teamwork
• Dependence on hydro-power
• Limited financial resources
Challenged resources
Market disconnect
Deconstruction 
challenges
Key take-out
Figure 40:  Key strategic issues facing the utility
3. WHAT IS THE IDEAL SITUATION?
In management theory the ideal situation is often described by “key success factors” - a 
description of the key factors required for the business to be successful. In our example of 
the body at the beginning of the previous section, key success factors are a healthy body, ﬁt 
and clean (internal), that is fed with healthy wholesome food at the right time intervals, kept 
safe, clean and protected from inclement whether (market), and which belongs to a person 
who is respected, liked, accepted in the community and would therefore have future support 
for survival (external).
Koch describes these factors as follows:
The reason why some ﬁrms are more successful than others in particular products 
or industries. Should be based on an in-depth understanding of why consumers 
buy the products concerned as a spur to resegmentation and/or innovation. (Koch, 
2000, p.234) 
Grunert and Ellegaard (1993) deﬁne a key success factor as a skill or a resource that a 
business can invest in that, in the market the business is operating in, explains a major part 
of the observable differences in perceived value and/or relative costs. 
They go further to say that key success factors differ from core skills and resources, which are 
prerequisites for being in a market, but do not explain differences in value created and costs 
incurred.  In addition, key success factors differ in their changeability, i.e. in the degree to 
which competitors can emulate them.
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We support these views, but emphasise that key success factors should always be deﬁned in 
the extended sense of what will differentiate my company from others in the internal, market 
and external environments.
The task presented to the participants in the strategic session is simply for them to describe 
the key success factors that will differentiate a company operating in that industry – in the 
internal, market and external environment.  The box “Key success factors for a food production 
company” gives an example. 
Example: Key success factors for a food production company
The key external success factor for a company operating in the processed foods industry was articulated 
as the ability to create value in a sustainable way.  This not only means value for shareholders, but 
also proactive, sound corporate governance and a good corporate image.  This will facilitate strategic 
partnerships on a global scale, which will give the company access to more established brands and 
markets and technical expertise, and will also enable it to expand its position in the value chain.
The key market success factor for a company operating in the processed foods industry was 
articulated as discerning brand leverage.  This translates into strong brands in each of its target 
market segments facilitated by effective market segmentation and a diverse product offering.  This, 
in turn, will enable the company to continually grow organically.
The key internal success factor for a company operating in the processed foods industry was articulated 
as resource control and exploitation.  Strategic sourcing and quality assets are key to enable efﬁcient 
production.  A balanced product portfolio is facilitated by an effective product development strategy. 
In addition, effective distribution and good IT systems are critical.  Lastly, strategic leadership and a 
high-performance culture (skills, performance and assets) facilitate an optimal internal process.
For ease of presentation, we once again summarise this in the following format:
• Strategic, global partnerships (access to brands, technical expertise, markets 
and value chain expansion)
• Value creation for all stakeholders
• Proactive, sound corporate governance
• Good corporate image
• Strong brands (no. 1 or 2 position in category)
• Effective market segmentation
• Diverse product offering
• Continuous organic growth
• Strategic sourcing
• Quality assets
• Balanced product portfolio
• Effective product development strategy
• Effective distribution
• Good IT systems
• Strategic leadership (strategy, business plan, implementation)
• High-performance culture (skills, performance, assets)
Resource control & 
exploitation
Discerning brand 
leverage
Sustainable value 
creation
Most important Key take-out
Figure 41:  Key success factors in the processed foods industry
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Asking participants to identify the most important issues for them, and summarising the list 
in a key take-out issue, focus our attention and enable the audience to digest the detail more 
easily for application to the strategic choice that follows later.
In addition, we ask the participants to rate the performance of their company against its major 
competitor on these key success factors.  This provides a clear indication of those areas in 
which the company is lagging behind its competitors.  The rating scale is from 1 to 5, where 
1 equals poor and 5 equals excellent.  Experience has shown us that, provided the right 
composition of people is present at the strategic session, this rating is as valid as a rating 
based on extensive and costly research.
The results for the processed food company are depicted in Figure 42.  Especially in the market 
environment, the food company is clearly lagging behind its major competitor.  Internally, the 
product development strategy and, externally, the company’s image need critical attention.
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Figure 42: Key success factor rating for the processed foods company
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4. OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS
Wilson, Gilligan and Pearson (1992) deﬁne opportunities and threats as those outside factors 
that can affect the future of the business and over which it has no control:
• Opportunities are observed or possible trends in the environment which are attractive 
to the ﬁrm, while
• Threats are observed or possible trends in the environment that could be detrimental 
to the ﬁrm.
For interpretation a matrix can be used, which offers a simple but powerful way of classifying 
and managing these threats and opportunities (Figure 43).
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Figure 43: Opportunity / threat matrix
• Interpreting opportunities:
o Attractive, probable opportunities should be managed and exploited;
o Less attractive, less likely ones ignored; and
o High-low opportunities should be monitored for shifts in position.
• Interpreting threats:
o A serious treat is one that, if it materialised, could seriously hurt the company. 
If in addition it were likely to occur, it would have to be managed constantly and 
contingency plans would probably have to be developed;
o A threat with low likelihood, which is not a very serious threat, could even be 
ignored; and
o High-low threats should be monitored for shifts in position.
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The task presented to the participants in the strategic session is simply to describe the key 
opportunities and threats in the industry (in most cases facing all the companies operating in 
that industry) – in the internal, market and external environment.  For a municipality, examples 
are given in the box “Example:  Opportunities and threats facing the Municipality”.
Example:  Opportunities and threats facing the Municipality
In the external environment the key opportunity is to create a development hub in the municipal 
area.  The municipal area could become a gateway to the broader region.  There are considerable 
opportunities for the development of economic clusters due to the diversity of the region.  The activities 
should take place within an environmental envelope.  Partnerships and joint ventures could enable 
the participation of the broader community in the economy.  These ideals are, however, threatened by 
misalignment.  The business community is divided on future growth strategies and it is a challenge 
to align the ideals of the various spheres of government.  Increased industrial activity and population 
growth could impact on environmental control.
In the market environment the key opportunities are articulated as upstream integration and 
downstream beneﬁciation.  Opportunities exist to collaborate in terms of upstream sourcing 
activities in major industries and to develop secondary local industries downstream from the major 
industries.  The area can also increase its focus on the development of regional markets.   This is, 
however, threatened by potential external interests entering the economy that are not aligned with 
the municipality’s growth strategy.  In addition, the distance to major markets could impact negatively 
on the municipality’s ideals.
In the internal environment the key opportunity is the optimised use of resources. The area has 
a good natural resource base which could be exploited by the optimised use of infrastructure and 
the development of new infrastructure in a low interest rate environment.  There are also signiﬁcant 
opportunities to optimise water catchment management in the area.  This is threatened by a potential 
socio-economic breakdown.  There is widespread illiteracy and HIV/Aids prevalence amidst high 
population growth.  The community is not yet equipped with the required change toolkit to manage 
heterogeneous emotional and political agendas.  There is also uncertainty about access to water for 
industry and access to capital for development.
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For ease of presentation, we once again summarise this in the format depicted in Figure 44:
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Figure 44:  Opportunities and threats facing the municipality
Asking participants to identify the most important opportunities and threats, and summarising 
the list in a key take-out issue, focus our attention and enable the audience to digest the detail 
more easily for application to the strategic choice that follows later.
5. WHAT DOES OUR TOOLKIT LOOK LIKE?
Strengths are positive aspects internal to the company: the advantages the company has, 
what you do well, unique resources you have, and also what other people regard as your 
strengths.  
Weaknesses are negative aspects internal to the company: areas that the company could 
improve, in which the company does badly, or does not have in relation to competitors.
Be speciﬁc:
Make absolutely sure you gather precise strengths and weaknesses. A strength like 
‘We have good processes’ tells you nothing, while a more speciﬁc version ‘Our counter 
processes mean that we can provide faster, cheaper, more satisfying experiences for 
our customers’ is a lot more useful. (Lake, 2002, p. 120)
Both strengths and weaknesses must be analysed in relation to competitors.  For example, if 
all your competitors have excellent distribution systems, then an excellent distribution system 
is not a strength in the market, but it is a necessity.  
The task presented to the participants in the strategic session is simply to describe the strengths 
and weaknesses in their business – in the internal, market and external environment.  Refer to 
the box “Example:  Strengths and weaknesses for a paper products manufacturer”.
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Example: Strengths and weaknesses for a paper products manufacturer 
In the external environment the company’s key strength is an established brand for the broader 
product range.  It has the ability to create jobs and its social responsibility initiatives are on track.  The 
weaknesses are the current cost of environmental management and the strength of its competitor’s 
brand in the ﬁnal consumer market. 
In the market environment the company’s key strength is its established key account management 
capability.  It dominates niche markets through adding value to present products.  This is supported 
by a good sales and marketing department.  This is, however, weakened by an expensive product 
compared to that of competitors.  The product is not clearly differentiated in the relevant market 
segments and is not easily transferable to other market segments.  The company could also do more 
to leverage its knowledge of its customers’ conversion processes. 
In the internal environment the key strength is the vast industry experience of its key personnel.  It 
has access to technology and raw materials, and is situated close to its major markets.  The current 
premises also has sufﬁcient space to support expansion.  The key weakness, however, is that the 
company is set in its ways.  This is exacerbated by old technology, causing quality problems.  The 
employee turnover is also too low, resulting in lack of new ideas and skills entering the business.
For ease of presentation, we once again summarise this in the format depicted in Figure 45:
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• Established brand for broader 
product range
• Job creation ability
• Socially responsible
• Niche domination
• Ability to add value to present 
products
• Good sales department and key 
account management
• Access to technology
• Close to raw materials
• Close to major markets
• Experienced operators
• Enough space to expand
• Cost of environmental 
management
• Strength of competitor brand 
in final consumer market)
• Not differentiated in market 
(restricted market 
segments)
• High prices
• Leverage knowledge of 
customers’ conversion 
processes
• Old technology
• Quality problems
• Need new blood (low 
employee turnover)
• Access to funds
• Knowledge sharing
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Figure 45: Strengths and weaknesses facing the paper products manufacturer
Summarising the list in a key take-out issue focuses our attention and enables the audience to 
digest the detail more easily for application to the strategic choice that follows later.
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6. TO SWOT OR NOT TO SWOT?
Tony Manning writes:
Beware SWOT. If ever there was a ‘hardy annual’ it’s the SWOT analysis. Managers 
seem to think that it’s mandatory, so year after year they slog through the same 
chore with the same result – approximately zilch. If a workshop is properly thought-
out, debate will naturally cover your ﬁrm’s internal strengths and weaknesses and 
the opportunities and threats it faces outside.” (Manning, 2004, p. 63)
If the SWOT is seen the way Manning writes about it, we couldn’t agree more. All strategic 
“rituals” tend to achieve the opposite result. Rituals do exactly what we warn about in the ﬁrst 
chapter – they dull the mind, blunt creativity and allow us to act without thinking – strategy’s 
one big enemy. But the SWOT can be a powerful tool, if used within a framework as set out 
in the previous paragraphs and if it is applied as we will illustrate in the next three chapters. 
Grundy and Brown contextualise this approach correctly by calling the tool “indispensable”, 
provided that:
• Continuous comparisons are made with competitors (we say this is achieved with the 
IME approach);
• The freedom exists to list an attribute as both a strength and weakness;
• We look at the attributes from a customer’s perspective (true, but the IME model will 
also help with this approach); and
• We use ratings.
They also insist:
• That key areas are highlighted;
• We shouldn’t be over-critical;
• We shouldn’t equate SWOT with strategy nor with strategy analysis; and
• That we look for patterns that emerged from the SWOT.
(Grundy and Brown, 2002, p. 25).
7. SUMMARY
We start our strategic process by posing very speciﬁc questions about where we are and what 
bothers us about our position, where we want to be, what we can use out of the environment 
to help us on our journey, where we might encounter obstacles and what our toolkit looks like. 
These are obvious questions, but if asked in a structured fashion around the IME approach, 
will be of great value further on.
We are now ready to look into the future. What will the future, in which the strategies that we 
think about today will be implemented, look like?  We will talk about this in our next chapter.
81First steps of the process
Final Take-out
SYSTEMISED THINKING – The formulation of the key strategic questions is important. Asking the right 
question takes you halfway towards the right answer.
WHAT BOTHERS YOU? – Key strategic issues are those things that keep you awake at night. But you 
need to think beyond the obvious and therefore should use the IME framework – at least.
WHAT IS THE IDEAL SITUATION? – The ideal situation is to have those internal resources, market-
speciﬁc factors and external positioning that will set me apart. The ﬁrst things that I will invest in 
if I start the business from scratch will include minimum requirements and those things that will 
differentiate my business from others.
OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS – Look for external trends that are attractive and detrimental. Be real. 
Also consider the likelihood of occurrence and impact.
WHAT DOES OUR TOOLKIT LOOK LIKE? – The toolkit is those things that you have and do, that set you 
apart, both in a positive and negative sense.
TO SWOT OR NOT TO SWOT? - If SWOT is a ritual – don’t do it. If you know how to facilitate the SWOT 
and what to do with it, it will enrich your thinking.
SUMMARY - We are deﬁned by what we worry about relative to our dreams for the future. Our thinking 
should be bounded by our worries, dreams, enablers and obstacles and what we have, or could ﬁnd 
to use. Nothing more, but also nothing less.
CHAPTER 8
LOOKING AT THE FUTURE 
Practical scenario planning - the future backdrop of the war
Critical issues for this chapter
LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE – Is this possible?
LEARNING FROM “PLANNING AS LEARNING” – Have we learnt anything from De Geus’s work?
KEY UNCERTAINTIES – How do we identify and use key uncertainties?
SUMMARY – How does it all hang together?
1. LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE
One of the greatest talents that a leader can have is to look into the future effectively. A 
general might have:
• Established clearly and succinctly what the broad problem areas are in the army 
(strategic issues);
• Painted a thorough picture of the “perfect” army (key success factors);
• Carefully considered the external situation in which the army operates and in which the 
battle will be fought for aspects that will support troops in battle or might work against 
them (opportunities and threats),
• Inspected the army’s toolkit for areas of advantage and shortages (strengths and 
weaknesses), but
the general still needs to establish the future conditions in which the war will be fought. 
Many South African businesses looked at an exchange rate of the South African rand to the 
dollar that changed from around R6.00 in 1999 to R12.00 in 2001. Inﬂation was below 10% 
over this period, which meant that the cost of production factors over two years rose by around 
15%, but income on exports, 100%! The Holy Grail for growth was exports and many business 
plans were developed based on a further slow and steady decline of the rand. Two years down 
the line, however, the South African rand strengthened to less than R7.00 per dollar. The winner 
here would have been businesses that were able to forecast the movements in the exchange 
rate correctly. As Arie de Geus said in his benchmark article, “Planning as Learning”:
Once in a crisis, everyone in the organisation feels the pain. The need for change is 
clear. The problem is that you usually have little time and few options. The deeper 
into the crisis you are, the fewer options remain. Crisis management, by necessity, 
becomes autocratic management. The positive characteristic of a crisis is that the 
decisions are quick. The other side of that coin is that implementation is rarely good; 
many companies fail to survive. The challenge, therefore, is to recognize and react to 
environmental change before the pain of a crisis.” (De Geus, 1988, p. 71)
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It is obviously not possible to look into the future with perfect visibility, but what is possible 
is to establish a range of possible future outcomes and then prepare the business for each 
possibility. The successful business in our example would therefore be the exporter who 
wrote a business plan for a R7.00, R9.00, R11.00 and R13.00 eventuality. De Geus calls 
this “institutional learning” and said that Shell for many years “triggered institutional learning 
through scenarios”. He summarised this approach in the famous oil price case study. In 
1984 (when the oil price was around $28 per barrel) De Geus’s team had a $15 scenario, a 
terrifying scenario that no oil person in 1984 would have liked to think about. Managers in 
Shell responded by asking the team “When is the price going to fall, how far will it fall and 
how long will the drop last?”, a typical response if you don’t want to prepare for the worst. The 
team’s response was:
We don’t know the future…but neither do you. And though none of us knows whether the 
price is going to fall, we can agree that it would be pretty serious if it did…We then described 
a case in which the price plummeted at the end of 1985 and concluded by saying: ‘And now 
it is April 1986 and you are staring at a price of $16 a barrel. Will you please meet and give 
your views on these three questions: What do you think your government will do? What do 
you think your competition will do? And what, if anything, will you do?’” (De Geus, 1988, p. 
73)
The price of oil didn’t drop at the end of 1985 and in early 1986 it was still $27 per barrel. But 
by February of that year it fell to $17 per barrel and in April $10, and in De Geus’s words the 
institutional learning “helped a great deal in that panicky spring of 1986”.
2. LEARNING FROM “PLANNING AS LEARNING”
Sadly, in the two decades following this ground-breaking work (De Geus’s work was based on 
solid research at a large sample of companies in business for more than 75 years), a 2002 
global survey reported that two-thirds of 140 corporate strategists polled admitted that their 
organisations were surprised by three or more high-impact events over the previous ﬁve years 
and 97% admitted the complete lack of early warning systems (Fuld, 2003, p.  20).
Gardiner Morse (2003, p. 14) talks about “making a science of expecting the unexpected”. 
What does this science look like? What are the basic requirements? We propose a simple 5-
step process, i.e.:
• Anticipate certain scenarios;
• Understand the drivers and signals that will “announce” the unfolding of a speciﬁc 
scenario;
• Watch the drivers and signals – appoint speciﬁc “watchdogs”;
• Communicate efﬁciently and effectively once a certain virtual “announcement” is 
detected; and 
• Empower the line to make quick decisions once the “announcement” is made.
These steps are reasonably self-explanatory and form part of a simple, but robust, management 
process. The “trick”, so to speak, is step 1. How do we anticipate certain scenarios?
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3. KEY UNCERTAINTIES
Scenarios are descriptions of possible future events with an uncertain outcome, over which 
the affected organisation has no control. This means that there are at least two elements at 
work:
• We don’t know what is going to happen;
• Whatever happens will dramatically affect us but, even so, it is outside of our control.
Ilbury and Sunter (2001, p. 36) summarise these elements in a simple diagram, depicted in 
Figure 46. 
UNCERTAINTY
ABSENCE OF CONTROL
CERTAINTY
CONTROL
4
12
3
Figure 46: Scenario matrix
Their work covers the areas described by the four quadrants extensively, but could be 
summarised as follows:
1. Predominant management behaviour in this quadrant depicts fatalists. We know 
what is going to happen, but feel we cannot control the response. The management 
response is quite easy: the game is set up, study the rules and look for an advantage, 
don’t give up until a solution is found.
2. In this quadrant the dominant behaviour is existentialistic, a strong belief that 
everything happens by chance. It is here where scenario planning becomes a vital tool 
to prepare for the future key uncertainties.
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3. In the third quadrant fence-sitters are often found. This management behaviour says 
I am in control but won’t act until I am more certain. The overriding management 
behaviour should be to generate options and to act.
4. The fourth quadrant is the home of control freaks, where the need to be in control is so 
strong that managers hardly believe that anything uncontrollable could ever happen. 
The behaviour is marked by decisions.
Solving leadership behaviours in quadrants 1, 3 and 4 is clearly outside the scope of what 
we want to achieve here. The key question is how do we identify those uncertainties that are 
critical and outside of our control. We follow a simple identiﬁcation process:
1. Extrapolation of known industry trends are used to create a range of potential future 
environments (this concept is depicted in Figure 47):
Scenario 1
Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Tomorrow
Tomorrow
Tomorrow
Tomorrow
Tomorrow
Tomorrow
Tomorrow
TodayYesterday
Consolidation?
Deregulation?
Mass acceptance 
of technology?
Current Industry Trends
Figure 47:  Extrapolation of known industry trends to develop scenarios (Andersen, 2000)
2. Participants are asked to assume that they are in the future (ﬁve or ten years from 
now, depending on the planning horizon), looking back over the planning horizon and 
to conclude that the company has been a great success.  What external forces would 
the company have had to overcome and which would have accelerated its progress? 
The PESTE approach is used as a starting point (see box on the PESTE analysis).
3. The two most important forces are selected by the participants based on the degree of 
impact these will have on shaping the future business.  (Our experience indicated that 
the judgement of most groups involved in the strategic session is sufﬁciently sound to 
enable this ranking).
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4. The two selected forces are expressed in terms of opposing axes and the main 
characteristics of each quadrant are described.  Each quadrant is also given a 
descriptive name to facilitate the understanding and communication of the scenarios.
Figure 48 depicts key external forces that will impact on the ability of a company to successfully 
transform (this work is not in the case studies, but was developed speciﬁcally for a company 
that expressed a wish to take certain proactive steps in the transformation space; see box on 
transformation). For example, if there are insufﬁcient resources available and the regulatory 
framework to support transformation is stringent, there will be high unemployment leading 
to conﬂict and revolt, making the country ungovernable.  Due to the scarcity of resources 
companies will not be able to comply with the transformation regulations.  The situation will be 
a shareholders’ nightmare.  We referred to this situation as “Zimbabwe” due to the unfortunate 
turmoil deﬁning the country since the latter part of the 1990s (in the midst of more rapid and 
stringent government transformation regulations).  In the “Singapore” scenario the regulatory 
framework is also stringent, but strong resources (such as a highly efﬁcient harbour) and high 
productivity can still lead to success. A company preparing for this environment will lobby 
government for economy-efﬁcient controls and involvement.
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• Conflict / revolt
• Unemployment
• Frustrated non-compliance
• Shareholders’ nightmare
• Ungovernable
• High road
• Divergence exacerbated
• Chaotic and reactive
• Social growth possibly impaired
• Meritocracy
• Highly legislative
• Little will happen
• Freeze / frustration
• Low growth
• Low investment
Figure 48: Examples of scenarios impacting on successful transformation
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The PESTE Analysis
This is the macro environment, which consists of broader forces that have a bearing upon the 
company. The environment consists of the following variables, which, although largely uncontrollable 
by the ﬁrm, will affect it in many ways:
Political / legal factors such as:
o Anti-trust legislation
o Deregulation
o Environmental protection laws
o Foreign trade regulations
o Employment laws
o Government stability
o Taxation
Economic factors such as:
o Business cycles
o Interest rates
o Money supply
o Inﬂation
o Unemployment
o Energy costs
Socio-cultural factors such as:
o Population demographics
o Income distribution
o Social mobility
o Life-style changes
o Attitudes
o Consumerism
o Levels of education
Technological factors such as:
o New discoveries/developments
o Speed of technology transfer
o Rates of obsolescence
o Government investment in research
Environmental / ecological factors such as:
o Pollution
o Seismic activity
o Global warming
o Desertiﬁcation
o Erosion
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Transformation in South Africa
South Africa has had a long history of oppression, typiﬁed by racial segregation and initiated by the 
previous government’s notorious apartheid policy. The apartheid policy was by far one of the worst 
and most pervasive aspects of South Africa’s history, but the policy also harmed other areas of 
economics, society and the environment. These were obvious in poor productivity, improper spatial 
planning, destruction of the environment and often out-dated management, leadership and people 
practices.
It is therefore inevitable that the country requires transformation and, in the light of what drove our 
previous mistakes, it is even more inevitable that transformation carries a large burden of generating 
improvements in representation, more commonly known in the Western World as afﬁrmative 
action. It is important, though, to understand that this transformation also seeks to address the 
downstream consequences of having to overcome the apartheid legacy and other errors, such as 
black economic empowerment, poverty alleviation, care for the environment and society in general 
and the improvement of education on all levels. The country is successful in many of these areas, 
also due to the peaceful nature of the initial transformation, but many difﬁculties still lie ahead. There 
is a constant debate in South Africa, which is also quite pervasive, on the regulatory framework of the 
transformation. Should government play a less or more active role? Recent election results suggest 
that society supports the government’s policy and the pace of reform, but the long-term future will tell 
us if we moved at the right pace. The proverbial jury is still out on this issue.
In another example, Figure 49 depicts key external forces that will impact on the future 
success of a company operating in the health and leisure industry.  For example, if there is an 
improvement in the health consciousness of the population, while disposable income is rising, 
the company has a bright, perhaps even utopian future.  Consumers are wealthy and healthy 
– new age yuppies.  On the other hand there will be few challenges to be creative!  Products 
that could be developed in this scenario are expensive, comprehensive health and leisure 
products – a “one-stop shop” type of scenario. It is interesting how preparation for a health 
and leisure company in the other quadrants will change. More basic, outdoor and cheaper 
products for the “healthy farmer” scenario, expensive alternative “therapies” for “fat cats” 
and even some options for “Sukkelfontein”10.
10 “Sukkelfontein” is a colloquial term for a poor community, literally meaning “fountain of struggle”.
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO STRATEGY90
H
IG
H
 D
IS
P
OS
AB
LE
 IN
CO
M
E
IMPROVEMENT IN HEALTH CONSCIOUSNESS
“New age yuppie” “Healthy farmer”
“Fat cats” “Sukkelfontein”
• Vibrant, star, bright future
• Utopia
• Wealthy / healthy
• Dream world
• Boring, no challenges!
• Product – current gym idea, expensive 
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• Heart problems
• Tired
• Short life span
• Health in a bottle
• Products – rich alternative products, 
medical bills, personal trainers, 
massages, lifestyle consultants
• Satisfied
• Lean and mean
• Long life span
• Products - Run/walk for life, cheap 
adventure tourism, Weigh-less
• Poverty
• Disaster
• Death
• Crime
• Products – stress management, 
government sponsored (also 
international), counselling
“Su kelfontein”
Figure 49: Examples of scenarios impacting on the health and leisure industry
4. SUMMARY
We must look into the future. This might not seem possible, but in fact it is made possible by 
developing key future scenarios. This will improve organisational learning and greatly enhance 
our mental model of the business.
Once we understand the future possibilities, know what we have (and do not have), understand 
what support we might get (or not get) and know what our dreams and problems are, we are 
ready to make certain strategic choices. In the next chapter we will look at this challenge.
Final take-out
LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE – This is a wonderful ability, but clearly not possible in its absolute form. 
But we can prepare for the future, identify possible outcomes, learn and prepare ourselves for those 
outcomes.
LEARNING FROM “PLANNING AS LEARNING” – Sadly, proper and useful scenario planning is still 
largely absent. The process is simple: anticipate a range of possibilities, understand the signals 
for pre-warning for each possibility, watch them, communicate and empower as the “prepared-for” 
events play out.
KEY UNCERTAINTIES – It is quite easy to identify key uncertainties with the use of the PESTE template. 
We propose a simple model, using two uncertainties to create four scenarios, which is in most cases 
quite adequate.
SUMMARY – Looking into the future with certainty is impossible, preparing for certain possible future 
eventualities is however not only reasonable, but critically necessary.
CHAPTER 9
STRATEGIC CHOICE 
Making decisions and formulating the ﬁrst draft battle plan
Critical issues for this chapter
CRAFTING – What are the basics of crafting? 
THE PROGRESS OF STRATEGIC CHOICE – What are the key criteria for effective choice?
THINKING AIDS IN CHOICE – How can we support choice (a difﬁcult step) with thinking aids?
WHAT ABOUT VISION? OR MISSION? – Did we forget about vision?
SUMMARY – How do we pull these thoughts together?
1. CRAFTING
At the point of strategic choice the process reaches an indisputable climax or inﬂection point. 
An inability to “solve” the nearly algebraic statement (what do issues plus key success factors 
plus toolkit plus opportunities and threats against certain possible futures require in terms of 
strategic action) will mean that the process was unsuccessful. Does this ever happen? In all 
the processes we have ever facilitated or where we were part of a facilitation team, this has 
only ever happened once (mostly because too little time was allowed for this critical step). 
Does this mean the process is fail-safe? In a certain way it is. If enough strategic energy is 
applied to the problem, it should nearly always produce the optimal result.
Mintzberg et al. (2003, p. 143) call the process crafting and maintain that “no craftsmen think 
some days and work others”.  This means that strategies can develop in strange ways and 
show up in strange places (see box on grassroots and hothouse models of strategy formation 
in Chapter 2). This couldn’t be more true, but is this statement relevant here, where we 
speciﬁcally look at a group process in real-time, i.e. the strategic conference?
We think it is, because if strategy is a craft one needs to get the best crafters together when 
crafting takes place. This doesn’t point to exclusivity. By excluding people, a huge opportunity 
to learn is lost. But it does mean that the important people who can support the process 
should be there. Mintzberg et al. (op. cit., pp. 148-149) provide four criteria for such people:
1. Detect discontinuity. Certain people have an uncanny ability to detect subtle 
discontinuities that can undermine a business in the future or provide hidden 
opportunities of exploitation.
2. Know the business. A real, deep and nearly personal knowledge of the business must 
be present in the room. 
3. Manage patterns. Through the processes described in the previous chapters a pattern 
has already emerged. The true strategist is the person who can identify and grasp 
those patterns.
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4. Reconcile change and continuity. There is a time to sow and a time to reap. Although 
a certain pattern is emerging and the organisation must be prepared for it, it is not 
always the right time to change. Managers who is either too scared to change or who 
are change besotted can do a business great harm.
In summary, the work of the strategic craftsman is to get his “crafting tools” (strategic thinkers) 
together and look at his material (his business in a speciﬁc environment which he should 
know well).  What discontinuities does he already see in the material and what patterns are 
available? Finally, a willingness must exist to work with the material and transform it – at the 
right place and time.
2. THE PROGRESS OF STRATEGIC CHOICE
These criteria point us to the elements in the progress of successful strategic choice (as 
depicted in Figure 50).
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Visual support
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participation
a
b
c
d
e
f
Ti
m
e
Figure 50: The progress of strategic choice
a. Participation is not optional
If ever there is a time for a leader to be autocratic, it would be in enforcing participation. 
Strategic work is not a part of the job description of the senior management team; it 
is the job in total. An inability to enforce participation would be a critical failure for 
any CEO or leader in any situation. At this point buy-in might be low – that’s OK. The 
challenge of the ﬁnal part of the process will be to, inter alia, engineer buy-in. This is 
also true in personal matters. At some stage we refuse to bring our holistic “persona” 
to a problem and we need to force ourselves to reconsider our lives in a more holistic 
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fashion. Ultimate success in our personal lives requires the “participation” of 
physical and mental health, family and societal support, wholesome relationships, 
etc. and sometimes we have to “force” ourselves to reactivate areas that have 
been neglected. (For many of us neglect is often observed in the form of stress 
(mental neglect), family neglect (absent from children and loved ones) or even 
physical neglect (overweight and unﬁt)  Mind, body and soul needs attention.)
b. Allow enough time
Strategic thinking can be a time-consuming process. After all the hard work that 
was required to get to this point, enough time must be made available to solve the 
ﬁnal challenge. In the most dramatic failures that we have witnessed, including 
the one in which we were involved, not enough time was allowed to complete this 
process. This should never be allowed to happen and we will now rather walk away 
from a facilitation process than agree to a process where this part is neglected. 
This is obviously a relative aspect. Strategy sometimes has to be developed in only 
a few hours or even minutes. But in those cases nothing less than 25% of all the 
strategic thinking effort should be spent on this part.
c. Challenge the participants
We often see a dumb-founded look on participants’ faces at this stage of the 
process. In spite of this, everybody gets through it quite well. The problem is not 
that it is that difﬁcult to do, but rather that it appears difﬁcult. We shouldn’t allow 
this perception to derail the process, but rather challenge participants to continue. 
In one very interesting case study a speciﬁc participant noisily wanted to stop the 
process at this point. The participant was not a direct part of the management 
team and it was clear to the facilitators that he was literally “scared” of where 
the discussion might go. Will the outcome harm his interests? Strangely enough, 
the strategy that evolved was so dynamic that all parties, including the “scared” 
participant and his interests, were served extremely well by the outcome.
d. Accept and cement the results
At some stage the process is complete. Owen says:
Whatever happens is the only thing that could have, a reminder that real 
learning and real progress will only take place when we all move beyond 
our original agendas and convention-bound expectations. If everything 
turned out just the way everybody expected, life would be exceedingly 
dull, and learning in any useful sense simply would not occur. It is 
precisely in moments of surprise, large and small, that we grow. It is 
important to cherish such moments and realize that whatever happens 
is the only thing that could have. (Owen, 1995, p. 70)
We have yet to be involved in a process, either as participants in a well facilitated 
session or as facilitators ourselves, where we weren’t enriched by the outcome of 
the proceedings. It is important to illustrate this to the participants and begin the 
process of acceptance and cementing. 
e. Provide emotional support
The process of strategy should not be divorced from emotion.  By trying to keep it 
cold and unfeeling, creativity would be lost. Rather allow for emotions, but provide 
support for emotions as they emerge.  In difﬁcult situations, where complex 
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transformation is imminent, we urge clients to consider process work as part of the 
intervention. 
Schein deﬁnes process consultation as:
A set of activities on the part of the consultant that helps the client to 
perceive, understand and act upon the process events that occur in the 
client’s environment. (Schein, 1987, p. 34)
These events obviously could become emotionally challenging at this stage of the 
process. The methodology, especially as further developed by Mindell, instills respect 
for each other’s opinions and is only sustainable if they have “recognised and 
incorporated the wisdom of conﬂicting opinions” (Schupbach, 2004, p. 8). In this 
sense the methodology promotes “Deep Democracy” within groups.
f. Provide visual support
We have achieved excellent results with visual aids. Rather than just “wallpapering” 
the room with scribbled ﬂip chart paper, we summarise and colour-code using large 
stickers. These “gimmicks” work and there is absolutely no reason why they should 
not be employed. It is ridiculous to try and save on these when a billion dollar company 
contemplates the future and even more ridiculous to walk away from visual aids merely 
because the use of these aids seems clichéd. It is a well established fact that visual 
aids work, therefore they should be used.
3. THINKING AIDS IN CHOICE
People often require more direct support to identify the underlying patterns. One of the best 
aids that we have seen is the return to the military example of strategy types, depicted in 
Figure 51 (developed by a colleague, Johan Ackron).
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Figure 51: Strategy formulation aids
1. In the military analogy the army has certain capabilities which impact on the way in 
which it wages war on the battle terrain.
2. In terms of business strategy the business has certain strengths to apply and sustain, 
weaknesses to overcome, opportunities to discover and exploit, and threats to avert.
3. When a business identiﬁes a strength it can apply to exploit an opportunity, this is an 
expansive strategy. Literally, for example, we have better weapons and greater troop 
strength than the enemy and the terrain favours us – so let us expand our area of 
control.
4. When there is a threat that could impact on an area of our weakness, we need to 
develop a defensive strategy. Literally, we have observed that the enemy is better 
equipped than we are right now and the terrain favours the enemy – so let us get into 
a proper defensive position.
5. When there is an opportunity that can only be exploited through the development of a 
weakness, this is a capacity strategy. Literally, the terrain favours us right now, but we 
don’t have the necessary troops and weapons – so we therefore need to develop the 
capacity of our army.
6. When we have a strength that can be applied to avert a threat, this is an aggressive 
strategy. Literally, the terrain doesn’t favour us right now, but we are stronger than 
the enemy – so let us attack aggressively so that we can overcome the poor terrain 
position.
We employ this line of thought separately for each of the three areas of internal, market and 
external.
This process helps us to understand what is possible. The ﬁnal step is to identify what it is that 
we actually want to do. An expansive strategy might illustrate the possibility to take a certain 
hill, but do we want to? Will it have future value? Do we want to defend a certain position? 
Shouldn’t we just abandon it? The last step in this initial choice is therefore to relate possible 
strategies with issues and dreams (Figure 52).
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Figure 52: Possible vs. Attractive Strategies
The reader is referred to the case studies in Chapter 16 to appreciate how the strategic 
process culminates in strategic choice – strategic themes that should be addressed for the 
sustainable future of the business.
4. WHAT ABOUT VISION? OR MISSION?
Some practitioners might ask if the discussion should not have started with vision and mission. 
There are even “deep” management sciences that distinguish between vision and mission.  We 
are now already talking about the formulation of strategy or strategic choice and the question 
of vision and mission has not yet been covered.
Simpson is quite harsh when he talks about some of the energy expended in vision and 
mission statements:
Former U.S. President George Bush was widely criticised for an offhand remark he 
made about ‘the vision thing.’ Not long after, Lou Gerstner felt the sting of the same 
criticism just after he became Chairman of IBM and said ‘the last thing IBM needs 
right now is a vision.’ 
Add me to the underground list of people who think that most work on mission, 
vision and values is a waste of time. Not all, mind you, but most. 
In my experience, the results of the great majority of the work are an insult to the 
intelligence of the average human. Most of it is either generic or it’s gibberish. The 
popularity of mission, vision and values as subjects for cartoons should tell us 
something. (Simpson, 2004, p. 1)
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Simpson goes on to quote a useful example, which was quoted with a “straight face”:
We are committed to an organisational capability and mindset which guarantees 
rapidly delivering exceptional customer and stakeholder value by negotiating and 
making the appropriate trade-offs among schedule, quality, cost, functionality, 
technology limits and resources. (ibid.)
We couldn’t agree with Simpson more when he asks what it is that these people really do and 
confesses that he doesn’t have “the foggiest idea”. The most important insight for us is one 
that we also arrived at independently:
If you are willing to invest the time and energy to try to reach the elite where mission, 
vision and values come to life and really impact decisions … do such work at the 
end of your strategy development work and not at the beginning. If your name is 
Richard Branson, then tackle the work at the beginning. But if you don’t have his 
skills, and most of us don’t, then don’t try to see the end from the beginning. You 
can’t.  (Simpson, 2004, p. 3)
We will therefore return to the “mission” issue at the end of the next chapter.
5. SUMMARY
Strategy is a craft.  The crafter uses her tools (participants) to detect discontinuities and 
patterns in her material.  She then commits herself to the transformation of the material at 
the right time and place. She uses all the tools available (enforces participation), challenges 
participants and ﬁnally gives herself enough time to get a participative, accepted and cemented 
answer.  She uses emotional and visual support to achieve results. Finally, possible strategies 
are developed by looking at the relationship between strengths, weaknesses, opportunities 
and threats.  These are then compared to issues and dreams to get to the chosen strategies. 
We now have a list of seemingly attractive strategic themes. Can we map and reﬁne these 
alternatives? We will discuss this reﬁnement in the next chapter.
Final take-out
CRAFTING – Crafting is about looking for and exploiting discontinuity and patterns. This is only possible 
if the craftsman knows his material and is willing to transform it.
THE PROGRESS OF STRATEGIC CHOICE – Effective strategic choice means enforced participation 
of the right people with enough time to be challenged, to consider alternatives and to be led to 
accepting a solution, with emotional and visual support.
THINKING AIDS IN CHOICE – We use military aids in dealing with the relationships between strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats to generate possibilities. Possibilities are compared with 
issues and dreams to determine what is attractive, and choices are made.
WHAT ABOUT VISION OR MISSION? – Vision and mission are derived statements. They should follow 
strategic work and not precede it.
SUMMARY – Strategies are crafted. Think about what the crafter needs, how she operates and how 
she completes her work.
CHAPTER 10
MAPPING STRATEGIES 
Conceptualising the battle plan for greater understanding –  
achieving depth of thought and participation
Critical issues for this chapter
TECHNIQUES FOR PRIORITISATION AND INTERPRETATION – How do we interpret and prioritise 
themes?
DETERMINING VALUE DRIVERS – What has value got to do with it?
THE REVOLUTION – Are there revolutionary approaches to selection? 
COMPETENCE AND RELEVANCE – Can we do it, is it necessary and do we want to?
VISION – THE ASHRIDGE WAY – Do we need a vision now?
SUMMARY – How do we pull these thoughts together?
1. TECHNIQUES FOR PRIORITISATION AND INTERPRETATION
Once the strategic choice has been made, and a list of strategic themes generated, it is 
prudent to go through a process of prioritising and strategically interpreting the results. We 
have used a variety of tools to do this and have found some value in all of the tools. It is useful 
to apply more than one tool if time permits, for this always leads to a greater understanding of 
the common patterns among themes. It is not possible to give a hierarchy here, but rather to 
sketch speciﬁc situations in which each tool works better.
2. DETERMINING VALUE DRIVERS
One way to analyse the strategic themes that were generated is to question whether the 
theme:
• Will impact on the value of the company;
• Can be inﬂuenced by management; and
• Can be measured.
The questions are visually depicted in Figure 53.
Ideally, strategic effort should be focused on those areas where the creation of high value can 
be measured and inﬂuenced by management.  
Identiﬁed themes with a low value should be reconsidered.  Value should, however, be deﬁned 
clearly – in the long term it does come down to increased return for shareholders.  But themes 
should be carefully evaluated.  Socio-economic themes, for instance, might seem costly and 
nice to have at the moment, but without that investment the company’s future might not be 
sustainable in the community.
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Figure 53: Determining value drivers
Where themes were rated with a high value, but with low measurability, management should 
investigate methods of developing measures to monitor progress.  These are normally soft 
issues that are critical to implement.
Where themes were rated with a high value, but management has little inﬂuence on the 
execution of the theme, management should investigate ways of developing its networks in 
relation to that theme.  Networks are important, because these themes are almost always 
issues external to the ﬁrm, but have a critical impact on the company, such as the performance 
of the supply chain.
As is apparent from the name, this tool works best with groups that very quickly want to 
consider only a few alternatives and who wish to start with the implementation of valuable 
strategies immediately.
3. THE REVOLUTION
We believe that correct leadership in the strategic choice should lead to a choice that includes 
both the environmental view of Porter and others, and the resource-based view of Hamel and 
others:
• The basic premise of the environmental view is that there is a speciﬁc environment 
determined by, inter alia, industry constructs and external forces.  The company has to 
ﬁt into this given environment – strategic choice is therefore limited.
• The resource-based view emphasises that the company has resources available such 
as the ability to innovate, knowledge, ﬁnancial and other assets.  These create core 
competencies and capabilities, on the basis of which a company can create a place for 
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itself in the market place – strategic choice is therefore basically unlimited.
In his book, Leading the revolution, Gary Hamel  emphasises that innovation is to be found both 
in the systemic and radical approach to business: 
CEO’s, CIO’s and efﬁciency-besotted consultants spent the 90’s learning to 
think systematically about business processes.  Initiatives aimed at supply chain 
integration, process re-engineering, enterprise resource planning and customer 
relationship management demolished functional chimneys and criss-crossed 
organisational boundaries. Yet they were seldom radical, and many impacted only 
a single component or process in the company’s overall business model.  Business 
concept innovation is both radical and systemic. (Hamel, 2000, p. 17)
This belief of Hamel (op. cit., p.18) is depicted in Figure 54.
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Figure 54: Move towards business concept innovation (based on various improvement styles)
In keeping with our approach of always evaluating the internal, market and external 
environments, we have expanded this to include the external environment (Figure 55).
We also believe that incremental and radical changes can be achieved in the internal, market 
and external environments.
The strategic themes are plotted on this matrix.  Thought gaps are the “empty” areas.  It is 
not necessarily a prerequisite to have a theme in each area, but the management team must 
understand that the area is not receiving strategic attention at the moment, and what the 
implications of that could be.
We’ve found that this methodology works best if the facilitators suspect that the participants 
are very much set in their ways. Some examples that we’ve found include the following:
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Figure 55:  Move towards environmental control
• Many engineering and resource-based ﬁrms, with long histories, seem to be busy with 
continuous improvement. Often in strategic sessions many themes that arise are in this 
area. The more advanced of these ﬁrms have dabbled in business improvement and in 
some cases spent tremendous efforts on these actions. The challenge for these ﬁrms, 
and for the facilitator if this is a typical result of the process, is to help the participants 
to understand the disruptive future of non-linear events in their markets (which will – in 
the fullness of time – come) and the need to continuously re-engineer not only process 
but the entire business concept. Often attempts to inﬂuence the environment (even 
control it) are insufﬁcient.
• Some new, or marketing and innovation-orientated, ﬁrms sometimes generate only 
non-linear innovation or new business concepts. Firms will eventually die if basic 
processes are not continuously improved and re-engineered. This is also important.
• A few parastatal type businesses that we have facilitated (but also some with private 
shareholding) sometimes get “stuck in the environment”. This is incredible but true. 
Trying to inﬂuence the political or shareholder control of your business cannot be 
the only strategy. In fact, environmental control points to an array of external actions 
amongst shareholders, regulators, venture partners, etc. Obsession with this aspect 
sometimes means too little attention is devoted to new market concepts, the business’s 
own process improvements, etc.
4. COMPETENCE AND RELEVANCE
Another model (source unknown) to facilitate interpretation of the strategic themes is rating 
the competence of the organisation to implement a theme, and the relevance of the theme to 
the business (which links to value described earlier).  These ratings are normally done from 
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1 to 5, where 1 means either incompetence or low relevance.  The ratings are plotted on a 
graph, as depicted in Figure 56.
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Figure 56: Interpreting competence and relevance
• Overkills:  The inclusion of these themes in the company’s strategic agenda should be 
re-evaluated.  Though competence is low, value is also low.
• Strengths:  Relevance is low, but the company has high internal competence.  The 
strengths in these areas should be leveraged to achieve other goals.
• Maintainers:  The business relevance is only relatively high.  The company has some 
competence to deal with this and should maintain its efforts in these areas.
• Gripes:  Business relevance is very high but competence low.  The company should 
invest in increasing the competence to achieve these strategic themes as the company 
will beneﬁt signiﬁcantly from doing so.
• Emergents:  Business relevance is very high and the company has average competence. 
Once again, the company should invest in increasing the competence to achieve these 
strategic themes as the company will beneﬁt signiﬁcantly from doing so.
• Opportunities:  Strategic themes that have signiﬁcant business relevance and there 
is highly developed internal competence to implement the themes. These themes are 
low-hanging fruit ready for picking.
We’ve found this approach works well in large groups where many strategic themes are 
competing for a place. We project the themes on an electronic worksheet in the room and 
then ask the participants to ﬁrst rate the strategies for competence and relevance. This is 
followed by a group discussion on the “effort” that should be allocated to each strategy (see 
the simple example in Figure 57).
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Figure 57: “Effort” points for themes (a simple example) 
Participants are asked to imagine that the organisation has 100 “effort points” to execute the 
strategy. At ﬁrst, we assign the points equally to each strategy. Participants are then asked to 
discuss this amongst themselves and then add extra points where required. This process is 
repeated, but this time points are subtracted, and with the ﬁnal pass the scores are balanced 
to add up to 100 again. We’ve found that the robust discussion on competence and relevance 
and the allocation of “effort” points enhance and expand the initial understanding of the 
themes and begin the process of acceptance and cementing. In the graph the size of the 
bubble that represents the strategic theme is relative to the theme’s ﬁnal “effort” points.
We refer the reader to the case studies in Chapter 16 for the practical application of this 
model.
5. VISION – THE ASHRIDGE WAY
The Ashridge Mission Model, developed by Campbell and Yeung (1991), supports the approach 
to complete the strategic process and to then conﬁrm the purpose, strategy, behaviour 
standards and values of the company based on the renewed strategic insights.  These concepts 
are interpreted as follows:
• Purpose:  Does the mission statement describe an inspiring purpose that avoids playing 
to the selﬁsh interests of some stakeholders?
• Strategy:  Does the strategy statement deﬁne a business domain and explain why it is 
attractive? (This is based on the strategic themes developed earlier).
• Behaviour standards:  Does the statement describe important behaviour standards 
that serve as beacons of the strategy and values?
• Values:  Does the statement identify values that link with the organisation’s purpose 
and act as beliefs that employees can feel proud of?
This model is depicted in Figure 58.
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Purpose
Strategy
distinctive competence
Values
What the company 
believes in
Behaviour standards
The policies & behaviour patterns that underpin 
the distinctive competence & the value system
Why the company exists
The competitive position & 
Figure 58: The Ashridge mission model
An example of the model applied in a ﬁnancial services company is given in Figure 59.
Strategy
• Better financial discipline
• Knowledge of cash cows
• Skill at buying and breaking up 
poor-performing groups
• Better operators
Values
• Individual responsibility
• Autonomy & 
accountability
• Efficiency is good
• Victorian work ethic
Behaviour standards
• Budgets must be met
• Managers work hard
• Keep business simple
• Decentralise
• Focus on short-term financial performance
Purpose
The shareholder is king.
Think of the pensioner living off her investments.
Figure 59: Ashridge mission model applied in a ﬁnancial services company
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6. SUMMARY
We have now taken our broad list of strategic themes and, by looking at value drivers, creativity, 
competence, relevance and aspiration, reduced these to a succinct list of strategies.
We are now ready for the next big step. How will we make it happen? In the next section we will 
discuss the implementation topics.
Final take-out
TECHNIQUES FOR PRIORITISATION AND INTERPRETATION – Prioritisation and interpretation are an 
extension of the craft. There are no absolutes and the situation will determine the technique.
DETERMINING VALUE DRIVERS – The value driver approach is used as a rule of thumb to quickly 
identify valuable strategies that management can inﬂuence and of which the results are easily 
measurable.
THE REVOLUTION – The most revolutionary approach to selection is to understand that the company 
must “ﬁt” into the environment, but with the skilful, clever and innovative use of resources should 
be able to “make” itself ﬁt – even if this requires changing the environment. 
COMPETENCE AND RELEVANCE – Competence/relevance plotting answers the critical questions of 
our ability, need and aspiration to execute a strategy. It is, however, the debate, rather than the 
numbers or plot, that makes a huge contribution.
VISION – THE ASHRIDGE WAY – The vision, if the process was facilitated well, will now be apparent 
in its most basic form. Using a good model, such as Ashridge, will facilitate further cementing and 
buy-in.
SUMMARY – The deﬁnitive step is to decide. After all that has been said and done, don’t continue 
without decisiveness.
 IMPLEMENTING STRATEGY
CHAPTER 11
THE OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION 
How an army’s leadership, way of doing things and quality of  
soldiers will make or break the implementation
Critical issues for this chapter
STRATEGY WITHOUT IMPLEMENTATION – Is strategy implementation a separate function from 
strategy? I.e. is an unimplemented strategy a strategy?
PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION – What are the core principles of implementation?
CAPACITY TO CHANGE – Do we have the capacity to change?
INITIATING PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT – Should we have an implementation programme?
SUMMARY – How do we pull these thoughts together?
1. STRATEGY WITHOUT IMPLEMENTATION
The most important question is: what is a strategy without implementation? And the most 
obvious answer is “nothing”. Implementation is not a “next step”. There is no such thing as 
a “strategy implementation phase” that follows strategic thinking – strategy implementation 
is a core part of strategy. “Strategy” can be said to consist of thinking, conceptualisation and 
implementation, and not one of the three can be divorced from the others. 
This would be the same as trying to conceptualise a car with an engine, body, wheels and 
steering mechanism and to imagine that the car would be of use without any of these four 
parts – it won’t. 
Similarly, the general that prepares for battle and, at the crucial moment, withdraws from the 
battleﬁeld and sends his troops home will not be a general for long.  Neither will a general who 
prepares for battle send her troops into battle and then retire from the battleﬁeld. The general 
will oversee the battle, get involved and inspire her troops at crucial moments. (Contrary to 
popular belief, senior ofﬁcers do exactly this and the best of them see battle experience right 
through their careers. In most wars many generals are killed in action11).
Yet, astonishingly, many businesses still sport “strategy implementation” teams and, in a 
recent case, even a person whose permanent job is “strategy implementation”. This doesn’t 
make sense. Strategy is implemented by line – it is not a staff function. 
2. PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION
This brings us to the ﬁrst principle of implementation: leadership through the line.  There is 
no such thing as “leaders” at the top and “managers” at the second layer. All managers must 
be leaders.
11 Being a general in the German army in World War II is a good example. Every two weeks one died (136 in total – not 
counting the 84 that Hitler executed).
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But leadership is often hampered by an intangible, difﬁcult to deﬁne phenomenon that many 
management scientists call culture. Culture, or the way in which things are done, is at ﬁrst a 
result of leadership, amongst other factors, but once entrenched it will inﬂuence leadership 
in the future. When Scott decided to go to the South Pole, he tried to mount an all-inclusive 
expedition with many scientists, representatives from branches of the British defence force, etc. 
In short, he tried to make it a national effort. He even believed in hauling supplies themselves 
(with limited dog use) to show “character”.  Amundsen on the other hand, had a single-minded 
technical approach, i.e. to get to the South Pole and get there ﬁrst. This difference in vision and 
leadership gave rise to two different cultures or “ways of doing things”. When Scott encountered 
major obstacles, he consulted widely, which is a good thing, but then often made sub-optimal 
decisions purely to stick to his inclusivity principle. When deciding who to include in the last 
legs of the journey, he didn’t select the ﬁttest, but rather a representative sample from all 
the groups he wanted to include. Amundsen, on the other hand, stuck to the single-minded 
approach and ruthlessly (after consultation) made decisions that led to the goal: getting to 
the South Pole ﬁrst. Amundsen won and survived, Scott and his expedition perished (see case 
study in Chapter 17). 
Culture relates to an organisation’s habits. Like in all organisms and systems, poor habits will 
lead to poor performance, sluggishness and a general state of decline.  But how do we inﬂuence 
culture? If the “way in which things are done” is so pervasive and has such a profound effect 
on success, can it be inﬂuenced? The answer is yes and it will be discussed in Chapter 13 as 
the second principle of implementation, i.e. fostering a supportive culture.
Leadership could be perfect and the environment conducive to great achievements, but the 
quality of the soldiers lacking. Recruitment refers to the process of getting the right person 
for the job. This doesn’t refer to the employment process, but rather the dynamic process of 
ﬁtting employees’ capabilities to job descriptions. As such it is also not an implementation 
process per se, nor is it a Human Resources function in business; it is a normal part of line 
management, but as such it is an important principle of implementation. 
The three principles of implementation are summarised in Figure 60.
Culture
the way things 
are done
Leadership
managing 
through the 
line
Recruitment
the right fit of 
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Figure 60: The three principles of implementation
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These principles refer to three core “states” of the organisation that will ensure success or 
failure. 
Many theorists talk about other production factors such as ﬁnance, assets and systems. 
These factors are not in the conceptual domain and are not core to success on the level of 
strategic thinking. It is no doubt important to have the right assets, investments and even 
environment and opportunities, but these are tactical elements, on the next level of strategy. 
The basic approach is that a system, on the ﬁrst level, consists of leadership, culture and 
people - prerequisites for successful strategy implementation.  But is this enough? There is 
one more aspect to consider.
3. CAPACITY TO CHANGE
Assuming that the strategic elements mentioned above are in place, we still need to consider 
if the organisation has the capacity to change. This means that we need to answer two critical 
questions:
1. Do our people have the capacity to change?  The implementation of strategy will require 
changed behaviour. Are people ready to modify their daily routine to implement the 
strategy?
2. Do our processes, systems, procedures, etc. have the capacity to support the 
implementation?
We can summarise these two points as emotional and systemic readiness for implementation 
and these are depicted in Figure 61.
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Figure 61: The principles of implementation and readiness
These elements need to be gauged and managed. We discuss this process in Chapter 15.
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4. INITIATING PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT
In a certain sense, if strategy implementation is to be described, it would amount to nothing 
more than:
• action plans;
• patterns of decisions; and
• relationships
that need to be managed, while the strategies are implemented (Harrison, 2003, p. 20). We 
want to reiterate that this implementation happens through the line at the various units that 
normally deal with the aspects that require change. The role of programme management 
should be limited to a certain level of involvement in and co-ordination of the three aspects 
mentioned above, i.e. answering the following questions:
• Do the various action plans of disparate units hang together in a sensible way?
• Are decisions enabled at the right time and place (and are they taken when required) 
in such a fashion that the overall strategic programme goes forward?
• Are all the relationships in the organisation and with external stakeholders continuously 
healthy and conducive to a positive environment for the execution of the strategy?
In order to get the ball rolling, we often ask the thinking team (that developed the speciﬁc 
strategy) to write the ﬁrst rough draft of key implementation steps during the strategic 
session.
4.1 The key implementation steps 
The purpose of developing the key implementation steps during the strategic session is two-
fold:
• The team involved in developing the strategic themes has the opportunity to articulate 
the details of the strategy to ensure that during the implementation process the core 
reasoning behind that theme is not lost; and
• Participants are also asked to develop the implementation steps over three distinct 
time periods, usually short term (3-6 months), medium term (6-24 months) and long 
term (2-5 years). (The speciﬁc time periods are not absolute, although consensus on 
the time periods should be achieved.)  By doing this, the long-term output for each 
strategy is articulated, i.e. the “bigger picture”.  The detailed implementation plan can 
then be monitored against these overall goals to ensure that we are moving in the right 
direction. This also serves as a motivator, because people know what they are working 
towards.12
In addition, an initial sponsor for each strategic theme is assigned during the session. This 
sponsor must be in the room and is responsible for driving the initial implementation of the 
assigned strategic theme.  The position of the sponsor is not cast in stone, but the key principle 
here is that this person is responsible until such time as another sponsor is assigned (with 
agreement from the strategic team).  The key ﬁrst step is the completion of “the template of 
agreement” for each strategic theme.
12 In a more detailed version of the exercise the changes could be expressed in terms of speciﬁc areas of the organisation, 
according to some models, e.g. the McKinsey 7-S model.  This depicts what will change in the short term, medium term 
and long term in the various areas of the organisation and what decisions and actions will be necessary to make that 
happen. Once the broad brushstrokes are agreed upon, it is possible to dig deeper into the terms of reference of each 
sub-strategy and ensure alignment.  (The 7-S model refers to three “hard” S’s - systems, strategy and structure - and 
four “soft” S’s – style, skill, staff and shared values (Lorenz, 2003, p. 70)).
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4.2 Ensuring alignment
The sponsor and an initial project team populate the “template of agreement” and present 
this to the larger group at the next strategic session (or if there is time available, after a 
break-away at the same session).  This template outlines the sub-group’s thinking on speciﬁc 
aspects of the strategy and will ensure ﬁnal alignment on the exact content of the strategic 
theme (see Figure 62). 
How do we align this outcome with other initiatives?
Interaction with other strategic 
themes and projects
What has to be in place BEFORE this theme can be implemented 
successfully and what can we do to ensure that this happens?
Prerequisites for execution
Who must we also take into account?Other stakeholders / participants
What do we need to do this?
Resources required (financial, 
skills, culture shift required)
What could go wrong if we implement / do not implement this theme?Perceived risks
Weaknesses to overcome
Strengths to leverage
Threats to monitor & address
Make the SWOT analysis developed previously relevant to this theme 
(Chapter 7)  [Which opportunities must we grab, which threats / 
weaknesses impact on this theme and must be addressed, which 
strengths must we exploit?]
Opportunities to exploit
Who are the key people that will implement this?
Sponsor, Steercom, project 
manager & team members
What will we do and what will we not do
Define scope and boundaries 
(what is excluded)
Describe the reason for the existence of the strategic theme
Summary of strategic issue 
being addressed
Figure 62: The template of agreement
It is the task of the overall, or plenary, group to talk to this outline and come to an agreement 
that the terms of reference of the strategic theme reﬂect the group’s intentions.
5. SUMMARY
The key obstacles to strategy implementation are therefore:
• Lack of leadership;
• An unsupportive culture;
• Ineffective recruitment;
• Lack of systemic or emotional readiness to support change; and
• Neglecting the key ﬁrst steps of effective programme management – assigning 
responsibilities and ensuring alignment regarding intentions.
These issues will be discussed in turn in the next few chapters.
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Final take-out
STRATEGY WITHOUT IMPLEMENTATION – An unimplemented strategy is a “contradiction in terms”. 
“Strategy” consists of thinking, conceptualisation and implementation.
PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION – Dynamic leadership, good habits and quality people 
will make or break the effort.
CAPACITY TO CHANGE – Even leadership, good habits and quality people will not facilitate change 
if people are not ready for it (emotional readiness) or if they don’t know what to do (systemic 
readiness).
INITIATING PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT – Line implements, but the programme ensures co-
ordination, enables decisions and tracks relationships.
SUMMARY – Implementation requires the line to lead, the culture to enable, the people to be motivated, 
and knowledge and commitment about what is required.
CHAPTER 12
LEADERSHIP 
A simple guide to achieve results 
Critical issues for this chapter
FROM PROGRAMMES TO PEOPLE – How do strategies get implemented? 
THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP – What is the most important climate indicator? 
LEADERSHIP THROUGH THE LINE – Is leadership a top management phenomenon?
DESCRIPTIVE MODEL FOR BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSE TO LEADERSHIP – How do personal and group 
leadership hang together?
MEASURING LEADERSHIP – How can I easily determine if leadership is effective in my organisation?
MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP – Are supervisors, managers and top management leaders?
SUMMARY – How do we pull these thoughts together?
1. FROM PROGRAMMES TO PEOPLE
Strategy implementation receives a lot of attention from project and programme management 
theory, as it should. Strategies won’t implement themselves, but neither will project plans and 
programmes. People will. And people must be led through the change process that strategy 
implementation requires. Strategies are implemented by the line, and as such line managers 
bear the brunt of implementation leadership.
Leadership is a well-deﬁned and established ﬁeld of study and we therefore would limit our 
discussion on the topic to the extent to which “leadership readiness” for strategy implementation 
can be established and what should be done to ﬁx gaps.
2. THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP
In a few climate surveys13 that we were involved in over the years, we were able to establish the 
drivers of organisational climate in many different organisations. It is true that, to some extent, 
these drivers differ from organisation to organisation, but it is also true that in many respects 
the same answers were found.
In some of the early studies there were opportunities to be highly explorative in our approach. 
I remember one event, quite a few years ago, where the study was based on eight focus 
groups at various levels of an organisation with 100 000 employees. A sample of 5 000 
employees were interviewed with 141 questions. A factor analysis was done on the results 
and, as factor analysis goes, the ﬁrst factor declared a very strong one third of the variance 
of the organisational climate (the second factor’s variance contribution dropped to 10%). All 
the questions in this factor related directly to employees’ relationship with their supervisors. 
All studies that we have been involved in ever since, and everything that we have experienced 
and read, conﬁrms the pervasive importance of leadership through the line.
13 Climate surveys are a common method of measuring the climate of an organisation.  Some global benchmarks in highly 
involved studies have been established by organisations such as Hay, based on a Harvard Methodology developed 
in 1967 and re-normed over the years. The survey “measures a leader’s effectiveness in creating a positive work 
environment.” (Hay Group).
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3. LEADERSHIP THROUGH THE LINE
Leadership through the line has three important and distinctive elements.  The interplay 
between these three describes most of what is necessary to understand for strategy 
implementation, i.e. personal leadership, group leadership and overall identity.  There is also 
a speciﬁc hierarchy between the three:
• Personal leadership refers to the personal relationship between an employee and his 
direct supervisor. The supervisor provides him with encouragement, guidance and 
material to do the job. This seems obvious, but it is incredible to see how many failures 
occur on this level.
• Group leadership refers to the functioning of the group as a “self-guiding” organism. 
The leadership relationship is much broader and includes the cohesion with team 
members, trust, guidance and involvement of top management and opportunities 
for success within the group. Success is determined by organisational factors, i.e. to 
achieve successful group leadership the organisation as a whole must understand it 
and invest energy to improve it, across the board.
• Overall identity is leadership on the deepest level, a personal quest to become truly 
connected with the organisation, team and yourself.
The three elements follow an obvious hierarchical path. It is exceedingly difﬁcult (though not 
impossible) to experience and beneﬁt from group leadership if personal leadership is not in 
place, and the challenge is even greater to ﬁnd a true self-connectedness with the organisation 
if the other two elements are not in place. It is also interesting to see the relationship between 
these three areas of leadership and the three realities, depicted in Figure 18.  We can update 
Figure 18 to include leadership, as depicted in Figure 63.
Con-
sensus
reality
Self-organising
reality
One-world reality
Team and top leaders
Sense of self, true 
connectedness
n-
nsus
ality
lf ganising
ality
One rld reality
Direct supervisor
Figure 63: Different realities and leadership
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The work that delves into especially the one-world reality becomes highly specialised and we 
would like to therefore concentrate on the areas of personal and group leadership and look 
for a descriptive model.
4. DESCRIPTIVE MODEL FOR BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSE TO LEADERSHIP 
The two elements of leadership are depicted in Figure 64.
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Figure 64: Impact of personal and group leadership on behaviour
• When leadership is poor on all levels, the behavioural response tends to be that of 
organisational terrorists. Employees who don’t leave usually exhibit traits of undermining 
the organisation on all fronts. People in this situation will begin by passively harming 
the organisation through ignoring targets and deadlines, staying home unnecessarily 
and ignoring the stewardship role of the organisation’s employees and assets. This 
can turn into substantively aggressive behaviour where the organisation is harmed 
through industrial espionage, theft and various activities that can harm the image, 
brand, products, markets and assets of the organisation.
• When personal leadership is strong in a speciﬁc sub-division, but employees struggle 
to ﬁnd group guidance (i.e. they don’t identify with the organisation’s mission, values 
and top leadership), a band of brothers mentality sets in. On a personal level there 
is a lot of support and the subdivision tends to be very effective in selective tasks. 
If the challenge is very speciﬁc and short term, the group usually can get together 
and effectively carry out a mission. Overall company or organisation objectives are, 
however, often ignored. This behaviour is often typical of the lower echelons in an 
organisation and the challenge is to ﬁx this, especially at the coal face.
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• When personal leadership is weak, but group leadership strong, behaviour often turns 
into back-stabbing events. Many people inadvertently fall into this behaviour pattern 
when relationships with ﬁrst-line supervisors turn sour, but overall identiﬁcation with 
company ideals and top leadership is high. In a certain sense the supervisor is seen as 
a stumbling block and is “wished out of the way”.
• Ideal behaviour is winning team behaviour. In the more advanced climate studies 
that we have been involved in, we always tried to look for elements that bind people 
together on all levels and through all the layers of diversity. No aspect is as unifying as 
success and faith in success. And this faith is only possible if ﬁrst-line supervisors and 
top management lead the organisation in that together. That is leadership through the 
line.
5. MEASURING LEADERSHIP
Bossidy and Charan (2002) identify 7 essential leadership behaviours:
• Know your people and your business;
• Insist on realism
• Set clear goals and priorities;
• Follow through;
• Reward the doers;
• Know yourself; and
• Expand people’s capabilities.
But how do we know whether these behaviours are present?
In their book First, Break all the Rules Buckingham and Coffman (1999) describe the results of 
research conducted by the Gallup Organisation over a period of 25 years (from the mid-1970s 
onwards).  The Organisation interviewed more that a million employees during this time and, 
through meta-analysis14, discovered 12 questions that measure the core elements needed to 
attract, focus and keep the most talented employees.  These elements are:
1. Do I know what is expected of me at work?
2. Do I have the materials and equipment I need to do my work right?
3. At work, do I have the opportunity to do what I do best every day?
4. In the last seven days, have I received recognition or praise for good work?
5. Does my supervisor, or someone at work, seem to care about me as a person?
6. Is there someone at work who encourages my development?
7. At work, do my opinions seem to count?
8. Does the mission/purpose of my company make me feel like my work is important?
9. Are my co-workers committed to doing quality work?
10. Do I have a best friend at work?
11. In the last six months, have I talked with someone about my progress?
12. This last year, have I had opportunities at work to learn and grow?
14 A meta-analysis is a statistical integration of dta accumulated across many different studies.  As such, it provides 
uniquely powerful information, because it controls for measurement and sampling errors and other idiosyncracies that 
distort the results of individual studies (Buckingham and Coffman 1999, p. 256)
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According to Buckingham and Coffman (ibid.), if you can create the kind of environment where 
employees answer positively to all 12 questions, then you will have built a great place to work. 
Also note that many of the questions are phrased in the extreme (“best”) to make sure that the 
rating of questions is discriminating - much of the power therefore lies in the wording of the 
question.  The questions about pay, beneﬁt, senior management or organisational structure 
are still important, but they are equally important to every employee, good, bad and mediocre 
– it will not differentiate talented employees from the rest.
The further hypothesis is that if these questions were the best questions, then employees who 
answered them positively would presumably work in higher-performing departments.  During 
1998 the Gallup Organisation investigated the business outcomes of 24 different companies 
across 12 industries (more than 2500 business units were included in the study).  Business 
outcomes consisted of productivity, proﬁtability, employee retention and customer satisfaction. 
Through meta-analysis it was discovered that:
• Employees who responded more positively to the twelve questions worked in business 
units with higher levels of productivity, proﬁt, retention and customer satisfaction; and
• Employees in different business units in the same company rated the questions 
differently.  Perceptions were therefore created by the employee’s immediate supervisor 
– the manager is therefore the critical link in building a strong workplace.
Based on the meta-analysis, the most powerful questions are those with the strongest links to 
the most business outcomes.  These were:
1. Do I know what is expected of me at work?
2. Do I have the materials and equipment I need to do my work right?
3. At work, do I have the opportunity to do what I do best every day?
4. In the last seven days, have I received recognition or praise for good work?
5. Does my supervisor, or someone at work, seem to care about me as a person?
6. Is there someone at work who encourages my development?
These questions therefore also form the “base camp” and “camp 1” of the hierarchical path 
of employee satisfaction (see Figure 65).
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ELEMENTSHIERARCHY
This last year, have I had opportunities at work to learn and grow?
In the last six months, have I talked with someone about my progress?Camp 3: 
How can we grow?
Do I have a best friend at work?
Are my co-workers committed to doing quality work?
Does the mission/purpose of my company make me feel like my work is 
important?
At work, do my opinions seem to count?Camp 2: 
Do I belong?
Is there someone at work who encourages my development?
Does my supervisor, or someone at work, seem to care about me as a? 
person
In the last seven days, have I received recognition or praise for good work?
At work, do I have the opportunity to do what I do best every day?Camp 1: 
What do I give?
Do I have the materials and equipment I need to do my work right?
Do I know what is expected of me at work?Base Camp: 
What do I get?
Figure 65:  Hierarchy of employee satisfaction
In addition, Buckingham and Coffman (op. cit., p. 57) highlighted a key insight of great leaders 
– capitalise on the uniqueness of each employee:
People don’t change that much.
Don’t waste time trying to put in what was left out.
Try to draw out what was left in.
That is hard enough.
This is enabled through the so-called “Four Keys” of great managers (op. cit., p. 67):
1. When selecting someone, they select for talent … not simply experience, intelligence 
or determination.
2. When setting expectations, they deﬁne the right outcomes … not the right steps.
3. When motivating someone, they focus on strengths … not on weaknesses.
4. When developing someone, they help them ﬁnd the right ﬁt … not simply the next rung 
on the ladder.
(See the case studies on the utility and the paper products manufacturer in Chapter 16 for 
examples of the application of the model.)
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6. MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP
A lot has been said about the difference between management and leadership. Levicki (2003) 
summarises this debate (relating to skills) Figure 66. 
Leadership skills
Management skills
USE OF SKILLS IN CAREER OVER A LIFETIME
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Figure 66: Management and leadership
The debate has two opposite sides. We would agree that management/leadership skills 
become more involved and complex and more related to the one-world reality challenge (as 
depicted in Figure 18), as the position in the hierarchy rises. At the same time, we would urge 
organisations to see supervisors on all levels as leaders.
7. SUMMARY
Understand that each person has a unique contribution to make to the organisation.  The 
core of this relates to whether people know what is expected of them, and whether they 
receive the right equipment, opportunities, recognition, care and encouragement to do this 
based on their unique competencies.
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Final take-out
FROM PROGRAMMES TO PEOPLE – Programmes can’t implement strategies, people do.
THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP – Leadership is the most important indicator of climate – always.
LEADERSHIP THROUGH THE LINE – Leadership happens through the line – from ﬁrst line managers 
all the way to the top.
DESCRIPTIVE MODEL FOR BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSE TO LEADERSHIP – Poor leadership will create 
organisational terrorists, splinter groups and back-stabbers in the organisation. It is always bad for 
the business.
MEASURING LEADERSHIP – Concentrate on the 12 tested questions that test basic requirements, 
recognition, belonging and development.
MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP – All managers should be leaders – at all levels.
SUMMARY – Leaders are the stewards of the organisation’s position in the environment, its relationship 
with the markets and the development of assets and people. Poor leadership will destroy you.
CHAPTER 13
CULTURE 
The army’s habits and their pervasive effect 
Critical issues for this chapter
THE COMPLEXITY OF CULTURE – How complex is the phenomenon?
CONTROL THROUGH CULTURE – How easily can we inﬂuence and “use” culture?
TYPES OF CULTURE – Can cultural “types” be identiﬁed?
THE DRIVERS OF CULTURE – What useful drivers of culture can we identify?
APPLYING THE MODEL – Can the model be applied in practical situations?
SUMMARY – How do we pull these thoughts together?
1. THE COMPLEXITY OF CULTURE
Habits are nothing more than entrenched behaviour. They are recognisable in individuals, 
but also in groups, businesses, countries, etc. They are, in fact, a dimension of any system. 
Various aspects of a system inﬂuence and shape these habits, including history, strategy, 
leadership and assets, to the extent that a complete algorithm which could describe habits or 
culture formation still needs to be developed.
If culture is a complex phenomenon, it could be asked whether it is worthwhile bothering 
about it. Couldn’t we accept culture as a given and just get on with strategy implementation? 
In order to answer this question, we need to establish ﬁrst whether culture can, in fact, at least 
be measured.
The description and measurement of culture became a great “fad” about two decades ago 
and a lot of work was done to understand this phenomenon better. Mintzberg (2000) talks 
about culture in an interesting way and has a less than ﬂattering jab at strategic planners’ 
use of the term. He writes about the failures of strategic planning and strategic planners’ 
responses to clear evidence of these failures. When Japanese penetration decimated the 
American markets, planners grabbed at culture and immediately developed a further four-
step process for the planning cycle, i.e. deﬁnition, organisation, assessment and focus:
It was all so simple, making this ‘a part of the corporation’s strategic planning 
process’. All it needed was lots of resources (especially for the consultants 
who concocted these procedures) and a blind eye to how it violated the natural 
functioning of the organisation. Somehow, imagining that you could sit down and 
calculate coalitions seems silly enough, but to take culture – so deeply rooted in 
the history and traditions of an organisation, and, for the Japanese at least, in the 
long evolution of a society – and work it into the pat procedures of the planning 
cycle seems extraordinarily naïve. One is hard pressed to imagine the Japanese 
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quaking in their geisha houses at the thought of Americans doing such planning. 
But then again, this probably never amounted to a marginal distraction in any event. 
(Mintzberg, 2000, pp. 144-145)
In spite of Mintzberg’s cynicism a lot of work has obviously been done on the subject. We 
would agree with the sentiment about the impossibility of a “quick and dirty” approach, where 
culture is “measured and corrected”. But at the same time there can be no doubt about the 
pervasive effect that “the way of doing things” has on implementation. If it is complex and 
important, but difﬁcult to change or “use”, what value could it have?
2. CONTROL THROUGH CULTURE 
Sanchez and Heene (2004, p. 99) talk about “cultural control”, where the norms and values 
of behaviour are used as a cultural control mechanism. This is useful only if the norms and 
values are well established and support the strategy. In all the work we have done, we have 
often found a speciﬁc deﬁciency, deeply rooted in culture, which makes it difﬁcult to “use” 
positive values, whilst change programmes are running to root out negative ones.
In the case of one parastatal in South Africa their positive values included a huge shift to 
learning (the organisation produced hundreds of MBAs and doctorates in the eighties and 
nineties) and a great emphasis on technical superiority. On the deﬁciency side, a culture of 
non-implementation of strategy was adopted (typically the organisation became more a society 
of “thinkers”, rather than doers, with lots of philosophies and dreams, but little business 
development). During the transformation in South Africa most of the top management in the 
organisation was replaced and some of the emphasis on technical superiority was replaced 
with a greater focus on people, but incredibly the strategic inertia remained for many years 
and the culture of “dreaming” rather than doing persisted. 
This problem became so pervasive that for many years even the employees, for whom 
transformation should have been a positive thing, were traumatised by the strategic inertia 
of the business. Was this a problem caused by the new leaders? Or is culture such a deep-
rooted phenomenon that a type of organisational “osmosis” transfers it from one generation 
to the next? Apparently it does. If it is pervasive, then we should measure it and contemplate 
the effects of culture – the way in which things are done – on the implementation of strategy. 
And although not a control mechanism as such, we believe that we can use culture in 
implementation and to facilitate change management, both to identify values that will be 
supportive and values that have to be rooted out. In order to do this we have to establish 
“types” of culture.
3. TYPES OF CULTURE
Handy (1993), a decade ago, provided one of the most enduring accounts of types of culture, 
i.e. power, role, task and person cultures.
• Power cultures exist predominantly near the entrepreneurial “birth” of an organisation, 
where power is still concentrated, decision-making centralised and “charismatic” 
leadership often still persists at the centre.
• Role cultures evolve after long periods of stabilisation in an organisation where roles, 
procedures and often bureaucratic red tape take over. Decision-making is typically 
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procedure-bound and often still highly centralised.
• Task cultures become established when organisations are faced with many changes, 
both internally and externally, and successful task teams tackle these changes 
proactively. As new tasks are performed successfully, a task-orientated way of doing 
things emerges. The value of project and programme management to complete 
organisational interventions is understood.
• Person cultures entail an evolution to a society where the existence of the organisation 
is seen more as a beneﬁt for the employees than anything else. The organisation begins 
to place a higher value on the wellness of employees than bottom line performance.
Handy’s descriptions are useful, but the mere fact that various other models have evolved over 
time suggests that even this enduring approach is not deﬁnitive. Harrison (2003, p.99-100) 
suggests four other types, i.e. craftsmen, builders, pioneers, salesmen:
• Craftsmen organisations are quality and pride driven. The major advantage is excellently 
engineered products, but disadvantages are over-engineering and over-pricing when 
they become tinkerers.
• Builder organisations are growth and risk driven. The major advantages are growth 
and acquisition, but these organisations can also become imperialist, with high debt, 
too many unrelated businesses and a neglect of the original core and successful 
business.
• Pioneer organisations are driven by innovation and “new”-ness. Advantages are design 
and ﬂexibility, but sometimes these organisations become escapist, with impractical 
inventions of limited customer value.
• Salesmen organisations are driven by brand, distribution and aggressive advertising. 
The major advantage is high turnover, but when low-value products are marketed they 
tend to become drifters.
There is obviously a plethora of these typologies, all theoretically useful, but how can they be 
applied? Hitt et al. maintain that:
Changing a ﬁrm’s organisational culture is more difﬁcult than maintaining it, but 
effective strategic leaders recognise when change is needed. Incremental changes 
to the ﬁrm’s culture typically are used to implement strategies. More signiﬁcant, 
and sometimes even radical, changes to organisational culture are used to support 
the selection of strategies that differ from those the ﬁrm has been implementing 
historically. (Hitt et al., 2003, p. 399)
We will propose a typology that enables the use of cultural measurement in strategy 
implementation, based on the drivers of culture.
4. THE DRIVERS OF CULTURE
Our independent research has once again brought us back to the IME model (Figure 4). It 
seems as if an organisation’s way of doing things is often determined by the relationships 
internally and with the external environment. This work was started by Sandra Gertenbach 
in her thesis “The development of a construct for the description of corporate culture and its 
determinants” (1992).
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Gertenbach’s work was based on 148 questions, with nearly 4000 ﬁnal usable respondents, 
and a correspondence and factor analysis of the results. Incredibly, the work proved that 
culture is determined by two major drivers, i.e.:
• Team dynamics, which describe the intergroup and intragroup behaviour of the 
business. This behaviour can be typiﬁed by strong internal competition, where 
individuals, or small groups at the most, are rewarded for personal performance, whilst 
the overarching objectives of the business or larger team play a smaller role. Yet it is 
true that, even today, with the plethora of work that has been done on team dynamics, 
wellness and performance measurement that links to balanced scorecard and in turn 
to strategy, we still struggle to enable, enhance and reward group behaviour.
• Environmental pressures describe the extent of external orientation (such as towards 
the market and external stakeholders of the organisation), especially external pressures 
to perform. These pressures are typically lower in bureaucratic (often government-
type) organisations and sadly often in the lower echelons of many companies, where 
employees are not exposed to and rewarded for external success.
These two drivers allowed the study to develop a simple model that proved quite useful to us 
over the years. The model is summarised in Figure 67.
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Figure 67: Model of culture behaviours
The model identiﬁes four cultures:
• Lemmings, which describe a highly cohesive, but externally disabled culture (see box on 
Lemmings). Large groups of people that are traumatised by the external environment 
and kept in the dark by leaders typically exhibit Lemming-like traits.  In businesses 
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lower-echelon employees who are underpaid and overworked usually tend to display 
this behaviour. The groups stick together within an organisation, but support for the 
organisation’s ideals (survival) is not forthcoming. In fact, through labour movements 
and unrest, management often see these groups’ behaviours as self-destructive, 
not acknowledging management’s own contribution to the situation that led to this 
culture. Lemmings are strongly cohesive, but could be, in organisational terms, highly 
destructive for the business.  Lemmings are often involved in routine tasks in low-
innovation environments with limited contact with organisational leaders and they 
experience no direct link between performance and rewards.
Lemmings
Lemming is the common name for a number of small arctic rodents comprising the genus Lemmus, 
closely related to the meadow mouse, and known for mass migrations which inevitably lead to self-
destruction in the sea. True lemmings are small, stout-bodied animals, about ﬁve inches long, with 
very short tails, averaging about three quarters of an inch in length. They are tan above, and slate 
grey, mixed with tan below. The animals live in extensive burrows, near water, in the northernmost 
portions of the world, and feed on vegetation. At periodic intervals, when overpopulation of lemmings 
has led to a scarcity of food, hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of the animals band together and 
migrate in search of food. They start in the direction of lower elevation, and, once having chosen their 
direction, do not swerve from their path. The lemmings swim lakes and rivers several miles in width, and 
cross over mountains, eating all vegetation in their path. Eventually they reach the sea; attempting to swim 
it as they would a river, they are drowned. 
(Morse, 1964, p. 5567) 
 
• Snakes (puff adders) are the true bureaucrats of organisations. They literally each look 
after their own hole and will bite anything and anybody that steps on them. They are 
not concerned about the group’s interests nor the organisation’s success. They work 
in highly formalised structures where “management by blame” is standard practice. 
They have a stable, but extremely sluggish relationship with the external environment 
and display a highly uncaring attitude. They are often seen as lazy when confronted by 
tasks other than what is routinely known to them. They don’t like change (see box on 
snakes – puff adders).
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Snakes – Puff adders
Puff adders make splendid rat-traps.  A veld-rat was observed scurrying along a grass track; within 
seconds there was a thud, followed by anguished squeaks which soon ended. On investigation, it 
was noticed that the rat’s tail was protruding from the mouth of the puff adder, which had cunningly 
parked on the rodent track to snap up the ones that never look where they are going. The snake 
deposited the rat and inspected it, possibly wondering if the speedy catch was palatable. A second 
puff-adder appeared on the path and seized the rear-end of the rat and started swallowing, much 
to the chagrin of the ﬁrst puff adder, which quickly grabbed the rat’s head and commenced gulping 
towards its competitor. As inter-nasal distance narrowed and neither snake was prepared to yield, 
their respective snouts soon met at mid-body. Number one gave an enormous gulp, encompassing 
most of his opponent’s head. An intense struggle followed but gradually the challenger was painfully 
persuaded to follow the rat down a very different path.
(Mitchell, 2002)
• Tigers are usually closer to management in many organisations, if not part of the 
management team speciﬁcally. They are highly competitive amongst each other and 
are often the hard hitting, rising stars of organisations who contribute with energy, 
enthusiasm and innovation, but destroy with too much task orientation, aggression 
and internal competition. They understand the environment and external pressures 
very well, are often “experienced hires” and usually believe that the organisation 
of which they are part is not clever in its dealings with this environment. They are 
often involved in special-skill professional tasks, such as accounting and engineering, 
and their rewards are more often linked to performance than snakes and especially 
lemmings.
• Dolphin behaviour is often displayed by respected leaders of successful companies. 
The challenge is for this behaviour to permeate organisations. Interaction with the 
environment is not only clear, but dynamic and continuous, with rewards and promotions 
that are directly linked to success in the external environment as well as successful 
group delivery. Dolphins are the architects of the patterned, wave-like behaviour of 
the new science as described in Figure 21. They work together, hunt together and play 
together with obvious ease and, in organised “packs”, quickly become the masters of 
their environment.
5. APPLYING THE MODEL
Bossidy and Charan (2002) talk about organisational “software” (beliefs and behaviours), as 
opposed to the “hardware” (strategy and structure). They maintain that cultural change efforts 
fail because they are not linked to improving the business’s outcomes. We cannot agree more 
and observed many case studies where cultural change, merely for the sake of change (or 
the consultants who sold the programme!), failed. Cultural change gets real when your aim is 
execution – we endeavour to change behaviour speciﬁcally to change results, which means 
that you:
• Should tell people what results you are looking for;
• Discuss with them how these results will be achieved;
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• Reward achievement; and
• Act if they don’t achieve it (provide additional coaching, give them other jobs or, in the 
ﬁnal instance, let them go).
They also address a classic problem with culture change when they say:
…we don’t think ourselves into a new way of acting, but act ourselves into a new way 
of thinking. (op. cit., p.89)
The model was applied in the case studies of both the utility and the food production company. 
As example, the results for the utility are depicted in Figure 68 against a reference of delegates 
in previous workshops.
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Figure 68: The utility’s culture
The culture of the utility is not yet conducive to optimal behaviour.  On a positive note, lemming 
behaviour is lower than the reference.  Snake behaviour is still too high, however, while tiger 
and dolphin behaviour is too low relative to the reference.  Yet this scenario is quite typical 
for a business in this situation (see case study for more detail) and will be addressed as the 
business progresses on the path to commercialisation.  It is critical to take note of this issue, 
however, and address it at relevant times during the commercialisation process.
6. SUMMARY
Culture is complex, but this doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t take note of it. It is difﬁcult to 
control and can’t be dictated nor really “decided” upon - management cannot “pick” a culture 
today and install it tomorrow. Management scientists have developed many typologies, but our 
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research has found that group behaviour and environmental pressures are the best indicators. 
These indicators must be measured, and if changes in culture are required, leaders must 
initiate the behaviour by example, and the organisation will follow.
If leadership and culture are in place, we still need to consider recruitment. Do we have the 
right people in jobs? We will consider that in the next chapter. 
Final take-out
THE COMPLEXITY OF CULTURE – Culture is a highly complex and deep-rooted phenomenon, yet this 
doesn’t mean that it should be ignored.
CONTROL THROUGH CULTURE – Cultural control is extremely difﬁcult. Culture dictates rather than 
being dictated to. But its pervasiveness means that measurement and consideration of it are 
essential.
TYPES OF CULTURE – Many management scientists have identiﬁed culture “types”. The power, role, 
task and person typology is one of the most enduring.
THE DRIVERS OF CULTURE – The most important drivers of culture is inter- and intragroup behaviour 
and the relationship with the environment.
APPLYING THE MODEL – “We don’t think ourselves into a new way of acting, but act ourselves into a 
new way of thinking” (Bossidy and Charan, 2002, p. 89).
SUMMARY – Culture can only be changed by getting leadership to act differently. Otherwise nothing 
will change.
CHAPTER 14
RECRUITMENT
The right soldier for the job 
Critical issues for this chapter
THE DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESSFUL STAFFING – What determines successful stafﬁng?
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT PERSON FOR THE JOB – How important are people?
THE RIGHT PERSON FOR THE JOB – What are the basic employment criteria? 
PERFORMANCE – How do performance measures relate to employment criteria?
SUMMARY – How do we pull these thoughts together?
1. THE DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESSFUL STAFFING
Once we’ve established the leadership readiness of the organisation and asked ourselves 
whether the way in which things are done will inhibit or facilitate the success of strategy 
implementation, we are ready for the third question – do we have the right people to ﬁght the 
battle with?
Tracy (2002, p. 130) describes a simple but effective process to get the right team, i.e. recruit 
correctly, train and manage well. He quotes the rule: “Hire in haste, repent at leisure”.
What are the important elements to look for when recruiting? This question, on a very basic 
level, is determined by the:
• Nature of the battle;
• Depth of knowledge of the soldier;
• Experience of the soldier; and 
• The motivation of the soldier.
The question is therefore simple: do we have the right man for the job, has he been trained 
well, has he had the opportunity to use that training and does he actually want to ﬁght? But 
maybe we ﬁrst need to look at the critical importance of people.
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT PERSON FOR THE JOB
Boulton et al. (2002) highlighted the importance of employees in their value dynamic framework 
(depicted in Figure 69) - on par with other value creating elements in the organisation.
They illustrated in a subsequent study how PE-ratios differ for different industries, based on the 
usage of speciﬁc assets (Figure 70). It is clear that intellectual property (people) is becoming 
more and more important.
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Figure 69: Boulton’s value dynamics framework
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Figure 70: PE ratios in different industries
One interesting case study that they quote is from Starbucks:
Starbucks Corporation has used its employee assets to achieve phenomenal market 
penetration almost overnight. How fast is Starbucks growing? ‘I don’t know for sure’ 
quipped one comedian, ‘but I do know they just opened one in my living room’… ’It’s 
an ironic fact’, says Howard Schultz, the company’s chairman and chief executive 
ofﬁcer, ‘that while retail and restaurant businesses live or die on customer service, 
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their employees have among the lowest salaries and worst beneﬁts of any industry. 
These people are not only the heart and soul but also the public face of the company. 
Every dollar earned passes through their hands …’ The answer is obvious – at least 
to Schultz. He has made Starbucks the restaurant and retail employer of choice 
… The company’s approach to maximising its employee assets is paying off in an 
employee turnover rate that is far below that of comparable retailers. (Boulton et al., 
2002, pp. 37-38)
In fact, it is not only “human capital” that plays a role in the impact of intangible assets on 
shareholder value, as depicted in Figure 71, but it is quite obvious that “humans” play a role 
in all the relationships depicted in the diagram.
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Figure 71: Intangible assets and shareholder value
The war for talent, to support the revolution towards the new economy, has also changed 
signiﬁcantly with smaller, more entrepreneurial companies, often still managed by their 
founders, drawing a bigger percentage of the top talent. Why is that?  Because companies 
closer to their entrepreneurial core see this as the most important “land-grab” of the 21st 
century (post-physical land and “electronic” land, where entrepreneurs used to focus their 
attention – Figure 72).
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Figure 72: From land grab to people and networks
But how do we ensure that we ﬁnd the right person for the job?
3. THE RIGHT PERSON FOR THE JOB
We need to look at the four basic criteria in a little more detail:
• The intrinsic nature of the job is often a given. Is it possible to appoint an economics 
professor in the job of a street sweeper and expect him to be happy even if you pay 
him well? Or how about a human rights lawyer as executioner? The intrinsic nature of 
what needs to be accomplished must be considered. This is a difﬁcult terrain and HR 
specialists will warn the strategy implementer to tread carefully. After all, we don’t want 
to “categorise” people, nor fall victim to our inherent biases. But we must consider “the 
right person for the job” carefully in some logical fashion.
• The depth of knowledge of the applicant is the prior training that was received. 
Although we strongly believe in continuous training, it is not always possible to prepare 
somebody for the job “on the job”. In some cases established professional knowledge, 
obtained prior to the challenge of what is expected, is necessary.
• The level of experience of the applicant, just like knowledge, can be obtained “on the 
job”, but sometimes an “experienced hire” is required.
• The motivation of the applicant refers directly to the incumbent’s willingness to 
contribute to the value and values of the organisation.
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Once these factors are in place and the recruitment for the strategy execution done, the next 
step would be to track the incumbent’s performance.
4. PERFORMANCE
When tracking performance, what should be considered? There is in fact no reason why the 
exact same elements that are considered in recruitment should not be tracked, as illustrated 
in Figure 73.
K
ey
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 a
re
as
Intrinsic nature of 
the job
Knowledge of 
incumbent
Experience of 
incumbent
Motivation of 
incumbent
To what extent has the 
demands of the job 
changed
To what extent has 
knowledge relative to 
KPA’s changed
To what extent has 
experience relative to 
KPA’s changed
To what extent was the 
incumbent’s stewardship of 
values and value enhanced
Conformity of 
output
Increase of 
output range
Volume of 
output
Value of 
output
Achievem
ent of key perform
ance areas
a
b
c
d
K
ey
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 a
re
as
Achievem
ent of key perform
ance areas
Figure 73: Performance relating to recruitment criteria
a. Intrinsic nature of the job: The incumbent’s ﬁrst order of battle is to understand what is 
required and to deliver, but also, over time, to be willing to change this “conformity” as 
new challenges arise. Once again, the strategy implementer might run foul of standard 
human resource theory, which states that it could be seen as unfair labour practice to 
change the requirements of the job. We believe that a “job requirement” of many key 
positions, especially through the line where we want to make strategy work at middle 
management and ﬁrst-line supervisor level, should be a willingness to change job 
requirements in step with a change in environment. This is real conformity of output.
b. Knowledge of incumbent: The knowledge challenge is not one of knowledge for 
knowledge’s sake. The knowledge that is brought to the equation and the growth 
of knowledge that the organisation invests in should, in time, increase the range of 
output. This means that the incumbent should, proactively, begin to enhance and grow 
the value of the job. This is real intellectual capital at work.
c. Experience of the incumbent: Many employees imagine that merely being knowledgeable 
and having the ability to conceptualise is enough. The job’s value and the incumbent’s 
contribution are enhanced by actually doing things, the volume of output. 
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d. Motivation of the incumbent: The incumbent’s ﬁnal goal is stewardship of the value 
created by the organisation for its stakeholders, underpinned by the values of the 
organisation. The value of output relative to the other three items should therefore be 
tracked.
We believe that it is dangerous to merely look at key performance areas, as if we “rate” the 
performance parameters of a machine. The employee is a holistic being, capable of adapting 
to the changing requirements of the external environment, expanding her contribution through 
knowledge and experience and through these actions increasing the value of the organisation. 
Rewards should then be concomitant to this increase in value.
5. SUMMARY
Successful stafﬁng and performance management are inseparable. The nature of the job is 
the ﬁrst criterion, but over time the incumbent should enhance the nature of the job. The 
incumbent must be knowledgeable, but over time contribute to the position with new knowledge 
and therefore increase the output range. As the volume of output grows, experience grows 
and ﬁnally the value of the contribution. This dynamic nature of stafﬁng and performance 
management is often seen too statically.
Once we’ve addressed leadership, habits and stafﬁng, we are ready to ask the ﬁnal question: 
are our people ready for change and do they know how to change?  We will approach these 
questions in the next chapter.
Final take-out
THE DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESSFUL STAFFING – Successful stafﬁng is determined by the nature of 
the position, knowledge of the applicant, experience and motivation.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT PERSON FOR THE JOB – In the post-electronic era, bio-diversity, 
people and networks are the most important assets.
THE RIGHT PERSON FOR THE JOB – The basic criteria (the intrinsic nature of the position, knowledge, 
experience and motivation) must be in place before an appointment is made.
PERFORMANCE – Performance is not just measured as output against expectation, but increase in 
the range of outputs over time, increased volume and ﬁnally increased value.
SUMMARY – Stafﬁng and performance measurement are dynamic measures, and should be treated 
as such.
CHAPTER 15
THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
Final determination of battle readiness 
Critical issues for this chapter
CHANGE – What is the role of change in strategy?
CHANGING PEOPLE AND PROCESSES – What are the core change criteria?
THE BALANCED SCORECARD AND IMPLEMENTATION – What are the core elements in building the 
balanced scorecard?
SUMMARY – How do we pull these thoughts together?
1. CHANGE
Strategy implementation is about change. Nothing more and nothing less. If nothing changes 
it clearly means that no strategy is implemented. Schein says:
Rarely is the goal of a helping process to maintain the status quo. Even if no great 
external changes will result, sometimes it is a signiﬁcant change when a client 
accepts a situation and redeﬁnes it inside his own head. But one cannot conceive 
of human processes without conceiving of change, either evolutionary, or managed. 
(Schein, 1987, p. 92)
It is also now, when we want to understand the dynamic of change, that the pervasive 
importance of our approach to strategy as consultative thinking makes the most sense. 
According to Wheatley:
From becoming attuned to this dynamic, I’ve come to believe that both individual 
and organisational change start from the same place. People need to explore an 
issue sufﬁciently to decide whether new meaning is available and desirable. They will 
change only if they believe that a new insight, a new idea, or a new form helps them 
become more of who they are. If the work of change is at the level of an entire 
organisation or community, then the search for new meaning must be done as a 
collective inquiry. (Wheatley, 1999, p. 148)
In this sense our ﬁnal strategic thinking, development and implementation “argument” hangs 
together:
Strategy as consultative thinking only makes sense if it seeks to satisfy acceptable 
and smart objectives (see Figure 11). If it then speciﬁcally targets and exploits 
the performance, wellness and loyalty of internal and external relationships, 
systematically and with maximum intelligence, new strategies can be developed. 
If the organisation is further supplied with proper leadership, has a way of doing 
things that supports the implementation, and the right people are deployed for the 
implementation, changed processes and people will ensure the implementation of 
the strategies.
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2. CHANGING PEOPLE AND PROCESSES
According to Bossidy and Charan:
The heart of the working of a business is how the three processes of people, strategy and 
operations link together.  Leaders need to master the individual processes and the way they 
work together as a whole.  These processes are the foundation for the discipline of execution, 
at the centre of conceiving and executing a strategy – they are the differentiation between you 
and your competitors. (Bossidy and Charan, 2002, p. 264)
• A robust people process:
o Evaluates individuals accurately and in depth and deals with non-performers;
o Provides a framework for identifying and developing the leadership talent the 
organisation will need to execute its strategies down the road; and
o Fills the leadership pipeline.
The ﬁnal test of a people process is how well it distinguishes between performers and 
non-performers – and how well leaders handle the sometimes painful actions they 
have to take.
• The strategy process is what a lot of this book is about – how do we decide where to 
take the business?
• The operations process covers the speciﬁcs on a short-term scale - it provides the path 
for the people:
o The operational plan describes how the strategy will be implemented over the 
next year;
o It is vital that everyone accountable for the execution of the plan is involved in 
developing it.  It must have clear, realistic targets, action plans (including making 
trade-offs between short-term objectives and long-term goals) and contingency 
plans; and
o Get sign-off from those accountable, including how implementation will be tracked 
to facilitate corrective actions if required.
The ability to execute is, however, inﬂuenced by the capacity of the organisation’s people and 
processes to change when required15:
• People’s capacity to change is determined by whether the organisation has an action-
oriented culture, change management is taken seriously, the implementation is well-
resourced (i.t.o. people) and whether sufﬁcient knowledge and skills are available or 
are developed; and
• Process capacity to change is determined by the ability to effectively and accurately 
communicate change, consequences for failure are clear and implemented when 
necessary, progress is evaluated and adjustments made, and implementation is 
happening right through the organisation.
The interpretation of these drivers is depicted in Figure 74.
15 Model developed by Leanne van der Westhuizen at the University of Stellenbosch Business School.
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Figure 74:  People and process capacity to change
• Sponge:  The individual does not want to or is not enabled to change, and the processes 
are not supportive of change.  The person does not contribute to implementation of 
the strategy, thereby sucking the life from the organisation. Sponges are passive and 
will only react if moisture is brought to them. They will also not release this moisture, 
except if force is applied. They have neither the will nor the technology to change.
• Donkey:  Processes support change but the individual doesn’t.  The individual is 
forced along, but shows no initiative. Donkeys are also passive, but they do possess 
the technology to change. They can walk, pull and carry a load, but are often clearly 
unwilling to do this. Unfortunately, due to their unwillingness to change they have to 
be cajoled, enticed and threatened, thereby weakening the organisation and putting 
strategy implementation in jeopardy.
• Bull in a china shop:  The individual is ready to go, but the organisation’s processes do 
not support this.  This results in uncoordinated execution in a rigid environment. The 
bull is on the run and looks almost as if he is enjoying breaking things. By the time an 
individual has reached this stage, he is desperate for change, any change, and will – if 
the organisation doesn’t develop solid change processes - become destructive.
• Eagle:  Both people and processes have the capacity to change.  The implementation 
of the strategy has the opportunity to soar unhindered. This is an ideal state and 
organisations that want to achieve strategic change must invest in change management 
programmes to create people with the will to soar and develop the processes and 
learning that will give people the wings with which to do this.
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3. THE BALANCED SCORECARD AND IMPLEMENTATION
3.1 Building the scorecard
In Chapter 2 we introduced Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard and strategy maps. 
The purpose is to articulate and communicate the strategy of the business, while aligning 
individual, organisational and cross-departmental activities and performance with the strategy 
through a series of cause-and-effect relationships.  The four perspectives of the Balanced 
Scorecards are depicted in Figure 75. 
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Figure 75:  Four perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard
Kaplan and Norton (1996) provide generic areas that describe each of the perspectives:
• Financial perspective:  Financial objectives and measures play a dual role (1) in deﬁning 
the expected ﬁnancial performance as a result of the strategy, and (2) as the ultimate 
targets and measures of the other scorecard perspectives.  Three ﬁnancial themes 
drive the business strategy: revenue growth and mix, cost reduction / productivity 
management and asset utilisation / investment strategy.
• Customer perspective:  Companies identify their target markets and customers.  The 
core measures for this perspective entail market share, customer retention, customer 
acquisition, customer satisfaction and customer proﬁtability (Figure 76).  In addition, 
businesses must also deﬁne the value proposition for each segment based on product 
and service attributes (functionality, quality and price), customer relationships (quality of 
purchasing experience and personal relationships) and lastly image and reputation.
141The implementation process
Market 
share
Customer 
retention
Customer 
satisfaction
Customer 
acquisition
Customer 
profitability
Value proposition
t 
share
t er 
retention
tomer 
satisfaction
C r 
acquisition
C t r 
profitability
Value ition
Figure 76: Measures for the customer perspective
• Internal business process perspective:  Those processes that are most critical for 
achieving customer and shareholder objectives.  This must be informed by addressing 
key components of the generic value chain depicted in Figure 77. 
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Figure 77: Internal business perspective – the generic value chain model
 Learning and growth perspective:  The objectives in this perspective provide the 
infrastructure to enable ambitious goals in the other three perspectives to be achieved. 
The three principal categories for this perspective are employee capabilities (measured 
through employee retention, employee satisfaction and employee productivity), 
information system capabilities (or technology infrastructure) and motivation, 
empowerment and alignment (or climate for action), depicted in Figure 78.
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Figure 78:  The learning and growth measurement framework
These measures are meaningless, however, if they do not have a direct link to the strategy. 
Kaplan & Norton (ibid.) provide three principles to facilitate this:
1. Cause-and-effect relationships:  Every measure selected for a Balanced Scorecard 
should be an element of a chain of cause-and-effect relationships that communicates 
the meaning of the business unit’s strategy to the organisation (this concept later 
evolved to their strategy maps).
2. Outcomes and performance drivers:  A good Balanced Scorecard should have an 
appropriate mix of outcomes (lagging indicators) and performance drivers (leading 
indicators) that have been customised to the business unit’s strategy.
3. Linking to ﬁnancials:  Ultimately, causal paths from all the measures on a scorecard 
should be linked to ﬁnancial objectives.
It is essential for each organisation to make these generic guidelines speciﬁc for its strategy and 
its implementation realities.  The purpose is to have a set of measures for the implementation 
of a single strategy. 
3.2 Using the scorecard
Kaplan & Norton (1996) provide a few simple principles to ensure that the scorecard is used 
to manage the performance of the business:
1. Ensure people alignment from top to bottom – communicate the strategy to all levels. 
Only when it is known can individual commitment be initiated.  Cascade the scorecard 
into division and team objectives.  Link it to rewards and incentives.
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2. Establish long-term targets for strategic measures, direct strategic initiatives and 
signiﬁcant physical and ﬁnancial resources towards achieving these targets and specify 
short-term milestones along the strategic path
3. Establish a process of feedback, analysis and reﬂection that tests and adapts the 
strategy to changing conditions – this will culminate in strategic learning.
Ultimately, however, the leadership and commitment of top management to use the scorecard 
in a holistic manner to get from strategy design to implementation is the real determinant of 
success.
4. SUMMARY
At the end of our process, we can reﬂect on the ground we have covered. We’ve looked at 
consultative thinking and how to deploy it effectively in the new age. We’ve gone through 
a strategic process to determine our worries, dreams, toolkit, enablers and detractors. We 
thought about the future and made some strategic decisions. We considered the potential of 
our leadership, habits and quality of our people to execute our strategy. In the ﬁnal instance, 
we ensured that people are ready for change, that they know what they should be doing, and 
we’ve put a measurement system in place.
We believe that strategy in all walks of life could be as simple as this. In many areas (like in the 
medical, business, physical and engineering sciences), complex research patterns and tools 
exist. We did not try and discuss these complexities here. We are showing how, provided that 
the correct skills set is present in your enterprise or situation, you can use the art of strategy to 
reach certain objectives. We trust that our book will be of assistance in this endeavour.
Final take-out
CHANGE – The proﬁt margin of strategy is successful change. The coinage is improved relationships 
and processes.
CHANGING PEOPLE AND PROCESSES – Only people can bring about change. But they must be shown 
the way.
THE BALANCED SCORECARD AND IMPLEMENTATION – The scorecard has four perspectives, (ﬁnancial, 
customer, internal business process, and learning and growth) and measures for all four of these 
perspectives must be linked to the developed strategy.
SUMMARY – Inspire people to change, give them the tools to do so and measure the results.
CASE STUDIES
CHAPTER 16
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDIES
The illustrative case studies in this section are composite (representing data and analysis from 
more than one business) examples from various companies in the speciﬁc industries. The case 
studies show how the strategic process described in the second and third section of the book 
is actually applied to develop strategic schemata – mental models to help us understand and 
relate to the questions, strategies and situations in each of the businesses. We have referred 
to elements of each of these businesses in the main text, but this comprehensive summary 
will assist the reader in grasping the complete picture.
1. A UTILITY IN AFRICA16
1.1 Strategic issues facing the utility
The key strategic issue facing the utility in its external environment was articulated as 
deconstruction challenges.  As in many developing economies, unbundling and privatisation 
are high on the government’s agenda, with the accompanying uncertainties experienced 
by investors, customers and employees alike.  This would require an independent ﬁnancial 
opinion of the utility, which could be affected by foreign exchange ﬂuctuations.  There is also 
an endeavour to interconnect the country’s electricity grid with that of neighbouring countries 
to broaden the utility’s market and to secure supply.  The commercial impact of this endeavour, 
and the effect of government interventions from the various countries, however, were still 
unclear at the time of the strategic session.
The key strategic issue facing the utility in its market environment was articulated as a market 
disconnect.  Given the monopolistic history of the utility, customer relationships were not a 
priority on the strategic agenda.  The poor socio-economic conditions in the country lead to 
challenges in revenue collections, compounded by theft.  The population is also geographically 
dispersed in small communities, making it very difﬁcult for the utility to reach the broader 
market cost-effectively.
The key strategic issue facing the utility in its internal environment was articulated as 
challenged resources.  On the supply side, the utility has long-term contracts with independent 
power producers (IPPs), which impact on its ability to optimise supply.  In addition, the utility’s 
dependence on hydro-power is challenged during the dry season.  Limited ﬁnancial resources 
impact on the ability to invest sufﬁciently in infrastructure.  There seems to be a lack of 
teamwork amongst its employees, compounded by unintegrated IT systems. 
1.2 Key success factors in the energy and utilities industry
The key external success factor for a company operating in the energy and utilities industry 
was articulated as being well connected.  Good relationships with government and the 
regulator are key to ensuring the future success of a utility in a deregulating environment.  This 
also holds true for investor conﬁdence and involvement.  In a challenged supply and demand 
economy, being part of a regional power grid will improve sustainability.
16 Composite case based on two utilities in two different countries in Africa.
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The key market success factor for a company operating in the energy and utilities industry 
was articulated as being commercialised.  Wide market reach (an expanded consumer base) 
will be facilitated by a competitive tariff structure, a well-developed market strategy for key 
accounts and reliability and quality of supply.  This, in turn, will facilitate the optimum collection 
of revenue.
The key internal success factor for a company operating in the energy and utilities industry 
was articulated as resource control and exploitation.  The starting point for this is effective 
management decisions and actions, supported by efﬁcient information ﬂow and communication 
on an integrated IT platform.  This is further enabled by well-trained staff motivated through 
an efﬁcient and effective performance-management system.  This enables the sourcing of 
diversiﬁed, cost-effective and reliable generation sources, optimised through efﬁcient sourcing 
agreements with Independant Power Producers (IPPs).  The utility then requires sufﬁcient 
capital to build reliable generation & transmission capacity, minimising transmission and 
distribution losses.  
1.3 Opportunities and threats facing the energy and utilities industry
In the external environment the key opportunity is new participants entering the market. 
Government’s drive for private sector participation will unlock external funding for infrastructure. 
In addition, the planned regional interconnections will stabilise prices.  This is, however, 
threatened by an unclear political agenda.  The government’s policy on the power sector is 
still not ﬁnalised.  Political pressure and government interference could force decisions that 
are not economically viable.
In the market environment the key opportunity is that, in a certain sense, there is an unlimited 
market available to the utility.  Given the growing local economy, there is a high demand for 
power evidenced by a large number of outstanding customers awaiting connections.  This is 
supplemented by opportunities in the export market.  This is, however, threatened by market 
apathy evidenced by the large amount of outstanding debt.
In the internal environment the key opportunity is the availability of diversiﬁed resources. 
The utility has access to a variety of generation potentials (e.g. coal, nuclear, gas), not only 
locally but also cost-effective imports.  This is, however, threatened by challenges related to 
the sourcing of the diversiﬁed resources.  As mentioned previously, unpredictable weather 
conditions impact on the reliability of its hydro-power supply.  In addition, the long term 
contracts with IPPs hamper optimum sourcing from other sources.
1.4 Strengths and weaknesses facing the utility 
The discussion on strengths and weaknesses highlights that, due to its historic monopoly, 
the external and market environments are not exploited and managed to the extent that the 
internal environment is.  It was much easier for the group to articulate the internal environment, 
than the external or market environment.
In the external environment, the key strength is the monopoly situation the utility can exploit 
to cement its position prior to new players entering the market.  This is, however, weakened by 
the  poor governance still prevailing in the company.
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In the market environment the key strength is high demand in its captive market.  This is, 
however, weakened by the poor quality of its current supply network.
In the internal environment the key strength is that the company is well-organised internally. 
It has a dedicated management team supported by skilled and dedicated people.  Engineering, 
accounting and ﬁnancial procedures are well documented, and there is generation capacity 
available.  The key internal weakness is the investment backlog.  This is evidenced in aged 
infrastructure, high system losses and poor system reliability.  Attention to its workforce has 
also been lacking, evidenced in bureaucracy, undocumented HR procedures and a lack of 
teamwork.  This is exacerbated by the perceived lack of transparency at management level.
1.5 Strategic objectives identiﬁed for the utility
The strategic discussion above enabled the group to identify the following strategic objectives 
for the company:
External 
environment
• Lobby with government to normalise the regulatory environment: 
Inﬂuence government’s policy on rural electriﬁcation, allocation 
of adequate funding, government’s priorities, expedite the 
establishment of a regulator and eventually create a good 
environment for investors
• Initiate regional interconnection:  Consult with neighbouring 
countries and regional bodies, establish JVs and develop a long-
term power master-plan
• Address IPPs: Take-over IPPs or restructure the contracts
Market 
environment
• Develop a public relations programme (to address corruption, 
vandalism, theft of electricity and to sensitise customers to the 
need for payment)
• Develop a commercial strategy to meter, invoice and collect debts
• Develop a growth strategy to connect more customers
• Prepare for pool trading
Internal 
environment
• Restructure long-term loans
• Regenerate current infrastructure
• Build new infrastructure
• Process re-engineering to eliminate bureaucracy and improve job/
skill ﬁt
• Ensure optimum training and development programs to support 
job/skill ﬁt
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These objectives are depicted on the competence / relevance map in Figure 79 to facilitate 
classiﬁcation and prioritisation.  The size of the bubble indicates the strategic effort that will 
be expended by top management to implement the speciﬁc strategic objective.
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Figure 79: Competence / relevance map for the utility company
The classiﬁcation is depicted in Figure 80.
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Figure 80: Interpretation of the competence / relevance map for the utility
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It is clear that in this case study the strengths, and even maintainers, are mostly areas internal 
to the utility that had to be addressed even in a monopolistic situation.   The gripes are typical of 
such an environment: lack of sufﬁcient infrastructure investment due to a lack of competition 
and political agendas.  Due to privatisation efforts from government, the incumbent has realised 
that it has to start preparing for pool trading and develop a commercial strategy to create loyal 
customers.  Opportunities are an extension of these areas where the incumbent will initiate 
regional interconnection, once it is ready for pool trading with a more secure customer base. 
This will also serve as a platform to enhance its lobbying power with government, as well as to 
develop a growth strategy to connect more customers from a sound base.
The map further assists us in identifying the strategic pillars for the utility company.  These are 
depicted in Figure 81 below.
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Figure 81: Identiﬁcation of strategic pillars (strategic themes)
The utility must address its internal issues and critical investment backlog, in order to exert 
more upstream and downstream inﬂuence, which in turn will facilitate growth opportunities 
and networks with other stakeholders. 
1.6 Leadership, culture and change capacity
The leadership, culture and change capacity were measured through a questionnaire 
completed by the attendees of the workshop.  This is not necessarily a representative sample 
and is merely shown for illustrative purposes.  Ideally, this capacity should be measured 
throughout an organisation on a statistically representative sample to obtain valid results.
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The leadership behaviours in the utility are depicted in Figure 82 against a reference of 
delegates in previous workshops.
What do I get?
Do I belong?
What do I give?
How can we 
grow?
2.00
3.00
4.00
Utility Reference
•In the last 7 days, I’ve received 
recognition/praise for good work
•My supervisor / someone at work, 
seems to care about me
•There is someone at work who 
encourages my development
•At work, I have the opportunity to 
do what I do best every day
•I have the material & equipment I 
need to do my work right
•I know what is expected of me at 
work
•My co-workers are committed to doing 
quality work
•At work, my opinions seem to count
•I have a best friend at work
•The mission/purpose of my company 
makes me feel like my work is important
•In the last six months, I have talked with 
someone about my progress
•This last year, I have had opportunities at 
work to learn and grow
Figure 82: Leadership behaviours
In terms of group ﬁt, there clearly is a strong sense of belonging within the leadership team. 
This is, however, negatively impacted on by the fact that the team members feel they are not 
given sufﬁcient opportunity to grow their careers.    In terms of personal behaviour, delegates 
indicated that they are not yet giving their total commitment to the company.  They also feel, 
however, that they are not sufﬁciently empowered to contribute more.
The culture of the utility is depicted in Figure 83 against a reference of delegates in previous 
workshops.
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Figure 83: Culture
The culture of the utility is not yet conducive to optimal behaviour.  On a positive note, 
lemming behaviour is lower than the reference.  Snake behaviour is still too high, however, 
while tiger and dolphin behaviour is too low relative to the reference.  This scenario is quite 
typical for this situation and will be addressed as the business progresses on the path to 
commercialisation.  It is critical to take note of this issue and address it at relevant times 
during the commercialisation process.
The change capacity of the utility is depicted in Figure 84 against a reference of delegates in 
previous workshops.
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Figure 84: Capacity to change
Although average, the process capacity to change is quite low relative to the reference. On the 
other hand, the people’s capacity to change is on par.  This bodes very well for the utility.  It can 
be expected that processes within an incumbent monopoly will not be conducive to change, 
but if the leadership team has the capacity to change, the challenges facing the utility are not 
insurmountable.
1.7 Summary
This utility was able, through the process, to clearly articulate problems of deconstruction into 
a privatised environment against the backdrop of third world market and supply conditions. A 
robust external positioning, market development and infrastructure rejuvenation strategy were 
developed. It was clearly illustrated that internal restructuring, especially around the relatively 
run-down state of generation assets was necessary, but could only be achieved by funding. The 
funding will be obtained through success in three distinct areas, i.e. through market growth, by 
exploiting the available upstream and downstream opportunities and ﬁnding new investors in 
the change from parastatal to private enterprise.
This was further enriched by trying to understand the possible implementation limitations 
for this strategy. Problems were especially identiﬁed around the past poor investment in 
leadership development – in the areas of recognition and growth. Managers feel that they 
are not encouraged to perform, nor do they receive regular career counselling. This obviously 
leads to a culture of poor responsiveness vis-à-vis the environment, exacerbated by inadequate 
team dynamics, a predominant snake culture. People are, however, willing to change once the 
change processes have been installed. This means that a change management programme 
that focuses on personal leadership development and business process re-engineering should 
be able to succeed.
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2. A LARGE FOOD PRODUCTION COMPANY IN THE SOUTH17
2.1 Strategic issues facing the food production company
The key strategic issue facing the food production company in its external environment is 
articulated as lack of visibility and global positioning.  The company does not have a strong 
corporate brand and identity.  It has a shortage of international alliances which inter alia 
impacts on its ability to address the issue of bio-technology and new food industry legislation. 
Unpredictable world commodity prices lead to vulnerability in procurement, compounded by 
exchange rate risks.  These factors impact negatively on the company’s ideal to list on the 
stock exchange of the company’s home country.
The key strategic issue facing the food production company in its market environment was 
articulated as a lack of presence in an evolving market.  The company is not regarded as a 
market leader, partly because of its slow speed to market.  Its traditional market is shrinking 
due to higher mortality rates, a decline in disposable income and urbanisation.  In addition, 
the company does not have enough strong brands in growing markets.  There is also a big risk 
of strong global entrants in the company’s domestic market.
The key strategic issue facing the food production company in its internal environment was 
articulated as challenged resources.  The company is vulnerable due to its reliance on its cash 
cow.  This vulnerability results inter alia in insufﬁcient funds being made available for R&D 
activities.  The workforce does not represent the demographics of the local population and is 
increasingly exposed to illness and disease.  Transfer pricing is also a contentious issue.
2.2 Key success factors in the process foods industry
The key external success factor for a company operating in the processed foods industry was 
articulated as the ability to create value in a sustainable way.  This not only means value for 
shareholders, but also proactive, sound corporate governance and a good corporate image. 
This will facilitate strategic partnerships on a global scale, which will give the company access 
to more established brands and markets and technical expertise, and will also enable it to 
expand its position in the value chain.
The key market success factor for a company operating in the processed foods industry was 
articulated as discerning brand leverage.  This translates into strong brands in each of its 
target market segments, facilitated by effective market segmentation and a diverse product 
offering.  This, in turn, will enable the company to continually grow organically.
The key internal success factor for a company operating in the processed foods industry was 
articulated as resource control and exploitation.  Strategic sourcing and quality assets are 
key to enable efﬁcient production.  A balanced product portfolio is facilitated by an effective 
product development strategy.   In addition, effective distribution and good IT systems are 
critical.  Lastly, strategic leadership and a high-performance culture (skills, performance and 
assets) facilitate an optimal internal process.
The rating of the food company against its major competitor on these key success factors 
is depicted in Figure 85.  Especially in the market environment, the food company is clearly 
lagging behind its major competitor.  Internally, the product development strategy and, 
externally, the company’s image need critical attention.
17 A composite case based on three different companies in the southern hemisphere; the one is on one continent and 
two others on a different continent.
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Figure 85: Key success factor rating
2.3 Opportunities and threats facing the processed foods industry
In the external environment the key opportunity is to create a sustainable presence achieved 
through increased networking and building the company’s corporate image.  This should 
culminate in increased strategic alliances and possibly even the listing of the company. This 
is, however, threatened by uncertainty caused by issues regarding ownership, increasing 
legislative pressures in the food industry, exchange rate volatility and political instability in the 
broader region that the company operates in.
In the market environment the key opportunity is articulated as product innovation.  The 
company is exposed to a more discerning customer base, which could result in a price premium 
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if correctly exploited.  This necessitates a customer relationship focus and the development 
or acquisition of strong brands.  The company also has the opportunity to strengthen its 
presence in the regional market by catering for those speciﬁc market needs.  The company 
is, however, under threat of being marginalised due to the increasing power of retailers on a 
global scale, as well as the threat of new entrants in its local market.  In addition, the supply 
chain infrastructure to serve its market is increasingly under pressure.
In the internal environment the key opportunity is to exploit current assets. This will be done 
through the increasing focus on a high performance culture and the exploitation of management 
information systems.  The company is however threatened by the loss of intellectual property 
if key personnel defect to competitors.
Looking at the value chain of the company’s industry, depicted in Figure 86 below, the 
company identiﬁed its speciﬁc position in the value chain. Some food production companies 
occupy a position close to the origins of the value chain. This is typically a “farmers”-type 
company. Others do more of the initial value-add, called “millers”, and at the higher end are 
the “branders”, who often “own” the ﬁnal consumer. The company realised that, although 
their successful businesses are in the “branders” category, the company is more of a “farmer” 
type business and downstream movement is essential.
Raw material 
procurement
Storage Milling
Packaging & 
branding
WholesaleRetailConsumer
Further 
enrichment
Packaging & 
branding
Raw material 
development
Figure 86: Value chain for processed foods industry 
2.4 Strengths and weaknesses facing the food production company 
In the external environment the company’s key strength is that it has pockets of inﬂuence. 
It has some good government relations and has ﬁnancial leverage to further its networking 
activities.  This is, however, hampered by the company’s image as an upstream player.
In the market environment the company’s key strength is that there is awareness of its current 
brands in the market, and it has diverse products to leverage.  The key weakness is that there 
does seem to be a disconnect with its customers due to ineffective relationship management, 
lack of customer service and dubious merchandising practices.
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In the internal environment the key strength is that the company does have strong, exploitable 
assets.  These include the availability of funds, management and leadership skills, a stable 
workforce and a good company culture.  This seems to be hampered by a lack of product 
innovation.
2.5 Strategic objectives identiﬁed for the food production company
The strategic discussion above enabled the group to identify the following strategic objectives 
for the company:
External 
environment
• Improve corporate identity and image to:
o Achieve optimal and sustainable stakeholder value, inﬂuence 
legislation and policies locally, attract strategic alliances, 
position the group for public listing and improve the corporate 
brand awareness
• Minimise vulnerability to ﬂuctuating commodity prices and 
exchange rates
• Align bio-technology policies with customer expectations
• Broaden shareholder base (including strategic alliances to 
change the face of the company)
Market 
environment
• Improve the group’s geographical presence in growing markets
• Develop and implement a CRM culture
• Develop a brand management strategy (grow existing brands, 
develop and/or acquire innovative products and build them into 
strong brands)
• Identify possible global invaders & develop contingencies (e.g. 
through joint ventures or retaliation strategies)
Internal 
environment
• Develop a technology strategy (this includes leveraging 
partnerships, enhanced R&D and product development)
• Review optimal utilisation of resources (people, assets, 
procurement, etc.)
• Develop a high-performance culture (includes the attraction  and 
retention of a talented and skilled workforce)
• Develop and implement a business transformation plan 
(including succession planning and strategic sourcing)
These objectives are depicted on the competence / relevance map in Figure 87 to facilitate 
classiﬁcation and prioritisation.  The size of the bubble indicates the strategic effort that will 
be allocated by top management to implement the speciﬁc strategic objective.
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Figure 87: Competence / relevance map for the processed foods company 
The classiﬁcation is depicted in Figure 88 below.
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Figure 88: Interpretation of the competence / relevance map for the processed foods company
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The company’s strengths are the ability to exploit its assets and increase its geographical 
presence.  In order to grow organically, however, the company must improve its ability to address 
its corporate image, bio-tech policies and a high-performance culture.  This will enable it to 
successfully implement a CRM culture and broaden the shareholder base.  Opportunities relate 
to the ability to exploit commodity trading, optimally apply technology to product innovation 
and address the transformation of its business.  
The map further assists us in identifying the strategic pillars for the company.  These are 
depicted in Figure 89.
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Figure 89: Identiﬁcation of strategic pillars (strategic themes)
The pillars are summarised in Figure 90.
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Figure 90: Summary of strategic pillars
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2.6 Leadership, culture and change capacity
The leadership, culture and change capacity were measured through a questionnaire 
completed by the attendees of the workshop.  This is not necessarily a representative sample 
and is merely shown for illustrative purposes.  Ideally, this should be measured throughout an 
organisation on a statistically representative sample to obtain valid results.
The leadership behaviours in the food production company are depicted in Figure 91 against 
a reference of delegates in previous workshops.
What do I get?
Do I belong?
What do I give?
How can we 
grow?
2.00
3.00
4.00
Food company Reference
•In the last 7 days, I’ve received 
recognition/praise for good work
•My supervisor / someone at work, 
seems to care about me
•There is someone at work who 
encourages my development
•At work, I have the opportunity to 
do what I do best every day
•I have the material & equipment I 
need to do my work right
•I know what is expected of me at 
work
•My co-workers are committed to doing 
quality work
•At work, my opinions seem to count
•I have a best friend at work
•The mission/purpose of my company 
makes me feel like my work is important
•In the last six months, I have talked with 
someone about my progress
•This last year, I have had opportunities at 
work to learn and grow
Figure 91: Leadership behaviours
In terms of group ﬁt, there clearly is quite a strong sense of belonging within the leadership 
team.  As in the previous case study, this is negatively impacted on by the fact that the team 
members feel they are not given sufﬁcient opportunity to grow their careers.  In terms of 
personal behaviour, delegates are on par with the reference in terms of what they give to the 
company.  This is, however, still quite low for a management team.  They do feel that they are 
sufﬁciently empowered to contribute to the company.
The culture of the food production company is depicted in Figure 92 against a reference of 
delegates in previous workshops.
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Figure 92: Culture of the food production company
The culture of the food production company is quite similar to that of the utility discussed in the 
previous case study.  Lemming behaviour is lower than the reference.  Snake behaviour is still 
too high, however, while tiger behaviour is too low relative to the reference.  Dolphin behaviour 
is higher than the reference which bodes well for the ability to implement the challenging 
strategy.  Once again, it is critical to take note of culture issues, and address these during 
relevant times in the strategy implementation process.
The change capacity of the food production company is depicted in Figure 93 against a 
reference of delegates from previous workshops.
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Figure 93: Capacity to change
The company’s management team showed a clear capacity to change, supported by a process 
capacity to change.  This will facilitate the successful implementation of the strategy.
2.7 Balanced scorecard for implementation
To track the implementation of the strategy we make use of balanced scorecard measures. 
The balanced scorecard illustrated here was developed for the strategic pillar “Customer 
focus” during the workshop and serves as an example.  The scorecards should be ﬁnalised 
with input and buy-in from a more diverse (yet relevant) audience.  The scorecards should 
then be cascaded down to strategic objectives and speciﬁc projects to ensure that the key 
elements are tracked to guarantee successful implementation of the strategy.
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO STRATEGY164
SCORECARD FOR PILLAR: CUSTOMER FOCUS
Key performance area Key performance indicator
Financial & 
external
Adding value to 
stakeholders
Increase turnover 
Increase proﬁt
Increase in volume
Customers & 
markets
Adding value to the 
customers
Number of new products per annum
Volume growth new customers / new 
markets
Increase market share
Number of new customers
Customer intimacy Customer satisfaction index
Supplier rating by customer
Debtors day outstanding
Order ﬁll / late deliveries
Customer centric 
biotech strategy
Customer satisfaction index for biotech
Leading brands in 
categories
Amongst top 5 brands in 3 categories
Internal business 
processes
Delivering service to 
the customer
Customer satisfaction index
Order ﬁll rate
On–time delivery
Credit notes as a % of invoicing
Customer contact Number of contacts per rep / sales 
employee
Point-of-sale 
management
Stock-outs
Implement CRM Implementation rate
Learning & 
growth
Trained CRM personnel Training programmes completed 
successfully
Brand management Brand and category management training 
completed successfully
Customer centric 
workforce through 
training & coaching
Lower customer complaints
Credit notes as a % of invoicing
Survey index
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2.8 Summary
Through the process the top management team articulated a clear strategic model of an 
upstream “farmer”-type business that has grown substantially, but still needs a positioning 
closer to the consumer. This was evidenced by their lack of brands, customer relations and 
new product innovation. The company’s growth ideals are facilitated by a looming IPO and new 
possible global alliances, but in order to get there they formulated a strategy of increasing 
visibility: in the external market through corporate identity, in the market place through both 
organic and inorganic brand growth and internally through product innovation, requiring an 
increased focus on research and development. The company has sound leadership, except for 
career growth and development plans that require attention. Other leadership functions will 
need more support and maintenance over the short term. The “farmer” background (typiﬁed 
by farmers’ often more isolated lifestyle) has led to a culture typiﬁed by “snake” behaviour, 
which means a culture of more openness and also more environmental responsiveness is 
required. Leaders are however in a strong “change” mindset and ready for it, however, provided 
a participative and thought-based leadership path is chosen. 
3. A MUNICIPALITY18
3.1 Positioning ideals for the municipality
The positioning ideal for the municipality in the external environment is articulated as being 
the ﬂagship municipality in its region.  This will be achieved through the involvement of all 
spheres of the community in the business sector and through the provision of support services 
to the broader region.
The positioning ideal for the municipality in the market environment is articulated as the 
provision of sustainable growth.  Small, bankable projects will be supported to build sustainable 
local economies.  Potential areas for both large and small projects are the tourism industry 
and the craft industry.  The municipality wants to increase local processing and become a net 
provider and exporter of food.  Local mineral deposits must be exploited optimally.
The positioning ideal for the municipality in the internal environment is articulated as the 
upliftment of the local people.  Employment will be created in rural areas, and small, medium 
and micro enterprises will be developed through investment expansion.  Employability of 
the local people will be enhanced through skills development and entrepreneurial capacity 
building.  This will be done on a platform of well-developed infrastructure, sustainable resource 
use and service provision.
3.2 Strategic issues facing the municipality
The key strategic issue facing the municipality in its external environment is articulated as 
a lack of structured forums.  There are insufﬁcient governance and development forums to 
facilitate the balancing of resources.  Furthermore, there are not enough strategic partners to 
assist the municipality in the execution of its ideals.
The key strategic issue facing the municipality in its market environment is articulated as 
inadequate economic structure.  The economy is primary-based and far from its main markets, 
resulting in high logistics costs.  There seems to be a lack of marketing and resourcefulness, 
resulting in little local beneﬁciation.  The pressure to show quick proﬁts could result in the 
18 The municipality is situated in a relatively poor area of South Africa, but with many resources.
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creation of economic units that are not sustainable in the longer term.
The key strategic issue facing the municipality in its internal environment is articulated 
as ineffective resource utilisation.  The high population growth is compounded by a slow 
development pace.  This is partly due to the lack of integrated planning and unstructured 
processes.  Resources, such as capital, jobs, water, infrastructure and skills are not optimally 
managed and developed. HIV / Aids prevalence in the local community is a concern.
3.3 Key success factors for a municipality
The key external success factor for a municipality is articulated as collaborative governance. 
This implies broad consultation and collaboration with all stakeholders in a spirit of good 
governance (a prerequisite being the existence of a stakeholder forum to address strategic 
issues).  Partnerships between the community, public and private entities are also critical.
The key market success factor for a municipality is articulated as the ability to market the 
municipal area on a strategic basis.  The municipality must create a conducive environment 
for economic development, especially the development of sustainable secondary economies 
(beneﬁciation) based on the primary economies.  This necessitates the development of market 
strategies to develop new markets locally and globally, the establishment of a regional market 
hub and joint sectoral marketing initiatives.  There must also be a focus on local customer 
retention – keeping local expenditure within the municipal boundary.
The key internal success factor for a municipality is articulated as planned capacity building. 
The platform for this is proper consultative planning and structures in line with a shared vision, 
continuous monitoring and evaluation of progress supported by professional processes.  The 
platform must be underpinned by a proper wider institutional framework to ensure alignment 
with regional and national objectives.  This will enable the development of relevant skills and 
the mobilisation of funds to ensure proper development and utilisation of land and other 
resources.  The delivery capacity of the municipality must be sufﬁcient to address these 
objectives.
3.4 Opportunities and threats facing the municipality
In the external environment the key opportunity is to create a development hub in the 
municipal area.  The municipal area could become a gateway to the broader region.  There are 
considerable opportunities for the development of economic clusters due to the diversity of 
the region.  The activities should take place within the presence of an environmental envelope. 
Partnerships and joint ventures could enable the participation of the broader community in the 
economy.  These ideals are, however, threatened by misalignment.  The business community 
is divided on future growth strategies and it is a challenge to align the ideals of the various 
spheres of government.  Increased industrial activity and population growth could impact on 
environmental control.
In the market environment the key opportunities are articulated as upstream integration and 
downstream beneﬁciation.  Opportunities exist to collaborate in terms of upstream sourcing 
activities in major industries and to develop secondary local industries downstream from the 
major industries.  The area can also increase its focus on the development of regional markets. 
This is, however, threatened by potential external interests entering the economy that are not 
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aligned with the municipality’s growth strategy.  In addition, the distance to major markets 
could impact negatively on the municipality’s ideals.
In the internal environment the key opportunity is the optimised use of resources. The 
area has a good natural resource base, which could be exploited by the optimised use of 
infrastructure and the development of new infrastructure in a low-interest-rate environment. 
There are also signiﬁcant opportunities to optimise water catchment management in the 
area.  This is threatened by a potential socio-economic breakdown.  There is widespread 
illiteracy and HIV / Aids prevalence amidst high population growth.  The community is not yet 
equipped with the required change toolkit to manage heterogeneous emotional and political 
agendas.  There is also uncertainty about access to water for industry and access to capital 
for development.
3.5 Strengths and weaknesses facing the municipality 
In the external environment the municipality’s key strengths are a well-developed legislative 
framework and good collaboration between sectors.  This is, however, weakened by a lack of 
structured forums.  The area is weak in attracting investment, spheres of government are not 
aligned and there are limited strong pressure groups to drive the area’s ideals.
In the market environment the municipality’s key strength is a strong brand.  The area 
is well-known for its quality resources. This is, however, weakened by a lack of proactive 
market development.  Players are weak in marketing the opportunities of the region.  There 
are insufﬁcient opportunities for young entrepreneurs.  The high logistical cost could also 
discourage potential investors.
In the internal environment the key strengths of the municipality are a strong primary resource 
base and leadership within the local community.  The cross-sectoral expertise base and well-
developed infrastructure enable the development of mineral, game farming and agricultural 
opportunities.  Current players in major industries have good leadership skills with the ability 
to persuade local communities to initiate change and economic growth.  The municipality is 
well managed and has a good reputation in the region.  This is weakened by a lack of optimal 
resource utilisation.  Not all the community leaders are ready for change.  This is compounded 
by insufﬁcient communication and the shortage of capacity within the municipality to drive 
the process strategically.  This is also evidenced in insufﬁcient support for small business 
development, the lack of a comprehensive risk-management strategy and an ineffective 
resource management strategy.
3.6 Strategic objectives identiﬁed for the municipality
The strategic discussion above enabled the group to identify the strategic objectives for the 
municipality.
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External 
environment
• Establish an integrated, representative development forum
• Alignment with, execution and inﬂuence of government strategy
• Development of business clusters based on current strengths
Market 
environment
• Support development of major industries
• Support current provincial and other agricultural plans incl. 
agriculture image building
• Support current provincial and other tourism plans
• Promote secondary (downstream) industries
• Focus on the development of small, medium and micro 
enterprises
Internal 
environment
• Develop a funding strategy
• Solve transformational issues
• Address capacity building and skills
• Develop a water management plan
• Address services and infrastructure needs incl. the national 
road
• Address land restitution
These objectives are depicted on the competence/relevance map in Figure 94 to facilitate 
classiﬁcation and prioritisation.  The size of the bubble indicates the strategic effort that will 
be expended by top management to implement the speciﬁc strategic objective.
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Figure 94: Competence / relevance map for the municipality
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The classiﬁcation is depicted in Figure 95 below.
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Figure 95: Interpretation of the competence / relevance map for the municipality
The municipality’s strengths are the building of business clusters, capacity building and 
inﬂuencing government strategy.  Agricultural and tourism development is already receiving 
attention.  These activities should just be focused to obtain maximum beneﬁt for the region. 
Land restitution, infrastructure and services (incl. water management) should receive urgent 
attention to support the ideals of the municipal area.  SMMEs and downstream industry 
development is a natural extension of the current business base.  This will assist with the 
transformation of the economy, but will not be possible without a well-constructed and 
supported funding strategy.  Signiﬁcant growth for the region will, however, only be achieved 
through the continuous development of its major industries, supported by an integrated 
development forum.
The map further assists us in identifying the strategic pillars for the municipality.  These are 
depicted in Figure 96.
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Figure 96: Identiﬁcation of strategic pillars (strategic themes)
The pillars are summarised in Figure 97 below.
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Figure 97: Summary of strategic pillars
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3.7 Balanced scorecard for implementation
To track the implementation of the strategy we make use of balanced scorecard measures. 
The balanced scorecard illustrated here was developed for the strategic pillar “Socio-economic 
growth support” during the workshop and serves as an example.  The scorecards should be 
ﬁnalised with input and buy-in from a more diverse (yet relevant) audience.  The scorecards 
should then be cascaded down to strategic objectives and speciﬁc projects to ensure that the 
key elements are tracked to guarantee successful implementation of the strategy.
The strategic outcome for the strategic pillar was deﬁned as the provision of all basic and 
appropriate services in a sustainable manner.  Services include water, people, services, 
infrastructure and land.  Sustainability implies cost effectiveness, affordability and equitable 
access.
SCORECARD FOR PILLAR: SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROWTH SUPPORT
Key performance area Key performance 
indicator
Performance 
(Financial & 
external)
• Appropriate services are 
provided cost-effectively 
to all the residents of the 
municipality
• % of households with 
access to basic services
• % reduction in real cost 
per annum
Relationship 
(Customers & 
markets)
• All members of the community 
trust the municipality and 
participate in the system
(Trust = Everybody understands 
the issue, transparency, collective 
responsibility, good communication, 
eradicate wrong perceptions)
• % decrease in non-
payment
• Degree of satisfaction with 
municipal performance
Activity (Internal 
business 
processes)
• Proactive skills development of 
local people (focus on growth 
plans )
• % sustainable jobs created
• % decrease in 
unemployment
• Ratio of local people 
employed
• Number/value of funding 
sources accessed
• % Improvement in overall 
skills level
• Strong forums, representing 
all stakeholders, with effective 
information ﬂow
• % developed terms of 
reference
• Number of reports 
prepared and action plans 
implemented
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SCORECARD FOR PILLAR: SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROWTH SUPPORT
Key performance area Key performance 
indicator
Activity (continued) • Service / infrastructure 
provision and management 
plans
• % of sectoral plans 
developed (water, 
transport, electricity, 
waste management, 
health, disaster, asset 
management, etc.)
• Service development plans in 
place
• Implementation of expanded 
public works programme
• Funding sourced for 
infrastructure and 
allocated appropriately
• Plans implemented on 
schedule within budget
Future (Learning & 
growth)
• Resources must be utilised 
optimally and equitably
• % decrease in service 
backlogs
• % decrease in network 
losses in water & electricity
• % increase in agricultural 
production in relation to 
water used (effective water 
usage)
• % increase in economically 
productive use of land
• Plan proactively for, and 
provide, services for growth in 
collaboration with community, 
government and industry
• Increased participation of 
community organisation 
members in integrated 
planning forums
• Improvement in prospects, 
living standards  and 
conditions for community
3.8 Summary
Our municipality has incredible resources, but is poorly developed and far from major markets. 
Through the strategic process they developed a mental model of “sticking together” through 
development forums and public-private partnerships, enabling market growth for the big 
upstream businesses and the development of new downstream businesses. This will provide 
investment for upliftment, especially in the provision of basic services, but also for training, 
to allow the local population to participate in the new employment opportunities created by 
growth.
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4. A PAPER PRODUCTS MANUFACTURER19
The paper products manufacturer’s proﬁts were decreasing due to the old technology in its 
plant and an inability to supply diverse market segments.  The purpose of the strategic session 
was speciﬁcally to address the issue of technology and consider the replacement options that 
the company has for the old technology. The complete strategic process is still followed to 
ensure that no elements are overlooked.  
4.1 Strategic issues facing the paper products manufacturer
The key strategic issue facing the paper products manufacturer in its external environment 
is articulated as the decision about the position in the value chain that the company wants to 
occupy.  Opportunities for forward and backward integration exist.
The key strategic issues facing the paper products manufacturer in its market environment 
are the changing market and the sizeable market gap that exists.  A business opportunity is 
presented by the existing excess supply of its main input commodity.  Management, however, 
feel they don’t understand future market segments and their positioning amidst changing 
customer requirements.  Their competitive advantage is slipping.
The key strategic issue facing the paper products manufacturer in its internal environment is 
the decision about production technology.   The plant is currently operated on old technology, 
impacting on quality and economies of conversion.  The control and price of their major input 
commodity is under question.  Customers demand e-commerce solutions for procurement, 
tracking and product information.
4.2 Key success factors in the paper products industry
The key external success factor for a company in this industry is to play the regulatory game. 
Management should inﬂuence and leverage legislative issues.
The key market success factor is to have the right products for the right customers.  Due to 
customers’ production processes they require very speciﬁc products within a very small range 
of speciﬁcations.  Access to accurate market intelligence is therefore critical to meet and 
understand customers’ needs.  This will enable the manufacturer to lock-in the market.  In 
addition, a plant requires sufﬁcient volume off-take and an effective supply chain to facilitate 
economies of scale.
The key internal success factors for a company operating in the paper products industry are 
a sustainable low-cost raw material supply and the production technology to produce the 
right product competitively.  This implies attracting and utilising intellectual property relating 
to production.
The rating of the paper products manufacturer against its major competitor on these key 
success factors is depicted in Figure 98 below.  The company needs to critically address its 
production technology and market positioning.  These should impact on the other key success 
factors where the company received a low rating.
19 Composite case from two companies in two countries in Southern Africa, the one a strategic business unit of a major 
global player and the other a small independent producer.
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Rating scale:  1 = Poor, 5 = Excellent
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Figure 98: Key success factor rating
4.3 Opportunities and threats facing the paper products industry
In the external environment the key opportunity is to create new value chain groupings 
through forward integration.  This could, however, be threatened by an uncertain legislative 
environment regarding ownership of the input commodity and environmental legislation. 
In the market environment the key opportunity is the ability to serve changing market 
requirements better than its competitors can.  This could result in longer-term contracts. 
Non-traditional market segments are also showing growth.  This is, however, threatened by 
increasing substitutes for paper.
In the internal environment the key opportunity is to deploy new technology. This will result 
in the ability to serve more market segments and to lower costs.  It could also assist the 
forward integration drive.  This is, however, threatened by pressure on production factors. 
These include the existence of old capacity, rising labour costs and an increased demand for 
the raw material from other players.
175Illustrative case studies
4.4 Strengths and weaknesses facing the paper products manufacturer 
In the external environment the company’s key strength is an established brand for the 
broader product range.  It has the ability to create jobs and its social responsibility initiatives 
are on track.  The weaknesses are the current cost of environmental management and the 
strength of its competitor’s brand in the ﬁnal consumer market.
In the market environment the company’s key strength is its established key account 
management capability.  It dominates niche markets through adding value to present products. 
This is supported by a good sales and marketing department.  This is, however, weakened by 
an expensive product compared to competitors’.  The product is not clearly differentiated 
in the relevant market segments, and is not easily transferable to other market segments. 
The company could also do more to leverage its knowledge of its customers’ conversion 
processes.
In the internal environment the key strength is the vast industry experience of its key personnel. 
It has access to technology and raw materials, and is situated close to its major markets. 
The current premises also has sufﬁcient space to support expansion.  The key weakness is, 
however, that the company is set in its ways.  This is exacerbated by old technology, causing 
quality problems.  The employee turnover is also too low, resulting in lack of new ideas and 
skills entering the business.
4.5 Strategic alternatives identiﬁed for the paper products manufacturer
The strategic discussion above enabled the group to identify the following strategic alternatives 
for the company:
External 
environment
• Create a downstream joint venture
• Sell the business as a going concern
Market environment • Product beneﬁciation
• Downstream integration
Internal 
environment
• Consolidate own raw material
• Purchase raw material suppliers
• Obtain medium-sized new production machinery (scrap old 
technology)
• Obtain super-sized new production machinery (scrap old 
technology)
• Dual approach:  Optimise old machinery and obtain medium-
sized new production machinery
To facilitate the ranking of the alternatives, scenarios for the future were developed (depicted 
in Figure 99).  These scenarios are used to test the robustness of the various strategic 
alternatives.
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Figure 99: Scenarios to test the robustness of the strategic alternatives
The various strategic alternatives were then ﬁltered, using Andersen’s ﬁltering tool, for 
robustness (will the option make sense given a range of future scenario options), attractiveness 
(will the option make money), aspiration (does the option ﬁt leadership ideals) and pragmatism 
(does the company have the wherewithal to actually execute the option).  (To calculate the 
average rating, the average for robustness is ﬁrst calculated and then the average for the four 
ﬁlters). 
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The following options were rated the most attractive and, following this exercise, a pre-feasibility 
study must be conducted for each option: 
• Consolidate raw material;
• Product beneﬁciation;
• Downstream integration;
• Medium-sized new machine; and
• Super-sized new machine.
Viable options must be depicted on a strategic map to facilitate lobbying, communication 
and alignment prior to Board presentation.  Once a decision has been made by the Board, a 
detailed business plan must be developed to implement the chosen option.
4.6  Summary
Our paper products manufacturer has reached a critical stage in its development, where old 
technology will not be viable in the near future and will have to be replaced. The strategic 
framework was used to develop alternatives and then a ﬁltering tool was applied to establish 
the most viable alternatives for further analysis. Through this process the company realised 
that the consolidation of their raw material supply (probably in an upstream joint business 
venture), new product development and some downstream beneﬁciation would be the most 
important strategic themes to consider and would be the most important drivers when 
considering investment in new equipment.
CHAPTER 17
ADDITIONAL CASE STUDIES
1. RADAR – THE FIRST DECADE
This story begins, paradoxically, on the same day in 1935 that Adolf Hitler and Herman Goering 
secretly laid plans to establish the Luftwaffe and started a programme that would enable them 
to take any country and all countries in Europe – from the air. On that same day in the English 
countryside Watts and Watson tested their theory that radar could pick up objects over a 
distance in the air.
Watts and Watson originally tried to develop “death rays”, a ray that was believed to have an 
ability to kill armies over large distances. The British believed that the Germans were working 
on such an invention and a prize of a 1000 pounds was offered to anybody that could kill a 
sheep over a distance of 100 feet with a ray. This proved impossible, but during their research 
Watts and Watson stumbled on radar.
Their invention was quickly acknowledged for its worth and by 1938 the whole of the British 
eastern and southern seaboard was dotted with radar aerials, completely covering the 
coastline. Great secrecy surrounded the technology.
The Germans launched an intelligence surveillance operation in 1938 and ﬂew up and down 
the English coast with a Zeppelin, believing that the masts must be some form of surveillance 
equipment. Unfortunately, in what was probably the costliest mistake the Germans ever made, 
their tracking radio was tuned to the wrong frequency and all they could hear and comprehend 
was gibberish. They ﬁnally gave up the tracking operation.
During the battle of Britain German planes outnumbered British by 5 to 1. The British relied 
heavily on the radar to make their force appear bigger, i.e. always appearing where the enemy 
was striking, something that bafﬂed the Germans right through the battle of Britain. Goering 
was advised of the possibility of radar technology, but reportedly said that battles were won 
by “bombers not aerials”. Goering was ﬁnally persuaded to attack the aerials and one single 
attack was launched, only partially damaging one aerial. Unbelievably no further attacks on 
radar installations, which were quite vulnerable, were launched. The Germans preferred civilian 
targets to attacking the radar masts, which were in open country and seemed unimportant.
The British remarked after these events: “For a while it felt as if Britain is not an island anymore 
– with the invention of radar we became an island again” (popular parlance).
Churchill was eager to share his invention with the Americans, against the advice of some 
of his generals and did so immediately after the Battle of Britain. Churchill knew that the 
Americans would have the scientiﬁc depth and resources to take the invention further, which 
they did.
Amazingly, on the morning of 7 December 1941 the incoming bombers of the Japanese attack 
force were spotted on radar, but the American watch ofﬁcer thought it was a friendly bomber 
squadron that he believed was expected. He didn’t bother to check this information. As a result 
the American ﬂeet (excluding submarines and aircraft carriers) were destroyed.
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The Americans hastily invested heavily in radar, and by the end of the war one million sets were 
in use. Radar progressed from being a defensive mechanism to an offensive weapons system 
in the hands of the Americans, giving them air superiority in submarine and carrier operations. 
The atomic bombs of 1945 were ﬁtted with a range of offensive radar systems on each bomb 
that allowed the bombs to explode at exactly the right altitude to cause maximum damage.
By the end of the war the Americans said, “The atomic bomb ended the war, but radar won it” 
(popular parlance). 
Questions
1. What was the English strategic objective?
2. What was the English tactical objective?
3. What was the English operational objective?
2. THE SPANISH ARMADA
In 1558 Spain was at the height of her growth and recognised as the most powerful country 
in the world. The Philippines were conquered in 1556 (named after Phillip II, the king of Spain 
at the time) and Phillip was poised to fulﬁl his goal of bringing Catholicism to every corner of 
the globe. This overriding ambition caused him to marry Mary Tudor (beyond child-bearing age 
and regarded by many as an unsuitable bride) in order to protect the faith in England and keep 
close watch on the Dutch, who were constantly striving to free themselves from Spanish rule. 
He started the modernisation of the English ﬂeet and the ﬁrst new ship was named by Queen 
Mary – The Phillip and Mary.
When Mary died and was succeeded by her sister Elizabeth, a Protestant, Phillip’s fortunes in 
terms of England changed. He proposed to her, reluctantly – in order to save Catholicism and 
the alliance, but Elizabeth rejected him. Phillip and Elizabeth lived in reasonable harmony for 
a decade, but her two “semi-pirate” sea captains, Hawkins and Drake, raised the stakes by 
plying a slave trade route between Africa and the Caribbean, where Phillip’s ﬂeet eventually 
attacked them. In the rising tension that followed, Pope Pius excommunicated Elizabeth and 
an invasion plot was hatched by the Vatican and Spain. Elizabeth promptly learnt about the 
plot, began to actively support the Dutch in their ﬁght against Spain and turned her “semi-
pirates” loose to plunder Spanish shipping and ports in the Caribbean. When Phillip’s ﬂeet 
hunted Drake down he escaped by circumnavigating the globe and lay the foundation for the 
emerging empire’s global expansion. When Drake ﬁnally got back to England he started to 
attack and plunder Spanish ports.
Phillip ﬁnally had no option, according to him, but to attack England. His advisers provided him 
with two strategies:
• Sail to England with a massive ﬂeet and conquer it; and
• Dispatch the army in Flanders (led by the Duke of Parma) to conquer England.
Phillip, unadvisedly, joins the two plans together and decides that a massive ﬂeet will sail up 
the channel, pick up the army in Flanders and attack England. When asked what he will do if 
bad weather strikes, he reportedly said: “God will provide good weather.” (popular parlance).
Once again the plan leaked out immediately, but Elizabeth merely accelerated her ship 
renewal programme, started by Phillip. She arranged for the further design and building of 
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attack ships, faster and more deadly than troop carriers (which Phillip would have to 
use in an invasion.) In 1587 Elizabeth felt she was not quite ready yet, so she ordered 
a proactive strike, which Drake carried out in Cadiz, causing enough damage to set the 
Spanish plans back a year.
The leader of the Spanish Armada (as the attacking ﬂeet became known) died that year 
and Phillip’s money was running out. He ﬁnally appointed the Duke of Medina Sidonia and 
instructed him to attack forthwith. The Duke tried to get out of the assignment, because, 
incredibly, he was not informed of any of the developments up to then, he had no personal 
funds to sustain the venture and he was not a skilled mariner. Phillip’s aides override 
Medina’s concerns and he is forced to lead the venture.
Being a good organiser, the Duke got going in six weeks with 19 000 soldiers, 7 000 
sailors, 1 000 adventurers, 130 ships and 180 clerics. Unfortunately, in order to get 
going quickly, quality was surrendered for the sake of quantity. The ships included 
many converted merchant ships of different types, many different canons with different 
ammunition sizes and calibres.
Facing them were 80 ships of Elizabeth’s navy, under the charge of the Lord Admiral, 
Howard of Efﬁngham, assisted by notable subordinates such as Francis Drake and Martin 
Frobisher.
Phillip entrusted the Armada with a holy charge – which included no blasphemy, no sodomy 
and no women aboard. When a storm hit them soon after sailing, Medina questioned 
Phillip about whether “God was really with us”, which made Phillip angry.
When Medina Sidonia arrived close to Plymouth, Drake wasn’t completely ready and out 
to sea yet (although folklore suggests he was playing bowls and reportedly claimed he had 
enough time to ﬁnish the game and take the Armada.). The wind was on the Armada’s 
side and Medina’s advisors urged him to attack and destroy Drake in Plymouth harbour. 
This was, however, contrary to the original plan to pick up Parma’s army, and Medina 
Sidonia refused and kept on sailing. During the night Drake organised row boats to haul 
his ﬂeet around the Armada and suddenly he was in the right position, upwind (in the 
weather gauge).
The Spanish promptly formed an impressive battle formation, but the English refused 
to take them on directly. Instead they picked off the ships one by one, on the fringes, in 
hit-and-run episodes with their faster ships and more effective canon. They also captured 
a ship early on in the battle and gleaned all the information that they could from the 
captain.
In the meantime communication between Medina and Parma became difﬁcult, in fact 
non-existent, which caused Medina to sail to Calais to wait for clariﬁcation. Historians 
believe that he could have attacked England, with success, at this stage, but once again 
Medina tried to stick to the original plan. Whilst in Calais harbour the English got upwind 
again, attacked with ﬁre ships (8 burning ships that were cut loose and ﬂoated towards 
the Spanish ﬂeet) during the night and so scatter the Armada into the North sea. When 
Medina tried to regroup, his ﬂeet refused, even after he hanged one of the captains. His 
remaining ﬁve ships in Calais faced the English bravely, but ultimately they were lost in 
the ﬁerce battle.
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The remaining ships try to make it around Scotland to Spain, and eventually only eight make it 
back. Historians have for many years speculated about the Armada’s failures. The discovery of 
wreck sites in the last four decades showed that the ships were often supplied with different 
canon sizes, even on the same ship, used a confusing array of different canon-ball sizes and 
often had the wrong size of canon ball on board. They were also often outﬁtted with unwieldy 
land carriages for the canon, which made the canon difﬁcult to reload.
Questions
1. Why did the Armada fail?
2. What was Phillip’s strategic objective?
3. What strategic mistakes were made?
4. What was the tactical objective?
5. What tactical mistakes were made?
3. THE RACE FOR THE SOUTH POLE
(Source: Flynn, 2004)
3.1 Different agendas
In 1911 Captain Robert Falcon Scott and Captain Roald Amundsen set off from their respective 
base camps on the Antarctic coast, each trying to reach the South Pole ﬁrst. Amundsen reached 
it on 15 December 1911 (the date is sometimes given as 14 December - the difference being 
due to differing interpretations of the international date line) and returned to civilisation within 
three months. Scott and his four men arrived at the Pole 33 days later, on 17 January 1912, 
and faced an agonising struggle to get back to base camp. They all perished. Exactly why 
Amundsen’s team completed the return journey with comparative ease and Scott’s party died 
has been the source of ﬁerce debate ever since.
Despite Scott and Amundsen’s shared aim to reach the Pole ﬁrst, they differed in how they 
organised their expeditions. From the type of men they chose to the food and equipment they 
took, the differences were marked. In the extreme and hostile conditions of the Antarctic, 
getting the smallest details right or wrong could mean the difference between life and death.
To begin with, Scott’s agenda was more diverse. He planned to continue his vast programme 
of scientiﬁc work, following on from the tasks undertaken on his Discovery expedition (1901-
1904), as well as wanting to reach the Pole. Amundsen, on the other hand, did not even take 
any scientists and had relatively limited interest in major scientiﬁc achievement. His childhood 
desire was to be the ﬁrst man at the North Pole, but when it was claimed in 1909, he was 
determined to be the ﬁrst at the South Pole instead. He wrote in his journal: “...my plans made 
the Pole the ﬁrst objective.”
This competitive focus enabled Amundsen to spend all his energy and funds on the journey 
south.
Scott and Amundsen represented two very different nations and this inevitably inﬂuenced 
how their expeditions were organised, as well as their expectations of achievement. Scott 
was appointed to lead two ofﬁcial British expeditions to the Antarctic and always planned his 
voyages in the gaze of an inquisitive media. Due to Britain’s world standing, it was naturally 
assumed that an Englishman would reach the Pole ﬁrst.
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In contrast, Norway was a relatively new nation in Amundsen’s day, having only achieved its 
independence from Sweden in 1905. Amundsen was taking a massive gamble in his quest 
to reach the Pole ﬁrst. One of the reasons why he planned his Antarctic expedition secretly 
was because Norway needed diplomatic support from Britain. He saw the political sensitivity 
in pitching himself against the English explorer and feared people would try to stop him if he 
made his plans public. Pride and an independent nature also contributed to Amundsen’s 
pretence, while he was continuing with his plans to journey to the Arctic.
3.2 Camp conﬂicts
Scott’s Terra Nova expedition was large compared to Amundsen’s hand-picked party. Over 
60 men manned the British ship and 25 men comprised the shore party, who would winter 
at base camp. Amundsen picked 19 men for his Fram expedition but only nine wintered at 
Framheim (meaning ‘home of the Fram’), the hut they built on the ice shelf. Scott had yet to 
pick his Polar team from the shore party and, in fact, did not settle the matter until he was 
about 240 km (150 miles) from the Pole. 
Amundsen planned for eight of the men to go to the Pole, with the Swedish cook, Adolf Lindstrøm, 
remaining at Framheim. The only man he feared in his party was Hjalmar Johansen, a famous 
Arctic explorer in his own right. When Amundsen set off too early in September 1911, the 
party was forced to return to the hut, and Johansen was appalled at the disarray and publicly 
chastised Amundsen. He was dropped with two others from the polar party - Amundsen would 
not tolerate people who criticised his leadership. In contrast, Scott included Captain Oates in 
his Polar party (as a representative of the army), despite the fact that the two men clashed. In 
letters home to his mother, Oates was candid in his criticism of Scott and this conﬂict was yet 
another strain on Scott’s leadership.
Regarding the equipment they planned to use, Amundsen’s men were used to cold climates. 
As a nation Norway pioneered skiing and Amundsen deliberately included a skiing champion, 
Olav Bjaaland, in his party. The British party was not so skilled at skiing and had little experience 
of how to adapt skis to different kinds of terrain. In the ﬁnal push to the Pole, one of Scott’s 
men, Birdie Bowers, even left his skis behind at one of the depots, forcing him to stumble 
through the snow. 
Meanwhile, Amundsen and his men had spent time working out what type of skis and bindings 
to use for the variety of terrain and snow they would face. The Norwegians also spent time 
at base camp re-building their boots to prevent crippling blisters. Unlike the British party, the 
Norwegians took wolf-skin fur suits, adapted from Inuit clothing, in addition to the windproof 
Burberry suits they wore, made of a lighter gabardine material. Amundsen had also learnt 
from the Inuit that in order to reduce sweating, clothing must be worn loosely.
3.3 The devil’s in the detail
One of the small details that later appeared to have contributed to the demise of Scott’s team 
was the use of leather washers for his expedition’s fuel cans. On his return from the Pole, 
having learned that Amundsen had got there before him, Scott noted in his diary that when 
his men opened the cans some of the fuel had apparently evaporated. This was caused by 
the deterioration of the washers used to seal the cans in the extreme temperatures, allowing 
the fuel to ‘creep’. 
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Amundsen knew of this ‘creeping’ in low temperatures, and one of his team devised bungs 
that hermetically sealed the cans, to prevent any loss of the life-giving fuel. By the time, later 
in their voyage, that Scott, Wilson and Bowers were conﬁned to their tent, they had run out 
of fuel, which was of course needed for turning ice into water for drinking. Dehydration is as 
much a problem in Antarctica as starvation.
In terms of transportation, Scott always planned to man-haul using harnesses attached to 
sledges. This was exhausting work, but he believed it was more noble and less cruel than 
using animals. Amundsen had experienced man-hauling sledges in the Arctic and did not want 
to repeat this experience. He took well-trained dogs, bought specially in Greenland, and two 
expert dog-handlers, Sverre Hassel and Helmer Hanssen. The dog teams set the pace for the 
journey to the Pole and every detail was seen to, from making sure traces were comfortable 
to feeding the dogs properly. Dogs that weakened or became disobedient were killed or set 
free.
The dogs were also part of the Norwegian’s meal plan and at Butcher’s Camp, about half way to 
the Pole, enough dogs were killed to feed the hungry men and the rest of the dogs. Amundsen 
and his men were sickened by such butchery, but they knew it was key to survival. The British 
party never ate their dogs but they did eat the ponies, burying some of the carcasses in the 
snow for their return journey.
3.4 Nutrition
Lack of good nutrition has been seen by some historians as being the main reason for the 
British party’s eventual failure. Before setting off for the Pole, the British team probably already 
had nutritional deﬁciencies. Scurvy, caused by a lack of vitamin C, was an illness long known to 
sailors. This painful debilitating condition is always fatal if left untreated. Even though vitamins 
had not been identiﬁed in the 1910s, it was known that fresh food appeared to be the cure. 
Amundsen and his men were eating fresh seal and penguin meat which, unknown to anyone 
at that time, contained enough vitamin C to prevent scurvy. The Norwegians, of course, had 
got this idea from indigenous peoples in the Arctic who ate an almost exclusively meat diet. 
The British palate preferred a less ﬁshy taste and their penguin and seal meat was often 
overcooked, destroying the vitamin C.
Another difference between the two teams was the ﬂour used for ‘sledging’ biscuits, a 
staple part of any explorer’s diet. The British biscuits were made with white ﬂour and sodium 
bicarbonate. The Norwegian biscuits were made with oatmeal and yeast, which provided the 
essential B vitamins needed to keep the nervous system healthy. Pemmican, a cake made by 
mixing pounded dried beef with beef fat, was also eaten every day. Although it was nutritious 
and compact, it was unappetising. On sledging journeys, pemmican was mixed with melted 
snow to make a hot stew or ‘hoosh’. Scott’s pemmican lacked the oatmeal and peas of 
Amundsen’s recipe, depriving his men of essential roughage. 
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3.5 Leadership
Ultimately, the main difference between the Norwegian and British parties was leadership. 
Scott was a complex, sensitive and introspective man with considerable literary skills and 
charm. His concept of leadership was honed by his training as an English naval ofﬁcer, which 
was inevitably hierarchical and formal. However, had his training been less conventional, he 
would not have been chosen by Sir Clements Markham (President of the Royal Geographical 
Society) nor the ‘ofﬁcial’ committee men who appointed him.
Conversely, Amundsen was more of an innovative individualist - a professional explorer with a 
genuine passion for snow and ice. He was also complex, particularly in his tangled relationships, 
but his competitive focus and drive were unparalleled. They never met, despite Scott’s attempt 
to make contact with Amundsen when he visited Christiania (modern-day Oslo) in 1910. 
Scott’s death, in the context of the mass-scale slaughter of World War One soon afterwards, 
put him beyond immediate criticism. Questioning his status as a ‘hero’ came later. By contrast, 
despite winning the race to the Pole, Amundsen had to live, embittered and insolvent, with 
anti-climax for the rest of his life - his victory at the South Pole very much eclipsed by the British 
tragedy.
Questions
1. Why did Scott fail?
2. What was Scott’s strategic objective?
3. What was Amundsen’s strategic objective?
4. How do Scott’s and Amundsen’s leadership styles differ?
5. What were the differences in culture?
6. What were the differences in recruitment approaches between the two?
7. What were the differences in emotional and process readiness?
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